# OT AIops

> Governed OT data tap + diagnostics: OPC-UA/Modbus/S7/MC/MTConnect/MQTT-Sparkplug.

- **Type:** MCP server
- **Install:** `agentstack add mcp-aiops-tools-ot-aiops`
- **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior
- **Seller:** [AIops-tools](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/aiops-tools)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Integrations](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/integrations)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.1
- **License:** MIT
- **Upstream author:** [AIops-tools](https://github.com/AIops-tools)
- **Source:** https://github.com/AIops-tools/OT-AIops

## Install

```sh
agentstack add mcp-aiops-tools-ot-aiops
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# OT-AIops

**Governed, vendor-neutral industrial data tap + intelligent troubleshooting for AI agents — across OPC-UA (incl. Historical Access), Modbus-TCP, S7comm, Mitsubishi MC, MTConnect, MQTT/Sparkplug B (full decode), EtherNet/IP (Rockwell/Allen-Bradley Logix), and EtherCAT (pysoem/SOEM fieldbus master) — plus OEE/downtime, active asset-inventory, and change-of-value analytics.**

OT-AIops is the OT/industrial member of [AIops-tools](https://github.com/AIops-tools). It is a **factory-level, vendor-neutral, governed data tap** that lets an AI agent safely *read* industrial control systems across many field protocols, plus a **cross-protocol intelligence layer** that localizes "no data" breaks, analyzes alarm floods (ISA-18.2), ranks unhealthy tags, computes OEE / categorizes downtime, and builds an active asset register. Read-first by design; the few write/command paths are OT-dangerous and gated by MOC discipline. Every tool runs through a vendored governance harness (audit / budget / risk-tier / undo).

> ⚠️ **Preview / v0.3.0** — validated against an **in-process OPC-UA simulator (incl. HDA), mocked Modbus/S7/Mitsubishi/EtherNet-IP(pycomm3)/EtherCAT(pysoem) clients, static MTConnect XML fixtures, and synthetic MQTT/Sparkplug B protobuf payloads**. **NOT tested against live PLCs / SCADA / brokers / Logix controllers / EtherCAT slaves.** EtherCAT is hard-real-time and has **no software simulator** (Linux + root + a real bus only), so it is **entirely unverified against hardware**. See *Safety*.

## Why

OT is exactly where you want an agent on a tight leash: read first, never blind-write. OT-AIops is the **safe, neutral read wedge** — one package, one MCP server, many protocols — with governance and an intelligence layer that turns raw reads into actionable diagnoses.

---

## Consolidated capability matrix

| Protocol | Tool | Operation | R/W | risk_tier | Returns (key fields) |
|----------|------|-----------|:---:|:---------:|----------------------|
| OPC-UA | `opcua_server_info` | server status | R | low | state, product_name, namespaces |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_browse` | browse node tree | R | low | [{node_id, browse_name, depth}] |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_node` | read one node | R | low | value, datatype, source_timestamp, good |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_many` | batch read | R | low | [{node_id, value, ...}] |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_subscribe_sample` | bounded sample | R | low | {collected, samples[]} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_alarms` | alarm surfacing | R | low | {active_alarms[], active_count} |
| OPC-UA | `opcua_read_history` | Historical Access (HDA) | R | low | {supported, count, values[]} |
| OPC-UA | `health_summary` | threshold classify | R | low | {overall, counts, offenders[]} |
| OPC-UA | `anomaly_scan` | stddev outliers | R | low | {mean, stddev, outliers[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_holding` | FC03 | R | low | {raw_registers, decoded[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_input` | FC04 | R | low | {raw_registers, decoded[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_coils` | FC01 | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_read_discrete` | FC02 | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Modbus | `modbus_health_summary` | threshold classify | R | low | {overall, counts, offenders[]} |
| S7comm | `s7_cpu_info` | CPU id + run/stop | R | low | {cpu_status, cpu_info} |
| S7comm | `s7_read_area` | read DB/M/I/Q | R | low | {items:[{address, value}]} |
| S7comm | `s7_read_db` | read data block | R | low | {items:[{address, value}]} |
| S7comm | `s7_read_many` | batch addresses | R | low | {items:[{address, value}]} |
| S7comm | `s7_write_db` | write data block | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_cpu_status` | CPU type | R | low | {cpu_type, cpu_code} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_read_words` | word devices | R | low | {words[]} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_read_bits` | bit devices | R | low | {bits[]} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_read_many` | random read | R | low | {words[], dwords[]} |
| Mitsubishi MC | `mc_write_words` | write words | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_probe` | device model | R | low | {devices:[{components:[{data_items}]}]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_current` | latest values | R | low | {observations[]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_sample` | bounded stream | R | low | {observations[]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_assets` | assets | R | low | {assets[]} |
| MTConnect | `mtconnect_oee_snapshot` | OEE inputs | R | low | {availability, execution, verdict} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `mqtt_read_topic` | bounded read | R | low | {messages:[{topic, payload}]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_subscribe_sample` | bounded SpB sample (full decode) | R | low | {samples:[{sparkplug, payload:{metrics[]}}], seq_gap_count} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_decode_payload` | decode raw SpB payload | R | low | {metrics:[{name, alias, datatype, value, is_historical}]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `sparkplug_node_list` | node discovery + state | R | low | {nodes:[{group_id, edge_node_id, online, devices}], primary_hosts[]} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `uns_browse` | topic-tree browse | R | low | {topics[], tree{}} |
| MQTT/Sparkplug | `mqtt_publish` | publish/command | **W** | **high/MOC** | {published_bytes, applied} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_controller_info` | Logix controller id | R | low | {controller:{vendor, product_name, revision, serial}} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_list_tags` | tag discovery | R | low | {tag_count, tags:[{name, data_type, structure}]} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_read_tag` | read one tag/array | R | low | {tag, value, type, good} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_read_many` | batch read | R | low | {items:[{tag, value, type}]} |
| EtherNet/IP | `eip_write_tag` | write tag | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, _undo_id} |
| Diagnostics | `diagnose_dataflow` | localize no-data | R | low | {verdict, diagnosis, hops[]} |
| Diagnostics | `alarm_bad_actors` | ISA-18.2 flood | R | low | {flood_verdict, top_offenders[]} |
| Diagnostics | `tag_health` | offender ranking | R | low | {overall, offenders[]} |
| Diagnostics | `historian_health` | gap/flatline | R | low | {verdict, gaps[]} |
| Analytics | `oee_compute` | OEE = A×P×Q | R | low | {availability, performance, quality, oee, oee_pct} |
| Analytics | `downtime_events` | stoppage detect + categorize | R | low | {event_count, total_downtime_s, by_category, events[]} |
| Analytics | `oee_multidim` | OEE machine×part×shift | R | low | {matrix[], worst_performers[], mean_oee} |
| Analytics | `asset_inventory` | active fingerprint | R | low | {assets:[{protocol, vendor, model, firmware, reachable}]} |
| Analytics | `monitor_changes` | bounded change-of-value | R | low | {change_count, changes:[{value, previous, wall_clock}]} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_master_state` | master/WKC + slave count | R | low | {master_state, expected_working_counter, slaves_found, slaves_expected} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_slaves` | bus scan | R | low | {slave_count, slaves:[{index, name, vendor_id, product_code, state}]} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_slave_info` | slave detail | R | low | {sync_managers[], fmmus[], object_dictionary[], input_bytes} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_read_sdo` | CoE SDO upload | R | low | {index, byte_length, hex, as_uint} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_read_pdo` | input PDO snapshot | R | low | {working_counter, input_hex, input_byte_length} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_write_sdo` | CoE SDO download | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, written, applied} |
| EtherCAT | `ethercat_set_state` | AL-state transition | **W** | **high/MOC** | {before, requested, reached, applied} |
| Self | `protocols_supported` | capability map | R | low | {protocols[], diagnostics[], analytics[]} |

**57 tools** = 51 read + 6 write (MOC). The 51 reads = 41 protocol-read · 4 diagnostics · 5 analytics · 1 self. Run `protocols_supported()` (or `ot-aiops protocols`) for the live map.

---

## Per-protocol reference

### OPC-UA
- **Versions/variants**: binary `opc.tcp://` via `asyncua` (sync facade). Security: **anonymous + username/password**. Certificate message security (Sign / SignAndEncrypt) = **roadmap, not validated**.
- **Connection params**: `endpoint_url`, `username` (password encrypted), `security_mode`, `security_policy`.
- **Not supported / planned**: cert security; real Alarms & Conditions event subscriptions (alarms are surfaced best-effort by browsing alarm-like boolean nodes).

### Modbus-TCP
- **Versions/variants**: Modbus-TCP via `pymodbus`. Read function codes **FC01 (coils), FC02 (discrete), FC03 (holding), FC04 (input)**. Write FCs (**FC05/06/15/16**) = **not implemented** (read-only preview).
- **Connection params**: `host`, `port` (502), `unit_id`. Registers are untyped 16-bit words → `decode` hint (uint16/int16/uint32/int32/float32/raw); **big-endian** word order.
- **Coverage**: many domestic 国产 PLCs (汇川 Inovance / 信捷 Xinje / 和利时 Hollysys / 台达 Delta) and any Modbus-TCP vendor.

### S7comm (Siemens + 仿西门子 国产)
- **Versions/variants**: `pyS7` (**pure-Python**, ISO-on-TCP / RFC1006 — no native `libsnap7`). **S7-300/400/1200/1500** and compatible clones. Memory areas **DB / M (merker) / I / Q**. No protocol auth (CPU gates via "Permit access with PUT/GET").
- **Connection params**: `host`, `port` (102), `rack`, `slot` (0/1 for 1200/1500; 0/2 common for 300/400).
- **Write**: `s7_write_db` = **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default**, captures BEFORE value + undo.
- **Not supported / planned**: optimized/symbolic DB access on 1500 with "optimized block access" can require absolute-addressing config on the CPU.

### Mitsubishi MC
- **Versions/variants**: `pymcprotocol` — **MC 3E frame (binary)** only. **1E / 4E frames = not supported.** PLC types **Q / L / QnA / iQ-R / iQ-L**. Devices: D/W/R (word), M/X/Y/B (bit).
- **Connection params**: `host`, `port` (5007 default; set to the module's open MC port), `plctype`.
- **Write**: `mc_write_words` = **high/MOC/dry-run default**, captures BEFORE + undo.

### MTConnect (ALL CNC machine tools)
- **Versions/variants**: agent **REST + XML** (`requests` + `xml.etree`), namespace-agnostic (parses MTConnect 1.x Devices/Streams/Assets schemas). Endpoints: `/probe`, `/current`, `/sample`, `/assets`. **Read-only by specification.** XML parsing is hardened (DTD/entity declarations rejected — XXE/billion-laughs defense).
- **Connection params**: `agent_url` (e.g. `http://host:5000`).
- **Not supported / planned**: MTConnect streaming (long-poll `interval=`); only bounded `count=` samples.

### MQTT / Sparkplug B / UNS
- **Versions/variants**: `paho-mqtt` — **MQTT 3.1.1 & 5**. Sparkplug B topic convention `spBv1.0/{group}/{type}/{edge}/[device]` (NBIRTH/DBIRTH/NDATA/DDATA/NDEATH/DDEATH/STATE). TLS + username/password supported.
- **Full Sparkplug B decode** (no optional extra): payloads are protobuf-decoded with a *vendored, byte-for-byte* copy of the official **Eclipse Tahu** `sparkplug_b.proto` generated module (depends only on `protobuf`). Per metric you get **name, alias** (resolved to its name via the BIRTH model), **datatype** (Int8…Int64/UInt…/Float/Double/Boolean/String/DateTime/Text/UUID/**DataSet**/Bytes/File/**Template**/PropertySet…), **value**, **timestamp**, and the **`is_historical` / `is_null`** flags. A **birth/death + seq model** tracks node/device **online** state (NBIRTH/DBIRTH ↔ NDEATH/DDEATH), builds the alias→name map from BIRTH, applies NDATA/DDATA by alias, and flags **`seq` gaps / out-of-order**. **Primary-host** awareness: `STATE/` topics surface in `sparkplug_node_list`. `sparkplug_decode_payload` decodes a single raw payload (base64/hex) offline.
- **Connection params**: `host`/`broker`, `port` (1883 / 8883 TLS), `topic`, `use_tls`, `username` (password encrypted).
- **Command**: `mqtt_publish` = **high/MOC/dry-run default**; a published command has **no automatic inverse**.

### EtherNet/IP (Rockwell / Allen-Bradley)
- **Supported**: **ControlLogix / CompactLogix** (and GuardLogix) via **CIP / EtherNet-IP** using **`pycomm3`** (pure-Python — no native deps). **Tag-based**, symbolic access: read/write tags by name (`Conveyor.Speed`, `Array[3]`, `Program:Main.X`) and **discover the controller's tag list** at runtime (`eip_list_tags`, the headline feature). `eip_controller_info` reads the controller identity.
- **Connection params**: `host`, `slot` (0 for CompactLogix; the CPU slot for a ControlLogix chassis), `port` (44818). `protocol: ethernetip` (alias `eip`).
- **Write**: `eip_write_tag` = **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run default**, captures BEFORE value + undo.
- **Not supported / planned**: **PLC-5 / SLC-500 (PCCC)** and **Micro800** are **not supported = roadmap** (Logix tag model only).

### EtherCAT (pysoem / SOEM fieldbus master)
- **Supported**: a **real EtherCAT master** via **`pysoem`** (the Python binding for the SOEM C stack). **CoE SDO read** (`ethercat_read_sdo`, acyclic mailbox upload) + **SDO write** (`ethercat_write_sdo`, download), **input PDO read** (`ethercat_read_pdo`, one bounded cyclic snapshot), **bus scan / slave enumeration** (`ethercat_slaves`, `ethercat_slave_info` — identity, SM/FMMU mapping, object-dictionary summary), **master/working-counter state** (`ethercat_master_state`), and **AL-state transitions** INIT↔PREOP↔SAFEOP↔OP (`ethercat_set_state`).
- **HARD REQUIREMENTS** (no way around them): **Linux**, **root or `CAP_NET_RAW`**, a **dedicated NIC** cabled to the bus, and **real EtherCAT slave hardware**. `pysoem` is an **OPTIONAL extra**: `pip install ot-aiops[ethercat]` — the base package installs and imports **without** it, and every EtherCAT tool then **degrades to a teaching error** (never crashes, never imports pysoem at module load).
- **NOT supported**: **no software simulator** exists (unlike OPC-UA / Modbus) — EtherCAT is **hardware-only** and **not testable in mock-only CI**; **macOS is unsupported**. **EoE / FoE / SoE** mailbox protocols and full PDO-mapping decode/expansion = **roadmap**.
- **Connection params**: `nic` (the dedicated interface name, e.g. `eth1`; alias `interface`), optional `expected_slaves` (a sanity check vs the bus scan). `protocol: ethercat`.
- **Operations matrix**:

  | Tool | Op | R/W | risk | Capture/notes |
  |------|----|:---:|:----:|---------------|
  | `ethercat_master_state` | master + WKC state, slave count | R | low | expected vs found |
  | `ethercat_slaves` | bus scan / enumerate | R | low | index/vendor/product/rev/addr/AL-state |
  | `ethercat_slave_info` | one-slave detail | R | low | SM/FMMU + OD summary |
  | `ethercat_read_sdo` | CoE SDO upload | R | low | hex + uint interpretation |
  | `ethercat_read_pdo` | input PDO snapshot | R | low | single cycle, never loops |
  | `ethercat_write_sdo` | CoE SDO download | **W** | **high/MOC** | before-value (SDO read-back) + undo |
  | `ethercat_set_state` | AL-state transition | **W** | **high/MOC** | before-state + undo; **can start/stop motion** |

- **Write/state safety**: `ethercat_write_sdo` (hex little-endian bytes) and `ethercat_set_state` are **high risk_tier, MOC, dry-run by default**, capture the BEFORE value/state for undo, and need a CLI double-confirm. **Changing EtherCAT state can START or STOP machine motion** — treat with extreme care. 未经授权勿对生产控制系统写入.

### OEE / downtime analytics (cross-protocol, read-only)
- `oee_compute` — **OEE = Availability × Performance × Quality** from production inputs (planned time, run time, ideal cycle, total/good counts). Each factor is reported **raw + clamped to [0,1]**; a `capped` performance >1.0 flags an optimistic ideal cycle.
- `downtime_events` — auto-detects **running→stopped transitions** in a `{timestamp, state}` series and produces stoppage events with durations, **categorized** (changeover / material / mechanical / quality / break / unknown, by keyword heuristics or a `{state: category}` override).
- `oee_multidim` — aggregates OEE across **machine × part × shift** (or any dimensions) from labelled records → the matrix + worst performers.
- Operate over **provided/collected inputs** (fully testable without a plant). `mtconnect_oee_snapsho

…

## Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [AIops-tools](https://github.com/AIops-tools)
- **Source:** [AIops-tools/OT-AIops](https://github.com/AIops-tools/OT-AIops)
- **License:** MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Versions

- **0.1.1** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/mcp-aiops-tools-ot-aiops
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/aiops-tools
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

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