# Broken Access Control

> >

- **Type:** Skill
- **Install:** `agentstack add skill-scholarly360-owasp-top10-web-skills-broken-access-control`
- **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior
- **Seller:** [scholarly360](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/scholarly360)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Security](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/security)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Upstream author:** [scholarly360](https://github.com/scholarly360)
- **Source:** https://github.com/scholarly360/owasp-top10-web-skills/tree/main/skills/broken-access-control

## Install

```sh
agentstack add skill-scholarly360-owasp-top10-web-skills-broken-access-control
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# Broken Access Control (A01:2025)

**The #1 OWASP risk for two consecutive cycles.** Found in **3.74% of applications** with over **1.8 million occurrences** and **32,654 CVEs**. Access control enforces that users cannot act outside their intended permissions. Failures lead to unauthorized data disclosure, modification, or destruction.

> For deep reference on all CWEs and remediation patterns, see `references/bac-detail.md`.

---

## What This Skill Covers

| Sub-category | Description | Key CWEs |
|---|---|---|
| Missing Authorization | Routes/endpoints with no auth guard | CWE-862, CWE-284 |
| IDOR | Resource ownership not verified | CWE-639, CWE-285 |
| CORS Misconfiguration | Wildcard or overly-permissive origins | CWE-284 |
| SSRF | Outbound requests to internal/private IPs | CWE-918 |
| CSRF | State-changing forms missing token validation | CWE-352 |
| Privilege Escalation | Users accessing higher-privilege roles | CWE-269 |
| JWT/Session Manipulation | Metadata tampering, session fixation | CWE-287 |

---

## Workflow: Auditing a FastAPI or Flask App

### Step 1 — Identify All Routes

**FastAPI:**
```python
# List all routes and their dependencies
for route in app.routes:
    print(route.path, route.methods, route.dependencies)
```

**Flask:**
```python
# Print all registered endpoints
for rule in app.url_map.iter_rules():
    print(rule.endpoint, rule.methods, rule.rule)
```

Flag any route that:
- Handles POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE without an auth dependency
- Returns user-specific data (profile, orders, files) without ownership check
- Has no rate limiting on sensitive operations

---

### Step 2 — Check Authorization Guards

**FastAPI — look for missing `Depends()`:**
```python
# VULNERABLE — no auth check
@app.get("/users/{user_id}/data")
async def get_user_data(user_id: int):
    return db.query(UserData).filter_by(owner_id=user_id).all()

# SECURE — requires authenticated user
@app.get("/users/{user_id}/data")
async def get_user_data(user_id: int, current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user)):
    if current_user.id != user_id:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
    return db.query(UserData).filter_by(owner_id=user_id).all()
```

**Flask — look for missing `@login_required`:**
```python
# VULNERABLE
@app.route("/dashboard")
def dashboard():
    return render_template("dashboard.html")

# SECURE
@app.route("/dashboard")
@login_required
def dashboard():
    return render_template("dashboard.html")
```

---

### Step 3 — IDOR Check (Resource Ownership)

IDOR is the most common BAC failure. Every query that fetches a user-owned resource must compare `resource.owner_id` against `current_user.id`.

```python
# VULNERABLE IDOR — attacker can request any document_id
@app.get("/documents/{doc_id}")
async def get_doc(doc_id: int, user=Depends(get_current_user)):
    return db.get(Document, doc_id)  # No ownership check!

# SECURE
@app.get("/documents/{doc_id}")
async def get_doc(doc_id: int, user=Depends(get_current_user)):
    doc = db.get(Document, doc_id)
    if not doc or doc.owner_id != user.id:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)  # 404 preferred over 403 (avoids enumeration)
    return doc
```

**Test vector:** Authenticate as User A, record a resource ID, then authenticate as User B and request that same ID. If you get data — it's an IDOR.

---

### Step 4 — CORS Misconfiguration

**FastAPI:**
```python
# VULNERABLE — wildcard origin
app.add_middleware(CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=["*"], allow_credentials=True)

# SECURE — explicit allowlist
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["https://app.yourdomain.com"],
    allow_credentials=True,
    allow_methods=["GET", "POST"],
    allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type"],
)
```

**Flask:**
```python
# VULNERABLE
CORS(app, origins="*")

# SECURE
CORS(app, origins=["https://app.yourdomain.com"], supports_credentials=True)
```

> ⚠️ `allow_origins=["*"]` combined with `allow_credentials=True` is doubly dangerous — most browsers block this, but it signals deep misconfiguration.

---

### Step 5 — SSRF (Now part of A01:2025)

Check any code that makes outbound HTTP requests with user-controlled URLs.

```python
import ipaddress, re

PRIVATE_RANGES = [
    ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
    ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
    ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
    ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
    ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),  # AWS metadata
]

def is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:
    from urllib.parse import urlparse
    import socket
    try:
        host = urlparse(url).hostname
        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(host))
        return not any(ip in net for net in PRIVATE_RANGES)
    except Exception:
        return False

# In your endpoint:
@app.post("/fetch")
async def fetch_url(url: str, user=Depends(get_current_user)):
    if not is_safe_url(url):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="URL not allowed")
    return await httpx.get(url)
```

**Test vectors:** `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` (AWS metadata), `http://localhost:6379` (Redis), `http://10.0.0.1/admin`

---

### Step 6 — CSRF (Flask-specific risk)

FastAPI APIs using JWT/Bearer tokens are generally CSRF-safe. Flask apps using session cookies need explicit protection.

```python
# Flask — verify Flask-WTF is installed and CSRF is enabled
from flask_wtf.csrf import CSRFProtect
csrf = CSRFProtect(app)

# All state-changing forms must include {{ form.hidden_tag() }} or {{ csrf_token() }}
```

Check that `WTF_CSRF_ENABLED = True` in config (it is by default, but verify it hasn't been disabled).

---

### Step 7 — JWT & Session Security

```python
# Verify JWT expiry is set (short-lived: 15 min–1 hr)
jwt.encode({"sub": user_id, "exp": datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=30)}, SECRET_KEY)

# Flask — verify session security flags
app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE"] = True    # HTTPS only
app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY"] = True  # No JS access
app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE"] = "Lax" # CSRF mitigation
app.config["PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME"] = timedelta(hours=2)
```

---

## Quick Audit Checklist

Run through this for any Python web app:

- [ ] Every non-public route has an auth dependency / decorator
- [ ] All user-owned resource queries verify `resource.owner_id == current_user.id`
- [ ] CORS origins are an explicit allowlist, not `*`
- [ ] Outbound HTTP calls validate URL is not in private IP ranges
- [ ] Flask apps have Flask-WTF CSRF protection on all state-changing forms
- [ ] JWTs have short `exp` claims; sessions have `SECURE`, `HTTPONLY`, `SAMESITE` flags
- [ ] Session IDs are invalidated on logout
- [ ] Access control failures are logged and alerted on

---

## Automated Scanning

| Tool | What it catches | Command |
|---|---|---|
| **Bandit** | SSRF patterns, hardcoded secrets, dangerous functions | `bandit -r . -t B105,B106,B107,B501,B601` |
| **OWASP ZAP** | IDOR, missing auth at runtime, CORS | `zap-baseline.py -t http://localhost:8000` |
| **truffleHog** | Leaked tokens/keys in git history | `trufflehog git file://. --only-verified` |

---

## Key CWEs Reference

| CWE | Name | Typical Pattern |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-284 | Improper Access Control | Route accessible without any auth |
| CWE-285 | Improper Authorization | Auth present but role/ownership not checked |
| CWE-352 | CSRF | State-changing endpoint accepts cookie auth, no CSRF token |
| CWE-639 | Auth Bypass via User-Controlled Key | IDOR — `GET /orders/{id}` with no ownership check |
| CWE-862 | Missing Authorization | No `@login_required` or `Depends(get_current_user)` |
| CWE-918 | SSRF | `requests.get(user_input_url)` without validation |
| CWE-200 | Sensitive Info Exposure | Unauthorized user receives another's PII/data |

---

## See Also

- `references/bac-detail.md` — Expanded CWE descriptions, more attack examples, compliance mapping
- OWASP A01:2025 official page: https://owasp.org/Top10/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/

## Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [scholarly360](https://github.com/scholarly360)
- **Source:** [scholarly360/owasp-top10-web-skills](https://github.com/scholarly360/owasp-top10-web-skills)
- **License:** MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Security capabilities

Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access:

- **Network access:** yes
- **Filesystem access:** no
- **Shell / process execution:** no
- **Environment & secrets:** no
- **Dynamic code execution:** no

*"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.*


## Versions

- **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-scholarly360-owasp-top10-web-skills-broken-access-control
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/scholarly360
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

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