# Foundry Rbac Audit > > - **Type:** Skill - **Install:** `agentstack add skill-aiappsgbb-awesome-gbb-foundry-rbac-audit` - **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior - **Seller:** [aiappsgbb](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/aiappsgbb) - **Installs:** 0 - **Category:** [Agent Skills](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/agent-skills) - **Latest version:** 0.1.0 - **License:** MIT - **Upstream author:** [aiappsgbb](https://github.com/aiappsgbb) - **Source:** https://github.com/aiappsgbb/awesome-gbb/tree/main/skills/foundry-rbac-audit ## Install ```sh agentstack add skill-aiappsgbb-awesome-gbb-foundry-rbac-audit ``` Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent. ## About # foundry-rbac-audit Peer skill that probes Azure RBAC assignments at a resource-group scope for privilege-escalation risks, returning a structured `IAM-101` finding. It wraps `AuthorizationManagementClient` via `DefaultAzureCredential` and never raises — errors are captured in the returned dict. Threadlight v0.5.3+ consumes this as the IAM-101 sibling-skill check in its `threadlight-production-ready` SEC-301 gate. ## When to use - **Threadlight IAM-101 sibling-skill flip** — threadlight's apply-plan reasoner calls `probe()` directly to satisfy the SEC-301 → IAM-101 check. - **Pre-pilot security review** of a Foundry-adjacent resource group before spoke onboarding — confirms no over-privileged principals hold Owner or equivalent roles. - **Scheduled CI check after team offboarding** — detects residual privilege assignments; orphan-principal detection (deleted Entra IDs) is explicitly out of scope for v1.0.0. ## When NOT to use - **Granting or revoking role assignments** — use `az role assignment create` / `az role assignment delete` directly. - **Foundry-internal agent identity or per-agent-instance MI RBAC** — use the `foundry-agt` skill for identity lifecycle on hosted agents. - **Hub-side Citadel checks** — use `citadel-spoke-onboarding` and its `probe_hub_contract` for APIM/hub-scope governance. ## Probe contract The probe returns a dict matching the design spec §4.3.1 sibling-skill contract. Signature and shape are stable across `1.x` releases: | Field | Type | Notes | |---------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | `finding_id` | str | Always literal `"IAM-101"` | | `scope` | dict (sub_id, rg) | Nested; not a string | | `result` | enum `ok` / `needs_attention` / `errored` | Never anything else | | `observations` | list[dict] | Empty when `result == "ok"` | | `remediation_hints` | list[str] | Empty when observations empty | | `confidence` | 0.0 / 0.5 / 1.0 | See Confidence heuristic below | | `probed_at` | ISO-8601 UTC with `Z` | tz-aware | | `error` | str \| None | `None` on success; `": "` on errored | **Never raises.** Any Azure exception is caught and surfaced via `result["error"]` with `result["result"] = "errored"` and `confidence = 0.0`. ### Confidence heuristic The catalog-wide §4.3.1 confidence convention (documented here so threadlight's apply-plan reasoning is reproducible): - `1.0` — probe completed AND at least one role assignment matched the principal-type filter (whether or not any were privilege-escalation). - `0.5` — probe completed but no assignments matched the filter (ambiguous: empty RG vs Reader-masked enumeration). - `0.0` — probe raised internally and was caught. ### Observation rows Each observation row has these keys (all populated on every row): | Field | Notes | |----------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | `principal_id` | The assignee object ID | | `role_definition_id` | Full SDK resource path | | `role_name` | Friendly name (e.g. "Owner") | | `principal_type` | SDK raw value (e.g. "User") | | `severity` | `"critical"` or `"high"` | | `scope` | The assignment's scope as reported by Azure | The probe currently flags assignments at three privilege-escalation roles: | Role GUID | Friendly name | Severity | |------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------| | `8e3af657-a8ff-443c-a75c-2fe8c4bcb635` | Owner | critical | | `18d7d88d-d35e-4fb5-a5c3-7773c20a72d9` | User Access Administrator | critical | | `f58310d9-a9f6-439a-9e8d-f62e7b41a168` | Role Based Access Control Administrator | high | ## Probe Reference > **MUST:** Read the canonical probe at > [`references/python/probe.py`](references/python/probe.py). Do NOT > re-paste its body here — the validator enforces single-source-of-truth. ## CLI ```bash cd skills/foundry-rbac-audit/references/python mkdir -p out python __main__.py \ --subscription-id \ --resource-group \ --target-principal-types user,service_principal ``` Result is printed to stdout as JSON. The manifest is also written to `out/IAM-101.json` (relative to CWD). Same-finding-ID writes overwrite the prior manifest by design (threadlight reads the file by literal finding-id name). Authentication uses `DefaultAzureCredential`. The caller must hold `Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/read` and `Microsoft.Authorization/roleDefinitions/read` at the target RG scope. ## Threadlight integration Threadlight v0.5.3+ consumes this probe for the IAM-101 sibling-skill flip (`kind: sibling-skill`). It calls `probe()` directly (no CLI subprocess) with `target_principal_types` passed by keyword. The manifest file at `out/IAM-101.json` is the cross-process handoff for threadlight's apply-plan reasoner. ## Known limitations (v1.0.0) - Orphan principal detection (assignments to deleted Entra IDs) is **out of scope** for v1. Threadlight has not requested it. - Only RG scope is supported. Subscription scope and management-group audits are intentionally excluded — the threadlight use case is spoke-RG-bounded. - The privilege-escalation role list is hard-coded (3 GUIDs). Custom roles equivalent to Owner are NOT detected. A v1.1.0 release can add a `custom_role_guids: list[str]` kwarg if a customer asks. ## See also - [Threadlight `threadlight-production-ready` SEC-301 → IAM-101 sibling-skill flip](https://github.com/aiappsgbb/threadlight-skills/blob/main/skills/threadlight-production-ready/references/sibling-skills-map.md) - [`azure-mgmt-authorization` SDK](https://learn.microsoft.com/python/api/azure-mgmt-authorization/) - [AGENTS.md §4.3.1 sibling-skill probe contract](../../AGENTS.md) (for catalog maintainers) ## Source & license This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code. - **Author:** [aiappsgbb](https://github.com/aiappsgbb) - **Source:** [aiappsgbb/awesome-gbb](https://github.com/aiappsgbb/awesome-gbb) - **License:** MIT Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above. ## Pricing - **Free** — Free ## Security capabilities Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access: - **Network access:** no - **Filesystem access:** no - **Shell / process execution:** yes - **Environment & secrets:** no - **Dynamic code execution:** no *"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.* ## Versions - **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source. ## Links - Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-aiappsgbb-awesome-gbb-foundry-rbac-audit - Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/aiappsgbb - Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse --- Listed on AgentStack — the marketplace for AI agent skills and MCP servers. 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