# Microsoft Bcquality Assets Al Security Review > Imported BCQuality skill from microsoft/skills/review/al-security-review.md - **Type:** Skill - **Install:** `agentstack add skill-louage-frw-agentic-coding-al-security-review-microsoft-skills-review-al-security-review-md` - **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior - **Seller:** [Louage](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/louage) - **Installs:** 0 - **Category:** [Agent Skills](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/agent-skills) - **Latest version:** 0.1.0 - **License:** MIT - **Upstream author:** [Louage](https://github.com/Louage) - **Source:** https://github.com/Louage/frw-agentic-coding/tree/main/assets/generated/microsoft-bcquality-assets/skills/al-security-review-microsoft-skills-review-al-security-review-md ## Install ```sh agentstack add skill-louage-frw-agentic-coding-al-security-review-microsoft-skills-review-al-security-review-md ``` Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent. ## About # AL security review Source: microsoft/skills/review/al-security-review.md > **Bundled consumption note.** This extension packages BCQuality as VS Code chat skills and chat instructions under `assets/generated/microsoft-bcquality-assets`. Do not probe an external clone, `skills/entry.md`, `skills/read.md`, `skills/do.md`, or `knowledge-index.json` when using this bundled copy. Treat this `SKILL.md` plus the bundled BCQuality instruction files whose `Source:` paths match the active domain as the packaged knowledge surface. This note overrides upstream clone-oriented path references preserved below for provenance. # AL security review Reviews AL source changes against the `security` knowledge domain in BCQuality and emits a findings report. This is a leaf action skill: it invokes no sub-skills. It is one of the skills composed by `al-code-review`. An orchestrator invokes this skill with either a `pr-diff` (the standard PR-review entry point) or a `file-path` (single-file review). The skill produces a single JSON document conforming to the DO output contract. ## Source Read the BCQuality knowledge index once, the `knowledge-index.json` BCQuality builds at the root of the knowledge checkout (Entry's preparation step regenerates it over the live, already-filtered clone, see `skills/entry.md`). It lists every article that survived layer and allow/deny filtering and carries, per article, its `path`, `layer`, `domain`, frontmatter dimensions, `keywords`, `title`, and a one-line `description` hint, exactly the fields Relevance and Worklist consume. Take the index entries whose `domain` is `security` as this skill's candidate set across every enabled layer; do not open the individual article files at this step. Open an article's full body only once it enters the Worklist below, so a review reads the index plus the handful of worklisted articles instead of every file under `*/knowledge/security/**`. ## Relevance Apply the frontmatter matching rules defined in READ (*Frontmatter matching semantics*) against the task context: - `bc-version`, the target BC version from the PR branch's `app.json` or the orchestrator-supplied version. If unavailable, the dimension is `unknown`. - `technologies`, `[al]`. - `countries`, the countries declared in the consuming app's `app.json`. Default to the orchestrator's configured context; if absent, `unknown`. - `application-area`, the union of application areas declared by the changed objects. Pass the actual set; do not substitute `[all]`. If the area cannot be determined from the changes, the dimension is `unknown`. Discard files that are not applicable. Retain conditionally applicable files (any dimension `unknown`) only when the orchestrator's configuration permits them; findings derived from those files MUST have `confidence` no higher than `medium`, AND the finding's `message` MUST name the dimension or dimensions that were unknown. ## Worklist Narrow the relevant files to the subset that applies to the changes under review. For each relevant file, compute overlap against: - The changed AL object names and types, especially permission sets, codeunits handling authentication or authorization, objects touching `Isolated Storage`, `OAuth2` flows, web service endpoints, API pages, event publishers, and RecordRef helpers. - The changed procedures and triggers, weighted toward those that call `HttpClient`, validate or compose URLs, write to telemetry, read or write secrets, unwrap SecretText, manipulate record-level security, expose var Boolean guard parameters, or bypass the permission model (for example, `RecordRef.Open`, `Record.WritePermission`, direct table access from a non-owning app). - Tokens extracted from the diff that relate to security concerns (`IsolatedStorage`, `SetEncrypted`, `OAuth2`, `SecretText`, `Unwrap`, `NonDebuggable`, `Password`, `Token`, `HttpClient`, `Uri`, `AreURIsHaveSameHost`, `IsValidURIPattern`, `RecordRef`, `RecordId`, `TransferFields`, `Codeunit.Run`, `Access = Internal`, `internalsVisibleTo`, `Open`, `IntegrationEvent`, `SkipValidation`, `HasAccess`, `Permission`, `UserSecurityId`, `Commit`). A file enters the candidate worklist when its `keywords` intersect the extracted tokens or its topic (derived from the index entry's `path`, `title`, and `description`) matches a changed object type. Read an article's full file, its `## Best Practice` / `## Anti Pattern` bodies, only after it makes the worklist; candidate selection uses the index alone. Always worklist `internal-access-is-not-a-security-boundary.md` when changed comments or code rely on `Access = Internal` or `internalsVisibleTo` to protect a sensitive operation, or an internal `OnRun` codeunit performs privileged work without an independent authorization boundary. Do not flag `internal` used only to keep implementation details out of the supported API. For secret values, select the most specific sink owner: - When a `Text`/`Code` credential is declared, passed, returned, or unwrapped without a visible HTTP URI/header/body sink, use `secrettext-for-credentials.md`. - When that value is interpolated into a URI, authorization header, or HTTP body and sent through `HttpClient`, use `secrettext-with-httpclient.md` as the primary finding. It supersedes the generic credential-type article at that location; keep the latter only as a supporting reference when useful. Once the candidate worklist is known, resolve layer-precedence conflicts per READ. Drop lower-precedence files whose normative guidance (`## Best Practice` or `## Anti Pattern`) directly contradicts a higher-precedence candidate, and record each dropped file in `suppressed` with `reason: "layer-precedence"`. Files that would have been candidates but are hidden because their layer is disabled in consumer configuration are recorded with `reason: "configuration"`. Files that never became candidates are NOT recorded in `suppressed`. When the post-conflict worklist is empty because no applicable security knowledge exists, or because configuration suppressed every candidate, emit `outcome: "no-knowledge"`. When the worklist is empty because no applicable security knowledge matched the changes, emit `outcome: "completed"` with an empty `findings` array. ## Action For each worklist entry, evaluate the diff against the file's `## Best Practice` and `## Anti Pattern` sections. Emit findings as follows: - When the diff contains a clear match for an Anti Pattern, emit a finding with severity `major` or `blocker`, a message summarizing the anti-pattern, `location` pointing to the offending line or range, and a `references` entry pointing to the knowledge file. Use `blocker` only when the knowledge file states the anti-pattern violates a platform-level guarantee (for example, documented secret-handling rules, permission-model invariants, or data-protection requirements). When the file does not make such a claim, the ceiling is `major`. - When the diff contains code that contradicts a Best Practice without being a full anti-pattern, emit `minor` with the same reference shape. - Applicability alone is not a finding. Emit `info` only for a concrete, non-actionable observation the article explicitly defines; otherwise emit nothing when no violation is present. Set `confidence` to: - `high` when the detection is based on an unambiguous pattern match (identifier, syntax, object type). - `medium` when detection relies on heuristics or when any frontmatter dimension was `unknown`. - `low` when the finding is an advisory derived only from applicability. After evaluating each worklist entry, also consider whether the diff exhibits a security defect the agent recognises from its general AL knowledge that no knowledge file in the worklist covers. Such candidates are agent findings within this skill's domain, emit them with `references: []`, an `id` slug prefixed with `agent:`, `confidence` capped at `medium`, `severity` capped at `minor` (agent findings are advisory and non-gating), and a `message` that is self-contained (describing both the issue and a concrete recommendation, since there is no knowledge-file footer for the consumer to fall back on). Hold every candidate to the precision bar in `skills/do.md` (*Agent findings*): emit only a concrete, material security defect a knowledgeable BC reviewer would agree is wrong, steelman it first and drop anything stylistic, speculative, dependent on code outside the diff, or merely a valid alternative; when in doubt, omit. The scope is strictly security; defects outside this domain belong to other leaves and MUST NOT be emitted here. Before emitting, check the worklist for a knowledge file that matches the candidate, if one exists, upgrade the candidate to a knowledge-backed finding instead. See `skills/do.md` for the full contract. For every emitted finding, decide whether the fix is mechanical. A fix is mechanical when it is small, local, and unambiguous from the diff context (for example: delete unreachable lines; replace `Count() > 0` with `not IsEmpty()`; move a local `Label` to object scope; add a missing `ToolTip`, `OptionCaption`, or `DataClassification`; replace a string-concatenated `Error` with a Label-backed call; change an over-broad permission token; or add an obvious `else`/guard branch). For mechanical findings, emit `findings[].suggested-code` with the literal replacement for the source lines indicated by `location`. The payload must be a verbatim replacement, no diff markers, no fences, no commentary, that the consumer can render as a one-click suggestion. When a `.good.al` companion exists and the diff context matches the `.bad.al` shape, adapt the `.good.al` replacement into `suggested-code`. Omit `suggested-code` only when the appropriate fix depends on context the skill cannot determine, when multiple defensible replacements exist, or when the fix spans non-contiguous code. If a finding is mechanical-looking but you omit `suggested-code`, set `findings[].suggested-code-omission-reason` to a short explanation. See `skills/do.md` for the full contract. Outcome selection: - `completed`, the skill evaluated every worklist item; default when the skill finishes normally, including when the resulting `findings` array is empty. - `no-knowledge`, no applicable security knowledge survived Source, Relevance, configuration filtering, and conflict resolution. `findings` is empty. - `not-applicable`, the task context lacks an AL dimension (no AL changes in the diff, or `technologies` filter rejected the task). - `partial`, a time or token budget was hit before the worklist was exhausted. `summary.coverage` reflects the evaluated subset; `outcome-reason` explains the cause. - `failed`, an unrecoverable error occurred. `outcome-reason` is required. ## Output Output conforms to the DO output contract. Every finding this skill emits MUST set `findings[].domain` to `"Security"`. A populated example: ```json { "skill": { "id": "al-security-review", "version": 1 }, "outcome": "completed", "summary": { "counts": { "blocker": 1, "major": 0, "minor": 1, "info": 0 }, "coverage": { "worklist-size": 2, "items-evaluated": 2 } }, "findings": [ { "id": "microsoft/knowledge/security/secrettext-for-credentials.md", "severity": "blocker", "message": "A bearer token is declared as a Text parameter and passed through the HTTP request path as plain text. The referenced guidance requires credentials to flow as SecretText end-to-end.", "location": { "file": "src/Integration/ApiClient.Codeunit.al", "line": 85, "range": { "start-line": 85, "end-line": 89 } }, "references": [ { "path": "microsoft/knowledge/security/secrettext-for-credentials.md" } ], "confidence": "high", "domain": "Security" }, { "id": "microsoft/knowledge/security/secrets-isolated-storage.md", "severity": "minor", "message": "A setup table stores an API key in an ordinary Text field, exposing it through table reads and exports. Persist it in IsolatedStorage instead.", "location": { "file": "src/Integration/ExternalServiceSetup.Table.al", "line": 12 }, "references": [ { "path": "microsoft/knowledge/security/secrets-isolated-storage.md" } ], "confidence": "medium", "domain": "Security" } ], "suppressed": [] } ``` The empty-corpus case, BCQuality's state until security knowledge files land, produces: ```json { "skill": { "id": "al-security-review", "version": 1 }, "outcome": "no-knowledge", "summary": { "counts": { "blocker": 0, "major": 0, "minor": 0, "info": 0 }, "coverage": { "worklist-size": 0, "items-evaluated": 0 } }, "findings": [], "suppressed": [] } ``` ## Source & license This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code. - **Author:** [Louage](https://github.com/Louage) - **Source:** [Louage/frw-agentic-coding](https://github.com/Louage/frw-agentic-coding) - **License:** MIT Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above. ## Pricing - **Free** — Free ## Security capabilities Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access: - **Network access:** no - **Filesystem access:** no - **Shell / process execution:** no - **Environment & secrets:** no - **Dynamic code execution:** no *"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.* ## Versions - **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source. ## Links - Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-louage-frw-agentic-coding-al-security-review-microsoft-skills-review-al-security-review-md - Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/louage - Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse --- Listed on AgentStack — the marketplace for AI agent skills and MCP servers. Every listing is security-reviewed. Creators keep 70%.