Install
$ agentstack add mcp-glorybnat-aegis-pentest Open-source listing — not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.
Security review
⚠ Flagged1 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- • Prompt-injection patterns
- • Secret / credential exfiltration
- • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- • Untrusted network calls
- • Known-malicious package signatures
- high Pipes remote content directly into a shell (remote code execution).
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
aegis · v0.12.0
Adaptive Engagement & Generic Inspection Scanner
An autonomous, AI-orchestrated web penetration testing agent. Aegis handles reconnaissance, fingerprinting, vulnerability discovery, verification, and reporting so the human pentester focuses on what actually requires human judgment.
What it is
Aegis runs structured, methodology-driven engagements against web targets. It profiles the host environment, fingerprints the target stack, selects relevant tools and tests from the PTES + OWASP WSTG v4.2 playbook, executes them concurrently, and produces a verified findings report with remediation guidance.
It is not a Burp Suite replacement. It is the autonomous recon and vuln-discovery layer that feeds the human pentester, eliminating roughly 70% of routine busywork.
Hard constraints built into the runtime:
- Every engagement requires a signed
scope.yamlbefore any network egress. - Every outbound request is matched against in-scope and out-of-scope rules before the socket opens.
- Scope violations abort the current task and are written to the audit log.
- Destructive tools (
sqlmap,wpscan,commix,kerbrute,crackmapexec, …) refuse to run without operator approval unlessscope.yamlexplicitly enables them. - There is no
--forceflag that bypasses scope.
Installation
Option A — Docker (recommended, all tools pre-installed)
# Pull pre-built image (~4 GB) or build locally (~15-30 min)
aegis docker pull # from GitHub Container Registry
# OR
aegis docker build # build locally from Dockerfile
# Run an engagement
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
aegis docker run engagements/2026-acme
# Interactive shell with every tool on PATH
aegis docker shell
# Check image status and tool inventory
aegis docker status
The Docker image is based on Kali rolling and includes every tool in the catalog.
Option B — PyPI
pip install aegis-pentest
# or
pipx install aegis-pentest
Option C — Arch (AUR)
yay -S aegis-pentest
# or
paru -S aegis-pentest
Optdepends cover the full tool surface; install only what you need.
Option D — Native install script (one-liner)
# Auto-detects Arch, Kali, Ubuntu/Debian, Fedora, macOS
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/glorybnat/aegis-pentest/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
# Or from the repo
bash scripts/install.sh
# Build Docker image instead
bash scripts/install.sh --docker
Option E — From source
git clone https://github.com/glorybnat/aegis-pentest.git
cd aegis-pentest
pip install -e .
cd tui && npm install && npm run build
After installing AEGIS, detect what's already on the host and fill in the rest:
aegis init # detect what's installed
aegis env tools --missing # show what's missing + install commands
aegis env install --missing # install everything (no-sudo tools)
aegis env install --missing --dry-run # preview first
Requirements:
- Python 3.12+
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYin environment- Docker (Option A) or pentest toolchain (Option B–E)
Quickstart
# Docker quickstart (zero host setup)
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
aegis docker build # or: aegis docker pull
aegis docker run engagements/2026-acme
# Native quickstart
# First run: profiles host, lists missing tools
aegis init
# Sync the knowledge base (NVD, GHSA, nuclei-templates, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS)
aegis kb sync
# Create a new engagement
aegis engagement new --client "Acme Corp" --domain "acme.com"
# Fill in the authorization details
vim engagements/2026-05-acme/scope.yaml
# Optional: seed endpoints from an existing API spec or proxy trace
aegis ingest openapi engagements/2026-05-acme/spec.yaml --engagement engagements/2026-05-acme
aegis ingest postman engagements/2026-05-acme/collection.json --engagement engagements/2026-05-acme
aegis ingest har engagements/2026-05-acme/burp.har --engagement engagements/2026-05-acme
# Run
aegis run engagements/2026-05-acme
# Resume from the last completed phase after a crash or Ctrl+C
aegis run engagements/2026-05-acme # picks up state.json automatically
# Generate report — md/html/json/sarif/h1/bugcrowd, or "all"
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format html
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format sarif # GitHub/GitLab code scanning
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format h1 # HackerOne JSON, one per finding
aegis report engagements/2026-05-acme --format bugcrowd # Bugcrowd VRT bundle
scope.yaml
Aegis refuses to run without this file. No exceptions.
engagement_id: "BL-2026-007"
client: "Acme Corp"
operator: "Majd Bnat "
authorization:
document_ref: "SOW-2026-007.pdf"
signed_date: "2026-05-12"
expiry: "2026-06-12"
in_scope:
domains:
- "*.acme.com"
- "api-staging.acme.io"
ips:
- "203.0.113.0/24"
out_of_scope:
- "admin.acme.com"
- "*.internal.acme.com"
rules_of_engagement:
rate_limit_rps: 10
business_hours_only: false
destructive_tests: false
no_credential_stuffing: true
no_dos_tests: true
confirm_before: # per-engagement gate for destructive tools
- sqlmap
- hydra
- commix
Architecture
aegis CLI
|
Engagement Manager
(scope validation, lifecycle, audit log)
|
+-----------------+-----------------+
| | |
Environment Target Methodology
Profiler Profiler Engine
(host info) (fingerprint) (PTES phases)
| | |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
|
LLM Orchestrator
(Haiku / Sonnet / Opus)
|
+----------+---------+----------+----------+
| | | | |
Tool Knowledge Findings PTT PoC
Registry Base DB Graph Generator
(173 tools) (NVD/GHSA (SQLite) (aiosqlite) (14 types)
+KEV/EPSS)
| |
Tool Executor Hallucination Guard
(async, sandboxed, (output verification)
destructive-gated)
|
Reporter
(md/html/json/sarif/h1/bugcrowd)
The orchestrator runs a bounded loop per phase:
plan(phase_context) -> execute(action) -> observe(result) -> update(state)
^ |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
until phase complete OR budget exceeded
Three independent budgets bound each phase: token budget, wall-clock time, and action count. Whichever trips first ends the phase and triggers finalize mode.
State is persisted to /state.json after every phase advance via atomic tmp + os.replace. Re-running aegis run against the same directory resumes at the last saved phase.
Reasoning engine
v0.12 repositions AEGIS from "tool dispatcher" to "brilliant bug-hunting partner". The agent reads observations, opens a structured theory, dispatches probes to test it, and writes a self-critique before advancing. The OOHA loop is the spine:
| Step | Meaning | |---|---| | OBSERVE | Read the new observations, the Open hypotheses block, and the Suggested-next block. What's actually new? | | ORIENT | Where in the kill chain am I? What's the highest-impact primitive within reach? | | HYPOTHESISE | Before dispatching a tool, propose_hypothesis with a one-paragraph rationale. If an open hypothesis matches, update_hypothesis with new evidence instead. | | ACT | Dispatch run_tool / aegis_verify in batches — independent calls run in parallel. | | CRITIQUE | Once per phase, self_critique — what assumption am I making that I haven't tested? Which open hypotheses are dead ends? |
Four reasoning verbs land in PLAN_TOOLS and bypass the per-phase enum filter (the agent reasons at every phase, not just VULN_ANALYSIS):
| Verb | Use | |---|---| | propose_hypothesis(target, vuln_class, rationale) | Open a structured theory before dispatching tools. Dedupes on (target, vuln_class) so repeated calls return the existing row. | | update_hypothesis(id, status, evidence_for, evidence_against) | Append evidence; transitions to CONFIRMED auto-write a Finding (with severity inferred from vuln_class) so chain detection fires immediately. | | mark_dead_end(id, reason) | Retire a theory permanently — keeps the suggester from re-surfacing it. The reason lands as evidence_against on the row. | | self_critique(reflection) | Free-form reasoning persisted as a reasoning_trace audit event. The sanctioned "scratchpad" — no DB side-effect beyond the log. |
The Hypothesis lifecycle is PROPOSED → TESTING → CONFIRMED | REFUTED | DEAD_END. Open hypotheses are injected back into the observation summary every turn so the agent sees its own working theory across turns.
Parallel dispatch. Non-control tool calls in a single turn now run concurrently via asyncio.gather, capped by a per-runner semaphore (defaults to executor.max_parallel_tools, falls back to 4). Control verbs — advance_phase, change_phase, abort — stay serial so the orchestrator can short-circuit. One crashing dispatch never kills the rest of the batch.
Structured failure signals. _recent_calls was dict[(tool, target), int] carrying "failed N times". It's now dict[(tool, target), FailureSignal] with an 8-kind classifier (TIMEOUT, RATE_LIMITED, PERMISSION_DENIED, AUTH_REQUIRED, OUT_OF_SCOPE, BINARY_MISSING, ZERO_RESULTS, EXCEPTION) and an attacker-flavoured pivot hint per kind:
rate_limited→ useaegis_verifyin-process; it's not rate-limitedauth_required→ ingest the captured Burp/ZAP HAR with cookies viaaegis ingest har --replaybinary_missing→aegis env install --missing, oraegis_tool_list_helpfor equivalents
The STUCK SIGNALS block in the observation summary renders kind + count + pivot, most-recent-first, capped at 5.
Attack chain detection
Findings carry structured tags. The chain detector matches on tag sets, not title substrings. 25 chains ship out of the box — 7 legacy web chains, 10 modern web/API chains, 5 Active Directory chains, and 3 v0.12 high-ROI gaps (host header, web cache deception, parameter pollution):
| Chain | Severity | Predicate (tag groups) | |---|---|---| | Account takeover via CORS + JWT | critical | cors_wildcard + jwt-family | | Stored XSS + CSRF = session hijack | critical | xss_stored + csrf | | SQL injection + weak crypto | critical | sqli + weak_crypto | | SSRF + internal service exposure | high | ssrf + cloud/internal | | SSRF + cloud metadata v1 | critical | ssrf + cloud_metadata_v1 | | Mass assignment + admin endpoint | critical | mass_assignment + admin_endpoint | | Open bucket + reachable Lambda | high | bucket_open + lambda_invoke | | Request smuggling → auth header bypass | critical | request_smuggling + auth_header | | Cache poisoning → auth bypass | critical | cache_poisoning + auth_cookie | | Prototype pollution → RCE sink | critical | prototype_pollution + dangerous_sink | | JWT alg-confusion → privilege escalation | critical | jwt_alg_confusion + privileged_endpoint | | Exposed .git → source code disclosure | high | git_exposure | | Open registration + IDOR | high | open_registration + idor | | Race condition → auth bypass | high | race_condition + auth | | Kerberoasting → service account compromise | high | ad_kerberoast + ad_spn + weak/service | | AS-REP roasting | high | ad_no_preauth + weak/user | | DCSync → full domain compromise | critical | ad_dcsync + any AD creds | | AdminSDHolder ACL backdoor | critical | ad_adminsdholder + any AD creds | | Unconstrained delegation → ticket forge | critical | ad_unconstrained + any AD creds | | Host Header Injection → Cache Poisoning | critical | host_header_injection + cache_poisoning/redirect_open | | Web Cache Deception → Auth Token Leak | high | web_cache_deception + auth_cookie/auth_header | | HTTP Parameter Pollution → Auth Bypass | high | http_parameter_pollution + auth_bypass/idor/mass_assignment |
For engagements predating the tag rollout, a substring fallback still fires the legacy 7 rules against finding titles.
Guided hunting
Chains are post-hoc detection — they fire when findings are already in the DB. Playbooks are the proactive counterpart: 28 entries in src/aegis/analysis/vuln_playbooks.py say "when you suspect X, run these probes; when you confirm X, hunt Y next".
| Field | Meaning | |---|---| | vuln_class | one of the TAG_* constants from chains.py | | severity_floor | critical / high / medium / low / info | | preconditions | state predicates (has_params, has_login, has_jwt, …) | | probes | concrete (tool_name, args_template, rationale) tuples | | confirm_chain | the ChainRule.name this playbook ultimately feeds, if any | | follow_ups | other vuln classes to hunt next when this one fires |
Initial set (one playbook per chain tag):
sqli, nosqli, cmdi, ssti, xxe, xss_stored, xss_reflected, ssrf, lfi, cloud_metadata_v1, bucket_open, request_smuggling, cache_poisoning, prototype_pollution, jwt_alg_confusion, jwt_weak_secret, csrf, idor, race_condition, mass_assignment, git_exposure, cors_wildcard, ad_kerberoast, ad_no_preauth, ad_dcsync, host_header_injection, web_cache_deception, http_parameter_pollution.
After every phase tick, EngagementRunner._suggested_next builds an escalation state from confirmed findings (tags + endpoints + tech stack) and runs adaptive.escalate. The top three actions are injected into the next observation summary as a Suggested next probes block; the model can act on them or ignore. Either way the recommendation is logged to audit_event with event_type='escalation_suggested' so aegis stats can answer "how often did the model take the suggestion?".
Tag inference (src/aegis/analysis/tag_inference.py) runs at the persistence boundary inside FindingsDB.add_finding. Findings get tags from a tool-base map (e.g. impacket_get_userspns → [ad_kerberoast, ad_spn]) plus a 31-rule substring matcher over the title + evidence text (distinguishing jwt_alg_confusion from jwt_weak_secret, xss_stored from xss_reflected, IMDSv1 in payloads tagging cloud_metadata_v1). Explicit tags from the caller are preserved.
Lateral pivots (v0.12). src/aegis/reasoning/lateral.py encodes the post-confirmation question every brilliant bug hunter asks: "given primitive X, what NEW classes does it unlock?" 10 hand-curated rows cover the highest-leverage chains — SSRF → IMDS → IAM → S3 → credential pivot; SQLi → file read via INTO OUTFILE → log poisoning → RCE; .git exposure → source review → JWT secret extraction → forge any token. Every confirmed primitive auto-proposes one hypothesis per unlocked class (proposed_by="lateral:") so the agent sees concrete next probes already framed as "given X, hunt Y because…".
Partial-chain primers (v0.12). Most chains need 2–3 required tag groups. When one group matches but at least one is missing, chains.partial_matches() returns the near-miss; the orchestrator surfaces them in the obs summary as PARTIAL CHAINS (one probe away) with what we have and what's missing — the agent sees concrete one-probe-away opportunities without an LLM planning call.
Token model
Aegis is designed to complete a full medium-scope e
…
Source & license
This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: glorybnat
- Source: glorybnat/aegis-pentest
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://aegis-pentest.vercel.app
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.