AgentStack
Browse Sign in
Browse Why AgentStack Sell Docs
Sign in
MCP verified Apache-2.0 Self-run

Command Scope Contract

mcp-madeinplutofabio-command-scope-contract · by madeinplutofabio

Bounded shell and CLI execution for AI agents: structured contracts, policy-gated execution, hardened Linux runtime enforcement, and signed receipts.

No reviews yet
0 installs
21 views
0.0% view→install

Install

$ agentstack add mcp-madeinplutofabio-command-scope-contract

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

Verified badge

Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.

AgentStack Verified badge Links to your public security report.
[![AgentStack Verified](https://agentstack.voostack.com/badges/verified.svg)](https://agentstack.voostack.com/security/report/mcp-madeinplutofabio-command-scope-contract)

Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
1mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude DesktopCursorWindsurf

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.

How agent discovery & health will work →
Are you the author of Command Scope Contract? Claim this listing to set pricing, connect Stripe payouts, and keep 70% of every sale.
Sign up to claim

About

CSC — Command Scope Contract

Bounded shell and CLI execution for AI agents. Structured contracts. Policy-gated execution. Signed receipts.


CSC is a protocol for bounded shell and CLI execution by AI agents.

CSC is complementary to MCP, not a replacement for it.

It exists to remove ambient authority from agentic execution.

Instead of giving an agent raw shell access, CSC requires the agent to submit a structured command contract that declares:

  • what it wants to run
  • why it wants to run it
  • where it wants to run it
  • what it needs to read
  • what it may write
  • whether it needs network access
  • whether it needs secrets
  • what kind of effect it may cause
  • how long it may run

A trusted policy layer evaluates the contract. If allowed, a constrained executor runs it and emits a verifiable, signed receipt.

Why CSC exists

Shell is useful because it is universal, composable, and token-efficient.

Shell is dangerous because it often carries too much implicit power.

CSC keeps the flexibility of shell while making scope, policy, and execution evidence explicit.

Execution model

agent -> command contract -> policy gate -> constrained executor -> execution receipt

Status

v0.5.2 — bounded production-ready

The reference runner implements the full CSC v0.1 protocol:

  • Stage 1a — Protocol complete: spec frozen, conformance suite, policy schema with structured reason codes, receipt field semantics
  • Stage 1b — Hardened defaults: fail-closed executor, path enforcement, resource limits, capped output capture, adversarial test suite
  • Stage 2 — First hardened mode: Linux sandbox (bubblewrap + setpriv + prlimit), Ed25519 receipt signing, approval artifacts with replay prevention, end-to-end integration tests
  • Stage 3 — Production candidate: release infrastructure, CI gates, security process, pilot validation, internal red-team review

Bounded production claim

> CSC hardened mode is safe enough for bounded production use in Linux-based, filesystem-bounded local/CI execution workflows without network access, under the documented trust assumptions and deployment constraints.

See [docs/deployment-modes.md](docs/deployment-modes.md) for security claims by mode and [docs/production-readiness-gate.md](docs/production-readiness-gate.md) for the formal release gate.

Deployment modes

| Mode | Platform | Security boundary | Receipt signing | |---|---|---|---| | Local | Any | Pre-launch validation only | Optional | | Hardened | Linux only | Kernel-enforced (bwrap namespaces) | Mandatory |

Local mode is for development, testing, and demos. Hardened mode is for CI/CD pipelines and production-like workflows where execution integrity matters.

See [docs/deployment-modes.md](docs/deployment-modes.md) for full details.

Design goals

  • Keep shell composability.
  • Remove raw arbitrary shell by default.
  • Make intent and scope explicit before execution.
  • Let trusted policy decide.
  • Emit signed receipts for audit and provenance.
  • Enforce boundaries with the kernel, not just Python.
  • Stay small enough to implement and adopt quickly.

Non-goals

CSC does not attempt to replace:

  • container isolation (CSC uses it as the enforcement layer)
  • IAM
  • workflow engines
  • semantic validation of task correctness
  • prompt injection defenses at every layer

CSC is an execution-boundary protocol. For a full statement of what CSC contributes and what it reuses, see [RFC-0003](rfcs/0003-csc-positioning.md).

Core objects

  • CommandContract — what the agent wants to run
  • PolicyDecision — whether it may run (with structured reason codes)
  • ExecutionReceipt — what actually happened (signed in hardened mode)
  • ApprovalArtifact — human authorization for sensitive operations

v0.1 rules

  • argv arrays only
  • no raw shell strings
  • no bash -lc, sh -c, eval, python -c, node -e by default
  • explicit read/write/network/env/secret scope
  • default deny on omitted capabilities
  • bounded runtime
  • signed receipts in hardened mode

Quickstart

# Install from PyPI
pip install csc-runner

# Or install from source with dev dependencies
pip install -e ".[dev]"

# Check a contract against a policy (no execution)
csc check examples/contracts/git-status.json examples/policies/dev-readonly.yaml

# Run a contract (local mode)
csc run examples/contracts/git-status.json examples/policies/dev-readonly.yaml

# Run in hardened mode (Linux, requires bwrap/setpriv/prlimit)
csc run contract.json policy.yaml \
  --mode hardened \
  --sign --signing-key key.pem --key-id prod-01

# Verify a signed receipt
csc verify-receipt receipt.json --public-key pub.pem --key-id prod-01

Documentation

  • [Spec v0.1](docs/spec-v0.1.md) — protocol specification
  • [Deployment Modes](docs/deployment-modes.md) — local vs hardened, security claims
  • [Key Management](docs/key-management.md) — signing key lifecycle
  • [Threat Model](docs/threat-model.md) — threat classes and mitigations
  • [Security Targets](docs/security-targets.md) — claims matrix by mode
  • [Production Readiness Gate](docs/production-readiness-gate.md) — formal release checklist
  • [Policy Packs](docs/policy-packs.md) — organizational policy conventions
  • [Reason Codes](docs/reason-codes.md) — structured decision reason registry
  • [Security Policy](SECURITY.md) — vulnerability reporting
  • [Internal Red-Team Review](docs/internal-red-team-review.md) — adversarial review findings
  • [Pilot Retrospective](docs/pilot-retrospective.md) — pilot execution and lessons learned

RFCs

  • [RFC-0001](rfcs/0001-csc-core.md) — CSC core protocol
  • [RFC-0002](rfcs/0002-pic-alignment.md) — PIC alignment and mapping
  • [RFC-0003](rfcs/0003-csc-positioning.md) — CSC positioning, contribution, and boundaries

Contributing

Contributions welcome. See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) and start with docs/spec-v0.1.md and schemas/.

License

Apache-2.0

Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

No reviews yet, be the first.

Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.