Install
$ agentstack add mcp-gnana997-bumper Open-source listing, not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.
Security review
⚠ Flagged1 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- • Prompt-injection patterns
- • Secret / credential exfiltration
- • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- • Untrusted network calls
- • Known-malicious package signatures
- high Pipes remote content directly into a shell (remote code execution).
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
bumper
A Terraform-plan & dependency safety gate — one deterministic gate for your two riskiest moments: the terraform apply that reshapes your cloud, and the dependency you're about to install.
[](https://github.com/gnana997/bumper/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [](https://github.com/gnana997/bumper/releases) [](https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/gnana997/bumper) [](LICENSE) [](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/bumper-terraform-plan-safety-gate)
bumper.sh · [Docs](docs/) · [Examples](examples/) · GitHub Action
bumper blocks two classes of change before they happen:
- a
terraform applythat would destroy or expose your AWS,
GCP, or Azure account — read from a terraform show -json plan;
- an install that pulls in a known-vulnerable or known-malicious
dependency — read from your lockfile.
Both verdicts are 100% deterministic, so it's safe to block a merge, an apply, or an AI agent on them. A single static Go binary; no API key, no account.
See it
Catch a destructive apply — reads the plan diff, not just the end state:
$ terraform show -json plan.tfplan > plan.json
$ bumper plan.json
CRITICAL aws_db_instance.orders This apply will DESTROY and recreate a database with no final snapshot
rule AWS_DB_DESTRUCTIVE_REPLACE_NO_SNAPSHOT
fix Set skip_final_snapshot = false, or find what forces replacement before applying.
CRITICAL aws_security_group.api Public internet ingress (0.0.0.0/0) to a sensitive port range
rule AWS_SG_PUBLIC_INGRESS
fix Restrict cidr_blocks/ipv6_cidr_blocks to known ranges and narrow the port range.
3 finding(s) 2 critical · 1 high
$ echo $?
1
Catch a poisoned dependency — known CVEs and known-malicious packages:
$ bumper deps package-lock.json
MALICIOUS flatmap-stream@0.1.1 (npm) — MAL-2025-20690: Malicious code in flatmap-stream (npm)
CRITICAL event-stream@3.3.6 (npm) GHSA-mh6f-8j2x-4483 fix → 4.0.0
CRITICAL lodash@4.17.4 (npm) CVE-2019-10744 fix → 4.17.12
CRITICAL minimist@1.2.0 (npm) CVE-2021-44906 fix → 1.2.6
4 vulnerable, 1 malicious package(s).
$ echo $?
1
Both examples are runnable from this repo — see [examples/](examples/). On a terminal, severities are colored (critical red, high amber); piped/CI output stays plain. Add --explain (plan scan) for an AI plain-English walkthrough.
Install
# Homebrew (macOS)
brew install gnana997/tap/bumper
# install script (macOS / Linux) — downloads the latest release, checksum-verified
curl -fsSL https://get.bumper.sh | sh
# Go
go install github.com/gnana997/bumper/cmd/bumper@latest
Every release is checksummed, cosign-signed (keyless), and carries a SLSA build-provenance attestation — see [docs/architecture.md → Releases and provenance](docs/architecture.md#releases-and-provenance) to verify the binary came from this repo's CI.
Quick start
# Terraform: scan a plan
terraform plan -out plan.tfplan
terraform show -json plan.tfplan > plan.json
bumper plan.json
bumper --explain plan.json # add plain-English enrichment
# Dependencies: scan a lockfile (npm / pip / uv / go.sum / …; auto-detected)
bumper deps package-lock.json
bumper deps # auto-detect a lockfile in the current dir
Exit codes: 0 = clean, 1 = findings present (CI-friendly), 2 = usage/parse error. Output formats (both scans): --format text (default) · json · sarif · markdown. Only package coordinates leave your machine for a deps scan — never your code.
Four ways to run it
- CLI / CI gate — text · JSON · SARIF (Security tab) · a sticky PR comment,
for both plan and dependency scans.
- Agent guard hooks — block an unverified
terraform applyand a
known-malicious package install before they run, and scan dependencies after install. Wire them in with bumper init.
- Hosted [Advisor MCP](docs/mcp.md) — your agent queries it for
best-practice, CVE, and malware data (lookup-only — your code never leaves the machine).
- [Agent skills](docs/agents.md#agent-skills) —
SKILL.mdplaybooks that
teach the agent to drive all of the above. bumper init installs them, or npx skills add gnana997/bumper for any agent.
An AI CLI you already have (claude, gemini, codex, opencode, auggie) optionally explains each finding in plain English — zero setup, zero cost. The deterministic core stands alone if it's absent.
bumper init # Claude Code (auto-detected)
bumper init --agent augment # or Augment
bumper init --agent gemini # or Gemini CLI
What you can do
| | | | | --- | --- | --- | | Scan a plan | flag exposure/destruction in a Terraform plan, optional AI enrichment | [docs/cli.md](docs/cli.md) | | Scan dependencies | flag vulnerable + malicious packages from a lockfile | [docs/cli.md](docs/cli.md) | | Enforce the apply | verify binds a passing scan to a plan by sha256; guard blocks an unverified apply | [docs/agents.md](docs/agents.md) | | Agent guardrail | bumper init wires the guard hooks + the hosted Advisor MCP into Claude Code, Augment, and Gemini CLI (--agent) | [docs/agents.md](docs/agents.md) | | Dependency guardrail | block malicious installs, scan deps for CVEs — in the agent loop and in CI | [docs/agents.md](docs/agents.md#dependency-guardrail) | | Agent skills | bumper skills install adds SKILL.md playbooks that teach the agent to drive bumper | [docs/agents.md](docs/agents.md#agent-skills) | | CI / GitHub Action | SARIF to the Security tab, a sticky PR comment, fail on high+ | [docs/ci.md](docs/ci.md) | | Search the catalog | bumper search ranks enforced rules + an advisory best-practice catalog | [docs/cli.md](docs/cli.md#search) | | Interactive console | bumper tui — the "hazard console" for the scary local apply | [docs/cli.md](docs/cli.md#tui) |
Coverage
Terraform rules — 112 curated, 100% deterministic: 20 critical · 57 high · 32 medium · 3 low, across AWS (60), GCP (35), and Azure (17): a consistent cross-cloud baseline (public storage/databases, open admin ports, public k8s control planes, wildcard/over-privileged IAM, TLS, encryption, public snapshots, destruction) plus deep per-cloud coverage. Every rule is hand-ported with a passing and a negative fixture, and carries its provenance (source: trivy with the upstream AVD-* id, or source: custom). Coverage map, rule format, and how to write your own: [docs/rules.md](docs/rules.md).
Dependency data — hosted [Advisor](docs/mcp.md): CVE/OSV advisories across npm, PyPI, Maven, Go, crates, RubyGems, and NuGet, plus known-malicious package intel (MAL-*) — refreshed daily, with AI-written remediation insights on critical/high CVEs. bumper deps and the agent malware-gate query it by package coordinate only.
Offline advisory catalog: bumper search also spans ~2,600 knowledge-only best-practice entries normalized from Trivy, Checkov, KICS, and Prowler — so an agent can ask "what should I bake in before writing Terraform for X?" fully offline.
Why bumper is different
- Reads the plan diff, not just the end state. Most scanners check the
resulting config. bumper also checks the transition (create / delete / replace) — the only way to catch "this apply will destroy your database." That destruction class is the differentiator.
- Catches malice, not just bugs. Dependency scanning flags known-vulnerable
versions and known-malicious packages — the supply-chain attack, not only the stale CVE.
- It enforces, it doesn't just warn.
verifybinds a passing scan to the
exact plan by sha256; the guard hook then blocks an unverified apply/destroy. A linter you can ignore becomes a gate you can't.
- Built for the agent era. Tool-layer guard hooks (Terraform apply + package
installs) plus the hosted Advisor MCP mean your AI agent can no longer silently apply infra it didn't verify or install a known-malicious package.
- Deterministic core stands alone. The AI layer is garnish; if it's absent or
fails, the deterministic findings are still complete and blocking.
How it stacks up against Checkov/Trivy (IaC) and Dependabot/Snyk/Socket (deps) — including what it deliberately doesn't do — is in [docs/comparison.md](docs/comparison.md).
CI / GitHub Action
Two composite actions, same signed release binary:
# Terraform plan safety gate — SARIF + sticky PR comment, fail on high+
- uses: gnana997/bumper@v1
with:
plan-json: plan.json
fail-severity: high
# Dependency scan — auto-detects lockfiles; malware always fails the job
- uses: gnana997/bumper/deps@v1
with:
fail-severity: high
Inputs, permissions, SARIF, and the sticky-comment behavior are documented in [docs/ci.md](docs/ci.md). (The Marketplace listing is the Terraform action; the dependency scan is the same repo at the deps subpath.)
Documentation
| | | | --- | --- | | [docs/cli.md](docs/cli.md) | command reference — scan, deps, list, search, explain, verify, guard, tui, init | | [docs/rules.md](docs/rules.md) | rule format (YAML + CEL), coverage, the advisory catalog, writing your own | | [docs/ci.md](docs/ci.md) | the GitHub Actions — inputs, permissions, SARIF, sticky comment | | [docs/agents.md](docs/agents.md) | the agent guardrail — the two tool-layer gates (Terraform apply + dependency install), agent skills, bumper init, supported agents | | [docs/mcp.md](docs/mcp.md) | the hosted Advisor MCP — tools, what leaves the machine | | [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) | internals, tech stack, supply-chain provenance, roadmap | | [examples/](examples/) | runnable, hermetic examples for both gates | | [e2e/](e2e/) | run the guardrail against a real Claude Code or Gemini CLI agent yourself (manual, local) |
Contributing & security
New rules and real-world plan fixtures are the most valuable contributions — see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md). To report a vulnerability, use private disclosure per [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) (not a public issue).
License
[Apache-2.0](LICENSE). Built-in rules adapted from Apache-2.0 sources (Trivy, Checkov) retain attribution in [NOTICE](NOTICE); CIS Benchmark content is not redistributed.
Source & license
This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: gnana997
- Source: gnana997/bumper
- License: Apache-2.0
- Homepage: https://bumper.sh
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.