# Hunch Mcp

> Drive your Mac focus-free over MCP: OS APIs, AppleScript, CDP, and Accessibility

- **Type:** MCP server
- **Install:** `agentstack add mcp-prithviseran-hunch-mcp`
- **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior
- **Seller:** [PrithviSeran](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/prithviseran)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Integrations](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/integrations)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Upstream author:** [PrithviSeran](https://github.com/PrithviSeran)
- **Source:** https://github.com/PrithviSeran/hunch-mcp
- **Website:** https://www.tryhunch.ca

## Install

```sh
agentstack add mcp-prithviseran-hunch-mcp
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# Hunch

**Drive your Mac with any LLM: focus-free, in the background, over [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io).**

Hunch is an MCP server that gives an LLM agent hands on *your* Mac: your installed apps, your
logged-in sessions, your files, without taking over your screen. While you keep working in the
foreground, an agent can read a background app's UI, click its buttons, drive Mail or Music by
AppleScript, fill a web form, or move files. It works on real native apps, not just a browser.

> **Works best with modern LLMs.** Hunch ships a detailed playbook as MCP server instructions;
> capable tool-using models (Claude Sonnet/Opus-class and up) follow it well. Smaller models may
> pick clumsier paths (screenshots and keystrokes instead of tree reads and clicks).

## The four layers

Hunch always prefers the most direct layer. It's faster, more reliable, and (except the last)
never touches your screen:

| Layer | Tools | What it's for |
|---|---|---|
| **OS-API** | `trash` `file_op` `open_file` `clipboard_*` `launch_app` … | files, clipboard, app lifecycle, via direct API calls |
| **AppleScript** | `applescript` | scriptable apps: Mail, Messages, Notes, Calendar, Music, Finder, Safari … |
| **Web / CDP** | `web_open` `web_snapshot` `web_act` `web_login` … | any browser page or Electron app, driven in the background |
| **Accessibility** | `snapshot` `act` | any native app's UI: read the tree, click/select/type by reference |

A gated last resort (`screenshot` + coordinate clicks/keystrokes) exists for apps whose
accessibility tree is truly empty. It steals focus, so it asks you first.

## How it works (no server, no cloud)

"MCP server" undersells how local this is. `hunch serve` is a plain Python process that your
MCP host (Claude Desktop, Cursor, …) spawns as a **child process** and talks to over
**JSON-RPC on stdin/stdout** (MCP's stdio transport). There is no HTTP endpoint, no port
Hunch listens on, no daemon, and no telemetry. When your host quits, Hunch is gone.

The tools are direct macOS API calls in-process: the Accessibility framework via pyobjc,
`osascript` for AppleScript, OS APIs for files/clipboard, and, for the web layer, a local
WebSocket to Chrome's DevTools port on `127.0.0.1`. The only thing that ever touches the
network is Chrome itself, doing ordinary browsing. What the model sees is whatever the tools
return through your host; nothing else leaves the machine.

## Benchmarks

Hunch is measured against other macOS computer-use agents on a real, logged-in Mac in
[mac-agent-bench](https://github.com/PrithviSeran/mac-agent-bench) — *same brain, different hands*:
identical `claude -p` per task, only the MCP adapter differs. It scores task success with programmatic
checkers **and** disturbance: how much the agent hijacks your cursor and foreground while it works.

Across 5 complex multi-step tasks (n=3):

| Tool | Success | Cost | Disturbance (focus·cursor) | Timeouts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Hunch** | **15/15** | **$1.52** | **1·0** | **0** |
| [Peekaboo](https://github.com/steipete/Peekaboo) | 13/15 | $14.60 | 22·16 | 2 |
| [cua-driver](https://github.com/trycua/cua) | 15/15 | $17.70 | 22·0 | 0 |

Perfect reliability, ~10x cheaper, ~5–10x faster, and it essentially never touches your screen (`0`
cursor moves, `1` focus switch across 15 trials). Full methodology and per-task tables are in the
[benchmark repo](https://github.com/PrithviSeran/mac-agent-bench).

## Install

macOS 13+. From PyPI (the distribution is `hunch-sdk`; the import and CLI are `hunch`):

```
pipx install hunch-sdk          # or: pip install hunch-sdk
pip install 'hunch-sdk[agent]'  # + the optional LLM agent loop (both backends;
                                #   [api] or [subscription] picks just one)
```

Or via Homebrew — best if you don't manage Python environments; it bundles an isolated
Python at a stable path, which makes the macOS permission grants the most predictable:

```
brew install prithviseran/hunch/hunch
```

Then, one time:

```
hunch setup      # walk the macOS permission grants
hunch doctor     # verify every layer; fix anything it flags
hunch connect claude-desktop   # or: claude-code, cursor
```

Restart your MCP host and ask it to *"use hunch to …"*.

### The permissions, honestly

macOS trust attaches to the **app that runs the server**, meaning your MCP host (Claude Desktop,
Cursor, your terminal), not "hunch" itself. `hunch setup` walks you through it:

- **Accessibility** (required): lets Hunch read app UIs and click focus-free. Grant it to your MCP
  host app in System Settings → Privacy & Security → Accessibility.
- **Automation** (per-app, automatic): the first time Hunch scripts an app, macOS shows a one-time
  "allow control" prompt.
- **Screen Recording** (optional): only for the screenshot/vision fallback.

`hunch doctor` reports what's granted. Note: its Accessibility line reflects the *terminal* you ran
it from; the server inherits the *host's* grant.

## Python SDK (library use)

Hunch is also an importable library — the same focus-free primitives as the MCP tools, driven
deterministically from your own Python (a cron job, a test harness, your own agent loop), no LLM
required. The distribution is `hunch-sdk`; the import is `hunch`:

```python
from hunch import Hunch

mac = Hunch()                              # your machine, your logged-in apps
print(mac.snapshot("Mail"))                # accessibility tree, focus-free
mac.act([{"action": "click", "ref": "e12"}])
mac.web.open(url="https://github.com")     # real persistent Chrome profile over CDP
print(mac.web.snapshot())
mac.files.trash(["~/Downloads/old.zip"])   # reversible delete, no Finder
mac.applescript('tell application "Music" to play')
```

Constructor knobs: `app` (initial snapshot target), `confirm="dialog"|"off"` (see below),
`check_permissions` (Accessibility check up front), `simultaneous` (never touch the
foreground/cursor/keyboard), `cdp_port`.

- **Permissions**: for library use it's *whatever runs your script* — your terminal or IDE — that
  needs Accessibility (the MCP server instead uses the host app's grant). The constructor checks
  and raises `AccessibilityNotGranted` with instructions. `screenshot()` additionally needs
  Screen Recording.
- **Safety gates default ON**: the same one-click "Go ahead" dialogs and `~/.hunch/config.json`
  gates as the MCP server. `Hunch(confirm="off")` auto-approves for that instance only — for
  unattended scripts, with the same caveats as `auto_approve_all`.
- **Errors**: methods return status strings (check for `REFUSED`); the SDK raises only
  `ApprovalDenied` (user declined a dialog), `AccessibilityNotGranted`, `WebNotOpen`
  (`.web` before `.web.open()`), `StaleRef` (re-snapshot), and `HunchError` when a CDP
  browser can't be opened (`web.restart()` recovers a stale instance).
- **Credentials**: `mac.web.fill_login(service)` / `fill_secret(service, ref)` type Keychain
  values straight into the page and never return them; domain binding is enforced.
- **Coexistence**: the SDK and the MCP server share the CDP port (9337) and the persistent Hunch
  browser profile — whichever opened it first is reused, but `web.restart()`/`web.login()` kill
  whatever holds the port.

Runnable scripts live in [`examples/`](examples/).

## Agent loop (`mac.agent`)

The instance SDK gives you deterministic primitives. The **agent loop** puts an LLM in the driver's seat:
you hand it a task in plain English and Claude drives the Mac through those same primitives —
Scrapybara's `act()`, but on *your* machine with *your* logged-in apps. It's an optional extra
(keeps the base install free of the model SDKs):

```bash
pip install 'hunch-sdk[agent]'
python -c 'import hunch; hunch.login()'   # Claude subscription sign-in (browser OAuth) — no
                                          # API key. Already signed into Claude Code? Skip it.
```

```python
from hunch import Hunch

mac = Hunch()
result = mac.agent.run("reply to Sarah's latest email, but don't send it")
print(result.text)          # Claude's final summary
print(result.turns, result.usage)
```

### Signing in

Auth is an explicit, visible surface — nothing is scavenged silently. Two ways to run the loop:

| Backend | Sign in with | Cost |
|---|---|---|
| `subscription` | `hunch.login()` — the same browser OAuth Claude Code uses. Already signed into Claude Code on this Mac? You're done; Hunch reuses that. | your Claude plan (no per-token cost) |
| `api` | `export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...` | metered API tokens |

You choose the backend where it suits your code — at construction, or per call:

```python
mac = Hunch(agent_backend="subscription")            # this instance's agent = subscription
mac.agent.run(task)                                  # ...no per-call ceremony
mac.agent.run(other_task, backend="api")             # per-call override still wins
```

The default `backend="auto"` picks by credentials, in a fixed documented order (API key →
`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` env → Claude Code sign-in → `hunch.login(token=...)` token) — inspect
it any time with `hunch.auth.status()` or `hunch doctor`. With no credentials at all, `run()`
raises a `HunchError` naming both fixes — it never guesses.

Auth is **public Python API** (there is no login CLI — the MCP server never needs one, and your
app owns its own onboarding):

```python
import hunch

st = hunch.auth.status()           # AuthStatus: .source / .email / .plan / .subscription_ready
if not st.subscription_ready:
    hunch.login()                  # browser OAuth; or hunch.login(token="sk-ant-oat-...") headless
hunch.logout()                     # removes what login() stored, and only that
```

- **Watch it work** with an `on_event(kind, data)` callback — `kind` is one of `text` (Claude's
  reasoning), `tool` (`{name, input}`), `tool_result` (preview), `done` (final text), `error`.
- **Continuation**: follow-up `run()` calls keep the conversation (Claude still knows which email
  is Sarah's); `mac.agent.reset()` starts a fresh task.
- **Mix layers freely**: call `mac.snapshot(...)` / `mac.clipboard.get()` deterministically around
  `mac.agent.run(...)` — the thing a cloud sandbox can't do on your real machine.
- **Knobs**: `run(task, model=None, max_turns=40, effort=None, on_event=None,
  system_suffix="", backend=None)` — `model=None` means `claude-opus-4-8` on the api backend and
  your subscription's default model otherwise. `AgentResult` has `text`, `turns`, `stop_reason`,
  `usage`, `aborted`.
- **Safety**: the instance's gate config governs the loop. The default `confirm="dialog"` pops a
  real "Go ahead?" dialog before any focus-stealing or risky step — good when you're at the
  machine, but a gated action can stall an unattended run for the dialog's timeout. For cron jobs
  use `Hunch(confirm="off")` and accept the risk; Claude still asks *you* (via `notify_user`)
  before irreversible or outward actions like sending a message. A declined gate comes back to the
  model as a `REFUSED` result, so the loop adapts instead of crashing.
- **Cost**: on the subscription backend, runs draw on your Claude plan's usage limits — no
  per-token bill. On the api backend each turn resends the tree-heavy history; prompt caching is
  on by default, so cached input is ~10× cheaper — but long autonomous runs still add up.
  `max_turns` caps it either way.

Other models: the agent loop is Claude-only, but the instance-SDK primitives are provider-agnostic —
wire `mac.snapshot()` / `mac.act()` into your own OpenAI/Gemini/etc. agent loop as tools.

## Building an app on Hunch

The SDK is developer-first: **one uniform semantics, everything instance-owned, nothing ambient
unless you opt in.** The MCP server above is itself just the first app built on it — its
"personal" behavior (the `~/.hunch/config.json` policy, "Hunch"-branded dialogs, shared browser
profile) is nothing but constructor arguments.

```python
from hunch import Hunch, ConsentRequest, OAuthToken

mac = Hunch(
    app_id="com.acme.mailbot",          # pure namespacing — own Keychain slots, browser
                                        #   profile, and CDP port; never a behavior switch
    app_name="Acme Mailbot",            # what consent dialogs + notifications say
    confirm=my_consent_callback,        # ConsentRequest -> bool, rendered in YOUR UI
    notify=my_toast_handler,            # (message, title) -> your surface, not macOS banners
    policy={"gates": {"shell": True}},  # instance-owned safety; the user's personal
                                        #   config can never disarm your app
    auth=OAuthToken(token),             # exactly the credential YOUR app manages —
                                        #   or "none" to forbid ambient pickup entirely
)
```

What this buys you:

- **Coexistence** — two apps with different `app_id`s get disjoint Keychain services, credential
  stores, browser profiles, and CDP ports. They can't read each other's logins, log each other
  out, or kill each other's browser sessions. Structurally, not by convention.
- **Your brand, your UX** — every dialog, refusal, and notification says your `app_name`;
  `confirm=` and `notify=` route consent and alerts through your app instead of osascript
  dialogs and macOS banners. A broken consent callback fails **closed**.
- **Isolated safety posture** — the machine's `hunch config` (and `HUNCH_NO_INTERNAL_GATE`)
  govern only the personal MCP server, never your instance.
- **Explicit auth** — `hunch.ApiKey(...)` / `hunch.OAuthToken(...)` use exactly that credential
  (reprs are redacted); `auth="none"` guarantees your app never silently rides on the end
  user's own Claude sign-in.

Programmatic credential management uses the same namespacing: `hunch.creds.set_credential(name,
user, pw, namespace=your_app_id)` etc. A runnable walkthrough lives in
[`examples/embedded_app.py`](examples/embedded_app.py).

## Credentials: agents use them, never see them

```
hunch creds add github --domain github.com
hunch creds list
```

Values go straight into the **macOS Keychain**. An agent signs in by calling
`web_fill_login("github")` with only the service *name*; Hunch reads the secret from the Keychain
and types it into the page over CDP. The value never enters the model's context, its logs, or its
provider's servers.

**Domain binding**: a credential added with `--domain github.com` will only ever be typed into
`github.com` (and its subdomains). If a confused or prompt-injected agent lands on a look-alike
page, the fill is refused. Bind every credential; blank (any-site) exists only for compatibility.

No stored credential? Agents fall back to `web_login`, which opens a tagged browser window where
*you* sign in yourself; the session then persists in Hunch's dedicated browser profile.

## Confirmation gates

Your MCP host's tool approvals are the primary permission layer. Hunch adds a content-aware second
gate, a one-click macOS dialog, for the catastrophic cases:

| Gate | Fires on |
|---|---|
| `gates.focus_steal` | actions that take over your keyboard/cursor (`key`, `click_xy`, ref-less typing) |
| `gates.app_to_front` | an app being brought to the front (a focus switch, even mid-fullscreen) |
| `gates.shell` | AppleScript containing `do shell script` |
| `gates.destructive_applescript` | delete / send / empty trash / shut down / … |

One approval covers its follow-through: clicking "Go ahead" (on `request_focus`, a gated `act`,
or the app-to-front dialog) authorizes the switch it announced for ~15 s: no second dialog, and
the focus-switch notification is suppressed. A switch is either *asked about* or *announced*,
never both, and never silent (turn `gates.app_to_front` off and switches fall back to the
notification).

All on by default. For the **MCP server**, `hunch config show` / `hunch config set gates.shell off`
adjusts them; changes apply immediately, even to a running server. `auto_approve_all` disables
everything and makes you confir

…

## Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [PrithviSeran](https://github.com/PrithviSeran)
- **Source:** [PrithviSeran/hunch-mcp](https://github.com/PrithviSeran/hunch-mcp)
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Homepage:** https://www.tryhunch.ca

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Security capabilities

Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access:

- **Network access:** yes
- **Filesystem access:** yes
- **Shell / process execution:** no
- **Environment & secrets:** no
- **Dynamic code execution:** no

*"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.*


## Versions

- **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/mcp-prithviseran-hunch-mcp
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/prithviseran
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

---
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