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MCP unreviewed MIT Self-run

Lilith Shell

mcp-charles-adedotun-lilith-shell · by charles-adedotun

An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that enables AI assistants to execute terminal commands securely.

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Install

$ agentstack add mcp-charles-adedotun-lilith-shell

Open-source listing, not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.

Security review

⚠ Flagged

1 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures
  • high Dangerous shell/eval execution.

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution Used
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

Reliability & compatibility

Not yet reviewed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
4mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude DesktopCursorWindsurf

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.

How agent discovery & health will work →
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About

Lilith Shell

Experimental MCP server that exposes local shell command execution to an AI assistant.

Current Status

This repository should be treated as a prototype, not as a secure shell server.

The current implementation exposes one MCP tool, execute_command, that runs a caller-provided command string through subprocess.run(..., shell=True). It has a fixed five-minute timeout, captures stdout and stderr, and accepts an optional working directory. It does not currently implement the security controls previously described in this README.

Recommended profile action: archive or unpin this repository until the security model is rebuilt and tested.

Security Warning

Do not run this against a host, account, or directory that contains credentials, production data, private source code, SSH keys, cloud tokens, or other sensitive material.

Known gaps in the current code:

  • No command allowlist or denylist enforcement
  • No strict, permissive, or lockdown modes
  • No working-directory boundary enforcement
  • No environment filtering
  • No output sanitization
  • No audit log
  • No shell selection via configuration
  • No streaming output
  • No Windows-specific execution path
  • shell=True is used with untrusted tool input

These gaps make the project unsuitable for production use and risky even in a normal developer workstation.

What Works Today

The MCP server registers one tool:

  • execute_command
  • input: command string
  • optional input: directory string, defaulting to ~
  • behavior: executes the command in the requested directory and returns exit code, stdout, and stderr

What Was De-Scoped

The previous README claimed support for command allowlisting, dangerous command detection, configurable modes, output sanitization, audit logging, working-directory confinement, cross-platform shell selection, and streaming output. Those capabilities are not present in the current source tree.

Minimal Patch Plan Before Re-Publishing

Before this should be presented as a security-oriented MCP server:

  1. Replace shell=True string execution with argv-based execution.
  2. Add a required strict mode by default, with explicit command allowlists.
  3. Canonicalize and enforce a configured workspace root before every command.
  4. Build tests for command parsing, blocked commands, path traversal, symlink escapes, timeout behavior, and output limits.
  5. Redact common secret patterns from returned output.
  6. Add bounded output handling so large commands cannot exhaust memory or flood MCP responses.
  7. Add auditable command logs with timestamps, cwd, exit code, and block reason.
  8. Document exactly which shells, platforms, and threat boundaries are supported.

Development

pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest

License

MIT

Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.