# Oracle Manipulation

> Detect oracle manipulation risks — spot-price reads from AMMs, stale Chainlink answers, single-source dependence, TWAP gaming. Activate whenever code reads a price, conversion rate, exchange rate, or `getReserves`, `latestAnswer`, `latestRoundData`, `consult`, `quote`, `slot0`, `observe`, `getAmountsOut`.

- **Type:** Skill
- **Install:** `agentstack add skill-omermaksutii-rugproof-oracle-manipulation`
- **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior
- **Seller:** [omermaksutii](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/omermaksutii)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Security](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/security)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Upstream author:** [omermaksutii](https://github.com/omermaksutii)
- **Source:** https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProof/tree/main/skills/oracle-manipulation
- **Website:** https://omermaksutii.github.io/RugProof

## Install

```sh
agentstack add skill-omermaksutii-rugproof-oracle-manipulation
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# Oracle manipulation detection

## When this applies

Any code that consumes a price feed or derives a price from on-chain state:

- Chainlink: `latestAnswer`, `latestRoundData`, `getRoundData`
- Uniswap V2: `getReserves`, `getAmountsOut`, `price0Average`
- Uniswap V3/V4: `slot0`, `observe`, `consult`
- Curve: `get_virtual_price`, `get_dy`
- Balancer: `getRate`
- Custom oracle modules, on-chain TWAPs
- LP token pricing, collateral valuation, liquidation thresholds, mint/burn rates

## Detection patterns

### Spot price from AMM (CRITICAL — funds at risk)
```solidity
(uint112 r0, uint112 r1,) = pair.getReserves();
uint256 price = r1 * 1e18 / r0;       // ← flash-loan manipulable in one block
```

### Stale Chainlink data (HIGH)
```solidity
(, int256 answer,,,) = feed.latestRoundData();   // ← ignores updatedAt and answeredInRound
```
Required checks:
- `updatedAt != 0`
- `block.timestamp - updatedAt = roundId`
- `answer > 0`
- Heartbeat sanity: ETH/USD is 1h on mainnet but 24h on some L2s — verify

### `latestAnswer` (deprecated, no freshness) (HIGH)
```solidity
int256 p = feed.latestAnswer();   // ← deprecated, prefer latestRoundData
```

### Single-source dependence (HIGH)
Only one oracle, no fallback, no cross-check against a second source.

### Uniswap V3 `slot0` without TWAP (CRITICAL)
```solidity
(uint160 sqrtPriceX96,,,,,,) = pool.slot0();   // ← spot, manipulable
```
Use `observe()` for TWAP with sufficient lookback (≥30min for shallow pools).

### Insufficient TWAP window (HIGH)
TWAP < 5 min on volatile assets or low-liquidity pools is gameable across two blocks.

### Read-only reentrancy on oracle (HIGH)
Reading `getVirtualPrice` / `getReserves` mid-callback — see [[reentrancy]] §Read-only.

### LP token priced via reserves directly (CRITICAL)
LP token price should use the *fair LP price* formula (Alpha Homora's method), not `reserve / totalSupply`.

### Price scaling errors (HIGH)
Chainlink answers come in feed-specific decimals; mixing ETH/USD (8 decimals) with token (18 decimals) without normalizing produces silent off-by-1e10 errors.

### Sequencer uptime ignored (HIGH on L2s)
On Arbitrum, Optimism, Base — must check `SequencerUptimeFeed` to avoid stale prices when sequencer is down.

## Severity rubric

| Pattern | Severity |
|---|---|
| Spot-price from AMM used in liquidation/mint | **Critical** |
| Uniswap V3 `slot0` used for collateral pricing | **Critical** |
| LP token priced via raw `reserve / totalSupply` | **Critical** |
| `latestRoundData` without freshness/round checks | **High** |
| Single oracle, no fallback, financial-critical path | **High** |
| Sequencer uptime check missing on L2 | **High** |
| Insufficient TWAP window (<5min on shallow pool) | **High** |
| Stale heartbeat for known-volatile asset | **High** |
| `latestAnswer` (deprecated) used | **Medium** |
| Decimal-scaling mistake | **High** |

## Remediation patterns

- For Chainlink: validate `(roundId, answer, , updatedAt, answeredInRound)` — guard against stale + zero + non-positive + round-mismatch.
- Use multiple oracles with deviation check (e.g. Chainlink + Uniswap V3 TWAP with ≥30min window).
- For LP tokens, use fair-LP-price math: `2 * sqrt(r0 * r1 * p0 * p1) / totalSupply`.
- On L2s, integrate Chainlink's `SequencerUptimeFeed` (Arbitrum, Optimism, Base).
- Avoid `slot0` and spot-price reads for anything that affects user funds.

## False-positive notes

- Display-only prices (UI/event metadata, not affecting fund flow) — Info-only.
- `getReserves` used purely for ratio diagnostics with no downstream effect — Info.

## Related

- [[flash-loan-attacks]] — most oracle attacks are funded by flash loans
- [[reentrancy]] — read-only reentrancy is an oracle-staleness issue
- [[mev-frontrunning]] — TWAP-window timing

## Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [omermaksutii](https://github.com/omermaksutii)
- **Source:** [omermaksutii/RugProof](https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProof)
- **License:** MIT
- **Homepage:** https://omermaksutii.github.io/RugProof

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Security capabilities

Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access:

- **Network access:** no
- **Filesystem access:** no
- **Shell / process execution:** no
- **Environment & secrets:** no
- **Dynamic code execution:** no

*"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.*


## Versions

- **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-omermaksutii-rugproof-oracle-manipulation
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/omermaksutii
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

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