# Ocm Mcp Server

> An MCP server that lets AI agents operate a multi-cluster Kubernetes fleet through an Open Cluster Management hub, with policy, approval, and audit between the model and your clusters.

- **Type:** MCP server
- **Install:** `agentstack add mcp-sandeepbazar-ocm-mcp-server`
- **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior
- **Seller:** [sandeepbazar](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/sandeepbazar)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Cloud & Infrastructure](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/cloud-infrastructure)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Upstream author:** [sandeepbazar](https://github.com/sandeepbazar)
- **Source:** https://github.com/sandeepbazar/ocm-mcp-server
- **Website:** https://www.linkedin.com/in/sandeepbazar/

## Install

```sh
agentstack add mcp-sandeepbazar-ocm-mcp-server
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# 🛡️ ocm-mcp-server

### AgentOps for Kubernetes fleets, done safely.

**An MCP server that lets AI agents operate a multi-cluster Kubernetes fleet through an
[Open Cluster Management](https://open-cluster-management.io/) hub, with policy, approval,
and audit between the model and your clusters.**

*The agent never holds a kubeconfig. Every write is policy-checked, human-approved, and traced.*

[](LICENSE)
[](pyproject.toml)
[](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
[](https://open-cluster-management.io/)
[](https://kyverno.io/)
[](https://github.com/sandeepbazar/ocm-mcp-server/actions)
[](https://github.com/sandeepbazar/ocm-mcp-server/releases)

[](https://www.linkedin.com/in/sandeepbazar/)
[](https://www.youtube.com/@techhorizonhub)

**[✨ Why](#why-this-exists)  ·  [🧭 Architecture](#architecture)  ·  [🧰 Toolsets](#toolsets)  ·  [🛠️ Tools](#tools)  ·  [💬 Prompts](#prompts)  ·  [🚀 Quickstart](#quickstart-laptop-15-minutes)  ·  [📖 Wiki](https://github.com/sandeepbazar/ocm-mcp-server/wiki)  ·  [📚 Docs](#documentation)**

The whole safe-remediation loop: investigate with free reads, propose a change, get rejected by the guardrails and correct it, wait for a human-signed token, apply, verify, and report from the audit log.

---

## Why this exists

Your team runs many Kubernetes clusters. Sooner or later somebody asks the question:
can an AI agent take the 2 a.m. page?

The quickest way to find out is to hand a model `kubectl` with cluster-admin and watch.
In production that experiment ends badly, for three separate reasons:

- **The model is non-deterministic.** The same alert can produce a careful diagnosis one
  run and a `kubectl delete` the next.
- **The credentials are real.** There is no dry run between the model's decision and your
  production cluster.
- **There is no record.** When something breaks, you cannot reconstruct what the agent did,
  in what order, or on whose authority.

This project starts from a different observation: fleets already have a control point that
humans trust every day, the multi-cluster hub. Open Cluster Management (a CNCF project)
gives every fleet an inventory (`ManagedCluster`), a scheduler (`Placement`), and a delivery
channel (`ManifestWork`). `ocm-mcp-server` exposes that hub to agents as a small set of
typed [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/) tools, and puts four independent layers
between the model and your clusters:

| # | Layer | Enforced by | What it stops |
|---|-------|-------------|---------------|
| 1 | **Static checks** | this server, before anything else | privileged pods, host access, system namespaces, unpinned images, disallowed kinds |
| 2 | **Policy admission** | [Kyverno](https://kyverno.io/) dry-run on the hub | anything your org's policies reject, evaluated inside the `ManifestWork` envelope |
| 3 | **Human approval** | HMAC token minted by `ocm-mcp approve` on a trusted terminal | any change reaching a cluster without a person consenting to that exact content |
| 4 | **Least-privilege RBAC** | Kubernetes | everything else; no Secrets, no exec, no deletes outside its own ManifestWorks |

None of these layers live in the system prompt, so none of them can be talked out of.

## Architecture

Dangerous capabilities do not exist. Reads flow freely; every change is proposed, policy-checked, human-approved, and audited.

```mermaid
flowchart LR
    A["🤖 AI Agent(any MCP client)"] -->|"typed tool calls"| S["🛡️ ocm-mcp-serverstatic guardrails · audit"]
    S -->|"reads + dry-run + apply"| H["☸️ OCM HubPlacement · ManifestWorkKyverno · RBAC"]
    H --> C1["cluster1"]
    H --> C2["cluster2"]
    H --> C3["cluster3"]
    U["🧑‍💻 Human operatorocm-mcp approve"] -.->|"approval token"| A
    S -.->|"spans"| J["🔍 OpenTelemetry / Jaeger"]
```

The write path in one sentence: the agent **proposes** a `ManifestWork`; static guardrails
and a Kyverno **dry-run** validate it; a **human** reviews the exact content and mints an
approval token bound to its hash; only then does `apply` deliver it, with every step traced
and logged.

## Policy admission with Kyverno

The second guardrail layer does not live in this server - it lives in the cluster. Before a
proposed change is ever stored, the server does a **server-side dry-run create** of the
`ManifestWork` on the hub, so the hub's [Kyverno](https://kyverno.io/) validating admission
runs against the exact manifests the agent wants to apply. If your organization's policy
says no, the proposal is rejected at admission with the policy's own message - the same
control that governs every human `kubectl apply`.

**Why Kyverno:**

- **Policy as code, no new language.** [Kyverno](https://kyverno.io/docs/introduction/) is a
  CNCF policy engine whose policies are ordinary Kubernetes resources in YAML and CEL -
  reviewable, versioned, and testable like any manifest. This is the policy-as-code approach
  the CNCF Kubernetes Policy Management whitepaper (CNCF
  [TAG Security](https://github.com/cncf/tag-security)) recommends: keep policy declarative
  and separate from application code.
- **Enforced by the cluster, not the prompt.** Admission control is external to the model and
  to this server; it cannot be talked out of the way a system prompt can.
- **The right tool for the job.** Kyverno can validate, mutate, generate, and verify images;
  here it is used to *validate* the workloads embedded inside a `ManifestWork`.

**Where it is used here:**

- [`deploy/policies/`](deploy/policies/) ships three `ClusterPolicy` objects that `foreach`
  over `spec.workload.manifests` inside a `ManifestWork` (block privileged/host access,
  protect system namespaces, enforce a kind allow-list), scoped by the
  `app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: ocm-mcp-server` label so they judge only agent-authored work.
- `make policy-test` runs a **12-case offline suite** with the `kyverno` CLI - good, bad, and
  human-authored `ManifestWork`s - needing no cluster and no dependencies. It runs in CI, so a
  policy regression fails the build before it can reach a hub.
- Don't start from scratch: the community library
  [kyverno/policies](https://github.com/kyverno/policies) and the searchable
  [Kyverno Policies catalog](https://kyverno.io/policies/) are a ready source of validation,
  Pod Security Standards, and best-practice policies to adopt or take inspiration from.

## Toolsets

The surface is **33 tools across ten toolsets**. Almost all of it is read: the whole
Open Cluster Management API is safe to inspect. Only two toolsets can change
anything, and only through the propose -> approve -> apply gate. Every hub-level
tool works for any managed spoke - a standalone OpenShift cluster, a HyperShift
hosted cluster, or a cloud cluster - because on the hub they are all `ManagedCluster`s.

| Toolset | What it covers | Tools | Writes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **inventory** | ManagedClusters, ClusterSets, set bindings, ClusterClaims, ManagedClusterInfo | 6 | - |
| **observability** | cluster health, events, pod logs | 3 | - |
| **placement** | Placements, PlacementDecisions, AddOnPlacementScores | 3 | - |
| **work** | ManifestWork status feedback + the gated deploy flow | 6 | gated |
| **addons** | ClusterManagementAddOns, fleet + per-cluster add-on health | 3 | - |
| **registration** | pending join CSRs + gated cluster lifecycle actions | 3 | gated |
| **policy** | governance compliance + violations rollup (if the add-on is installed) | 2 | - |
| **hosted-control-planes** | HyperShift HostedClusters and NodePools (when the hub hosts them) | 3 | - |
| **resources** | generic get/list over an allow-list of OCM API types | 2 | - |
| **audit** | pending proposals, this server's own audit trail | 2 | - |

Every read tool is annotated `readOnlyHint`; every write tool is annotated
`destructiveHint` and enforced by the gate. Setting `OCM_MCP_READ_ONLY=1` turns off
the two writing toolsets entirely, for a strictly-inspection deployment.

> **Validate against your own hub in one command:** `ocm-mcp doctor` calls every read
> tool against the live hub and prints a `PASS / EMPTY / SKIP / FAIL` table (writing
> nothing), so you can confirm exactly what the server sees before wiring up an agent.

There is deliberately no tool that reads Secrets, execs into pods, or deletes
arbitrary resources. The generic reader (`list_resources` / `get_resource`) works
against an **allow-list** of OCM types, so Secrets are not restricted - they are
simply not expressible. A capability that does not exist cannot be prompt-injected
into use.

## Tools

Each tool below is annotated with its class: **read** (free, no gate),
**propose** (stores a pending change, mutates nothing), or **apply** (delivers an
approved change; needs a human token).

inventory - who is in the fleet

- **`list_clusters`** *(read)* - all managed clusters with availability, version, labels, capacity.
- **`get_cluster`** *(read)* - full view of one cluster.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.
- **`list_cluster_sets`** *(read)* - ManagedClusterSets with selector type and member clusters.
- **`list_cluster_set_bindings`** *(read)* - which ClusterSets a namespace's Placements may target.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - limit to one namespace; empty lists all.
- **`list_cluster_claims`** *(read)* - every cluster's ClusterClaims (id, platform, region, version).
- **`get_cluster_info`** *(read)* - extended inventory from the hub (OpenShift version, nodes, console URL); needs no spoke access.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.

observability - why a cluster is unhealthy

- **`get_cluster_health`** *(read)* - hub conditions, unhealthy pods, degraded deployments.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.
- **`query_events`** *(read)* - recent Kubernetes events, newest first.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - namespace filter; empty means all.
  - `limit` (int, optional) - max events (default 40).
- **`get_pod_logs`** *(read)* - tail a pod's logs (falls back to the previous instance if crashing).
  - `cluster` (string), `namespace` (string), `pod` (string) - target.
  - `container` (string, optional) - container name; empty picks the default.
  - `lines` (int, optional) - trailing lines (default 80).

placement - which clusters were chosen, and why

- **`list_placements`** *(read)* - Placements and how many clusters each selects.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - limit to one namespace.
- **`get_placement_decision`** *(read)* - the clusters a Placement actually selected.
  - `placement` (string) - Placement name.
  - `namespace` (string) - the Placement's namespace.
- **`list_addon_placement_scores`** *(read)* - custom scores prioritizers consume.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.

work - what the hub is delivering, and the gated deploy flow

- **`list_manifestworks`** *(read)* - ManifestWorks targeting a cluster.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.
- **`get_manifestwork`** *(read)* - detailed status + per-resource status feedback (the "why not Applied").
  - `cluster` (string), `name` (string) - target.
- **`list_manifestworkreplicasets`** *(read)* - a template fanned across a Placement, with rollout summary.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - limit to one namespace.
- **`propose_manifestwork`** *(propose)* - propose a change as a ManifestWork. Applies nothing.
  - `cluster` (string) - target cluster.
  - `name` (string) - short kebab-case ManifestWork name.
  - `summary` (string) - one or two sentences the human approver reads.
  - `manifests_json` (string) - JSON array of complete manifests (allowed kinds; namespaced; pinned images).
- **`apply_manifestwork`** *(apply)* - deliver an approved ManifestWork.
  - `proposal_id` (string), `approval_token` (string) - from `ocm-mcp approve `.
- **`rollback_manifestwork`** *(apply)* - delete the ManifestWork from an applied proposal (needs a fresh token).
  - `proposal_id` (string), `approval_token` (string).

addons - add-on health across the fleet

- **`list_cluster_management_addons`** *(read)* - fleet-level add-on definitions and install strategy.
- **`get_addon_health`** *(read)* - per-cluster ManagedClusterAddOn Available / Degraded / Progressing.
- **`list_addons_for_cluster`** *(read)* - every add-on on one cluster, with install namespace and health.
  - `cluster` (string) - managed cluster name.

registration - onboarding and cluster lifecycle (gated)

- **`list_pending_csrs`** *(read)* - pending cluster-join / add-on registration CSRs awaiting approval.
- **`propose_cluster_action`** *(propose)* - propose a lifecycle action. Applies nothing.
  - `cluster` (string) - target cluster.
  - `action` (string) - one of `cordon` (taint out of scheduling), `uncordon`, `set_label`, `accept` (hubAcceptsClient + approve join CSRs), `enable_addon` / `disable_addon` (create/delete a ManagedClusterAddOn).
  - `summary` (string) - what the human approver reads.
  - `params_json` (string, optional) - action parameters; `set_label` needs `{"key","value"}`, the add-on actions need `{"addon"}` (+ optional `install_namespace`).
- **`apply_cluster_action`** *(apply)* - apply an approved lifecycle action.
  - `proposal_id` (string), `approval_token` (string).

policy - governance compliance (optional add-on)

- **`list_policies`** *(read)* - Policies and per-cluster compliance. Reports clearly if the governance add-on is not installed.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - limit to one namespace.
- **`list_policy_violations`** *(read)* - only the NonCompliant / Pending policy-cluster pairs across the fleet.

hosted-control-planes - HyperShift HCP (when the hub hosts them)

- **`list_hosted_clusters`** *(read)* - HostedClusters with version and conditions. Reports clearly if HCPs are hosted on a different management cluster.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - limit to one namespace.
- **`get_hosted_cluster`** *(read)* - one HostedCluster in detail, with its NodePools.
  - `name` (string), `namespace` (string) - target.
- **`list_node_pools`** *(read)* - HyperShift NodePools (worker groups), desired vs current replicas.
  - `namespace` (string, optional), `cluster` (string, optional) - filters.

resources - generic, allow-listed OCM reads

- **`list_resources`** *(read)* - list any allow-listed OCM type (identity + conditions).
  - `resource` (string) - e.g. `managedclusters`, `placements`, `manifestworks`, `managedclusteraddons`, `klusterlets`.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - for namespaced types.
- **`get_resource`** *(read)* - get one allow-listed OCM object in full. Never returns a Secret (not on the allow-list).
  - `resource` (string), `name` (string) - target.
  - `namespace` (string, optional) - required for namespaced types.

audit - the record

- **`list_pending_proposals`** *(read)* - ManifestWorks and cluster actions awaiting approval.
- **`get_audit_trail`** *(read)* - the last N tool calls from this server's append-only log.
  - `last_n` (int, optional) - trailing entries (default 30).

## Prompts

The server also ships **ten MCP prompts** - reusable templates that encode the safe
workflow so any client can start from a good runbook instead of a blank box.

| Prompt | What it drives | Arguments |
|---|---|---|
| **`diagnose_fleet`** | sweep every cluster and add-on, summarize what is unhealthy and why - reads only | - |
| **`remediate_with_approval`** | investigate a symptom, propose the smallest safe fix, wait for the human token, apply, verify, report | `symptom` |
| **`incident_postmortem`** | write the post-incident report strictly from `get_audit_trail`, not from memory | - |
| **`why_not_scheduled`** | explain why a cluster was or was not selected by a Placement, from the live objects | `cluster`, `placement`, `namespace` |
| **`onboard_cluster`** | accept a pending cluster safely through the approval gate | `cluster` |
| **`addon_troubleshoot`** | diagnose a degraded add-on across th

…

## Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [sandeepbazar](https://github.com/sandeepbazar)
- **Source:** [sandeepbazar/ocm-mcp-server](https://github.com/sandeepbazar/ocm-mcp-server)
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Homepage:** https://www.linkedin.com/in/sandeepbazar/

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Security capabilities

Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access:

- **Network access:** no
- **Filesystem access:** no
- **Shell / process execution:** no
- **Environment & secrets:** yes
- **Dynamic code execution:** no

*"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.*


## Versions

- **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/mcp-sandeepbazar-ocm-mcp-server
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/sandeepbazar
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

---
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