# Auditing Ml Model Supply Chain > >- - **Type:** Skill - **Install:** `agentstack add skill-unboundcompute-security-agent-skills-auditing-ml-model-supply-chain` - **Verified:** Yes — security-reviewed for prompt injection and unsafe behavior - **Seller:** [UnboundCompute](https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/unboundcompute) - **Installs:** 0 - **Category:** [AI & ML](https://agentstack.voostack.com/c/ai-and-ml) - **Latest version:** 0.1.0 - **License:** MIT - **Upstream author:** [UnboundCompute](https://github.com/UnboundCompute) - **Source:** https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills/tree/main/skills/auditing-ml-model-supply-chain - **Website:** https://security.unboundcompute.com ## Install ```sh agentstack add skill-unboundcompute-security-agent-skills-auditing-ml-model-supply-chain ``` Requires the [AgentStack CLI](https://agentstack.voostack.com/docs/cli). Works with Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible agent. ## About # Auditing the ML model supply chain: a model file is code you run A model file is usually treated as inert data, a bag of weights. Many formats are not: loading one can execute arbitrary code embedded in the file, and even a pure-weights model can carry a backdoor that changes behavior on a trigger. The moment your pipeline loads a model someone else produced, that model is untrusted code and untrusted logic entering your system, on the training host, the inference server, or a developer's laptop. ## When to use - You are adding a model, checkpoint, or weights file to a training or inference pipeline. - You are reviewing where and how models are loaded, and from where. - You are vetting a third-party or publicly-hosted model before you trust it. ## Scope check Audit models and pipelines you own or are authorized to test. Do not load or execute untrusted model files outside a contained environment. If you can't name the authorization, stop. ## The loop 1. **Inventory every model load path and its format.** List where the system loads a model, checkpoint, or weights file, who produced each one, and the serialization format. Formats that can reconstruct arbitrary objects execute code on load; formats that carry only tensors are safer. Mark each load site by format risk. 2. **Check for code execution on load (the RCE leg).** For any load path using a format that can rebuild arbitrary objects, a malicious file runs code the instant it is loaded, before any inference. Confirm whether untrusted files reach that path, and whether a tensor-only loader or a restricted deserializer is enforced. An unrestricted load of an externally-sourced file is remote code execution. 3. **Trace provenance and integrity.** Where did each model come from, and is it verified? Check for a pinned hash or signature, a known publisher, and a fixed version. A model pulled by mutable name from a public hub without hash pinning is a rug-pull and name-confusion channel: the artifact can be swapped, or a lookalike name served. 4. **Test for name and dependency confusion.** Is the model referenced by a bare or ambiguous name a public source could satisfy, or does loading it pull auxiliary code (custom loading scripts, a remote-code flag, tokenizer or pipeline scripts that run)? A model that ships and runs its own loading code is code execution disguised as a download. 5. **Consider weight-level tampering (backdoors).** Even a safe-format, integrity-verified model can be trojaned: trained to misbehave on a trigger input while scoring normally on benchmarks. You cannot fully verify this by loading, but you can bound exposure through provenance (trusted producer, reproducible training) and by treating unverified models as untrusted logic behind a boundary. 6. **Rate and record.** Code execution on load from an untrusted file is critical. A poisoned-weights model in a low-trust decision is lower but real. Record confirmed unsafe load paths and paths that enforce safe formats plus pinned, verified provenance (killed) in the schema. ## Reading model risk honestly - **A load is an execution for many formats.** "We just load the weights" can mean "we run whatever the file says." Check the format first. - **Popularity is not provenance.** A widely-downloaded artifact can still be swapped or lookalike-named. Pin and verify. - **Remote-code load flags are opt-in RCE.** A convenience flag that lets a model run custom code on load is the whole vulnerability. - **Weight backdoors survive integrity checks.** A hash proves the file is unchanged, not that it is honest. Provenance is the control. ## Worked example (a confirm and a kill) > **Confirm.** An inference service downloads a model by mutable name from a public > hub with a flag that permits the model to execute its own loading code, no hash > pinning. An attacker publishes a trojaned version (or a lookalike name); the next > deploy runs the attacker's code on the inference host on load. **Confirmed** > model-supply-chain RCE, `critical`, remediation = pin by hash, disable remote-code > execution on load, restrict to a tensor-only format, and vet the publisher. > > **Kill.** A pipeline loads only tensor-only-format weights (no code execution > possible on load), by pinned hash, from an internal registry, with remote-code > flags disabled and the loader restricted. A swapped file fails the hash and no code > can run on load. **Killed**, `kill_reason` = "tensor-only load with no code > execution, hash-pinned from a trusted registry, remote-code flags off." ## Rationalizations to reject - *"It's just a weights file."* → Many formats execute code on load. Check the format before you call it data. - *"It's from a popular repo."* → Popular is not pinned. The artifact behind a name can change or be impersonated. - *"We need the convenience flag to load it."* → That flag is opt-in remote code execution. Find a safe-format alternative. - *"The hash matches, so it's safe."* → The hash proves it is unchanged, not that it is not backdoored. Provenance still matters. ## Executing this in practice You need every model load site and its format, the provenance and pinning of each artifact, and whether the loader can execute embedded or remote code. Any environment where you can inspect the load configuration and the artifact source works; the format-risk classification and the provenance check are the method. ## Related - `hunting-supply-chain-risks` - the same confusion, pinning, and rug-pull discipline for code dependencies. - `auditing-ai-agent-permissions` - bounding what a loaded model or its code can reach at run time. - `adjudicating-taint-paths` - tracing whether an untrusted file reaches a code-executing load. - [FINDING-SCHEMA.md](../../FINDING-SCHEMA.md) - source = the untrusted model artifact, sink = the load call that executes it. ## Source & license This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code. - **Author:** [UnboundCompute](https://github.com/UnboundCompute) - **Source:** [UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills](https://github.com/UnboundCompute/security-agent-skills) - **License:** MIT - **Homepage:** https://security.unboundcompute.com Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above. ## Pricing - **Free** — Free ## Security capabilities Automated source analysis of v0.1.0 — what this tool can access: - **Network access:** no - **Filesystem access:** no - **Shell / process execution:** no - **Environment & secrets:** no - **Dynamic code execution:** no *"Yes" means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it is unsafe.* ## Versions - **0.1.0** — security scan: passed — Imported from the upstream source. ## Links - Listing page: https://agentstack.voostack.com/l/skill-unboundcompute-security-agent-skills-auditing-ml-model-supply-chain - Seller: https://agentstack.voostack.com/s/unboundcompute - Browse the marketplace: https://agentstack.voostack.com/browse --- Listed on AgentStack — the marketplace for AI agent skills and MCP servers. Every listing is security-reviewed. Creators keep 70%.