# Setup Permissions

> Scan the current repository's stack and propose scoped Codex sandbox, trust, and command-approval guidance for common test, lint, build, package, git, and external-tool workflows. Writes only after explicit approval. Global and project-agnostic. Trigger when the user says "set up permissions", "setup-permissions", "configure Codex permissions for this repo", "what permissions do I need", "allowli…

- **Type:** Skill
- **Install:** `agentstack add skill-ada-ggf25-ai-tools-setup-permissions`
- **Verified:** Pending review
- **Seller:** [ada-ggf25](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/ada-ggf25)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Agent Skills](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/agent-skills)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Upstream author:** [ada-ggf25](https://github.com/ada-ggf25)
- **Source:** https://github.com/ada-ggf25/AI-Tools/tree/main/global/codex/skills/setup-permissions

## Install

```sh
agentstack add skill-ada-ggf25-ai-tools-setup-permissions
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# Set Up Codex Permissions

Review the repo and propose narrow Codex permission/config guidance before the user hits
repeated approval prompts. Treat permissions and sandbox settings as a security boundary.

## Targets

Prefer the least invasive target:

- **Project guidance in `AGENTS.md`**: default for documenting commands that should be
  run and which ones need care.
- **Project trust in `~/.codex/config.toml`**: only if the user explicitly wants this
  repo trusted and understands it is personal machine config.
- **Codex hooks or plugin config**: only for deterministic automation that should always
  run.
- **Global config**: only for genuinely global, user-approved behavior.

Do not silently edit `~/.codex/config.toml`; show the exact change first.

## Rule Of Thumb

Propose narrow, frequent, low-risk operations. Do not propose broad or destructive
allows.

Good examples:

- test commands from project manifests;
- lint/format commands;
- build/type-check commands;
- read-only `gh` status and PR inspection;
- scoped package manager commands that do not publish or mutate global state.

Do not propose:

- `rm`, `sudo`, force-push, destructive git reset/checkout, deploys, releases, publish
  commands, secret reads, `.env` reads, or `curl ... | sh`;
- broad shell rules that would cover unrelated commands.

## Procedure

### 1. Orient

- Read existing `AGENTS.md`, `.codex/`, `.agents/`, README, and manifests.
- Check whether the repo is already trusted in `~/.codex/config.toml` if local access is
  available.
- Do not treat Claude `.claude/settings*.json` permission rules as Codex config; use
  them only as hints about repeated workflows.

### 2. Scan The Stack

Read manifests/configs such as `package.json`, `pyproject.toml`, `Makefile`, `justfile`,
`go.mod`, `Cargo.toml`, CI workflows, lint/format config, and test config.

Identify:

- test runner;
- linter/formatter/type checker;
- build tool;
- package manager;
- GitHub/GitLab/other external tooling;
- commands likely to need network or writes outside the workspace.

### 3. Propose

Group proposals by category: tests, lint/format, build/type-check, package management,
git/GitHub, local tools, and documentation.

For each proposal include:

- command or config change;
- target location;
- what it enables;
- what it deliberately does not enable.

Include a "Deliberately not proposed" section for dangerous operations withheld.

### 4. Write Only Approved Changes

After explicit approval, apply only the selected changes. Preserve existing config and
dedupe entries. If the approved change is global/personal config, make the scope obvious
in the final report.

## Guardrails

- Proposal first, write second.
- Never silently edit global Codex config.
- Never propose broad shell or destructive permissions.
- Merge, never clobber.
- Base every proposed command on files observed in the repo.

## Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [ada-ggf25](https://github.com/ada-ggf25)
- **Source:** [ada-ggf25/AI-Tools](https://github.com/ada-ggf25/AI-Tools)
- **License:** MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Security capabilities

Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access:

- **Network access:** yes
- **Filesystem access:** no
- **Shell / process execution:** no
- **Environment & secrets:** yes
- **Dynamic code execution:** no

*"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.*


## Versions

- **0.1.0** — security scan: flagged — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-ada-ggf25-ai-tools-setup-permissions
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/ada-ggf25
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

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Listed on AgentStack — the marketplace for AI agent skills and MCP servers. Every listing is security-reviewed. Creators keep 70%.