# Serverless Security

> Lambda / Cloud Functions / Azure Functions hardening: IAM, timeouts, secrets, event injection — Applies to: when generating AWS Lambda / GCP Cloud Functions / Azure Functions code; when generating serverless.yml / SAM templates / functions framework; when wiring API Gateway, EventBridge, SQS, S3 triggers

- **Type:** Skill
- **Install:** `agentstack add skill-shieldnet-360-secure-vibe-serverless-security`
- **Verified:** Pending review
- **Seller:** [ShieldNet-360](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/shieldnet-360)
- **Installs:** 0
- **Category:** [Cloud & Infrastructure](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/cloud-infrastructure)
- **Latest version:** 0.1.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Upstream author:** [ShieldNet-360](https://github.com/ShieldNet-360)
- **Source:** https://github.com/ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe/tree/main/dist/agent-skills/.agents/skills/serverless-security

## Install

```sh
agentstack add skill-shieldnet-360-secure-vibe-serverless-security
```

Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent.

## About

# Serverless Security

Lambda / Cloud Functions / Azure Functions hardening: IAM, timeouts, secrets, event injection

## ALWAYS

- Give each function its own IAM execution role with the minimum permissions needed. Never share roles across functions; never reuse the bootstrap / developer role.
- Set a concrete function timeout (≤ 30s for synchronous APIs, ≤ 15min for background jobs). Defaults like 6s or 900s are footguns in different directions.
- Set reserved or provisioned concurrency limits per function to avoid bill blow-outs and to keep one noisy tenant from starving the rest of the account.
- Pull secrets at cold-start from a secret manager (AWS Secrets Manager / GCP Secret Manager / Azure Key Vault) **with caching**, not from plaintext environment variables.
- Validate every event payload against a schema before any code that touches it. Lambda doesn't care that the event arrived from "your" SQS queue — it could be a poison message.
- Enable structured logging that redacts known secret patterns (delegate to the `logging-security` skill).
- Enable X-Ray / OpenTelemetry tracing and CloudWatch / Cloud Monitoring alerts on error rate, throttle count, duration p95.
- Use a VPC for functions that touch a private database or service; otherwise the function gets full outbound internet, which is rarely desirable.

## NEVER

- Use `arn:aws:iam::*:role/*` (wildcard PassRole), `*:*` action/resource, or `iam:*` permissions on a function role.
- Put secrets in environment variables in plaintext (use Secrets Manager references / `aws_lambda_function.environment` with `kms_key_arn`).
- Pass user-controlled strings to `exec`, `os.system`, `child_process`, `subprocess.Popen(shell=True)` — function URLs become RCE shortcuts when someone shells out.
- Trust the Lambda function URL or API Gateway resource as authentication. Function URLs with `AUTH_TYPE=NONE` are unauthenticated; require IAM, Cognito, or a Lambda authorizer.
- Disable `aws_lambda_function.code_signing_config_arn` for production functions; sign and verify on deploy.
- Use the `latest` image tag for container-image functions; pin by digest.
- Use long-lived static AWS access keys to call AWS from Lambda — use the execution role.
- Skip validation of S3 / SQS / EventBridge event payloads — assume any caller can post any shape, even if the trigger is "trusted".

## KNOWN FALSE POSITIVES

- Custom CloudFormation / Lambda resource handlers (`cfn-response`) sometimes legitimately need broad permissions for short-lived setup.
- Cold-start warmer hacks (pinging the function on a CloudWatch Events schedule) are not, themselves, a security issue.
- Step Functions iterators with thousands of map states are not an "untracked concurrency" problem if the StateMachine has its own concurrency cap.

## Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

- **Author:** [ShieldNet-360](https://github.com/ShieldNet-360)
- **Source:** [ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe](https://github.com/ShieldNet-360/secure-vibe)
- **License:** MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

## Pricing

- **Free** — Free

## Security capabilities

Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access:

- **Network access:** no
- **Filesystem access:** no
- **Shell / process execution:** yes
- **Environment & secrets:** no
- **Dynamic code execution:** no

*"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.*


## Versions

- **0.1.0** — security scan: flagged — Imported from the upstream source.

## Links

- Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-shieldnet-360-secure-vibe-serverless-security
- Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/shieldnet-360
- Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse

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