Btp Cf Mcp

btp-cf-mcp

**An MCP server that lets an AI assistant inspect and manage your SAP BTP account and Cloud Foundry — as you. A user signs in once via IAS; the server then calls the BTP and Cloud Foundry APIs under that person's own identity, so their real roles are enforced and the audit trail shows the real human — no shared technical password, no second login. A shared read-only technical user** mode is also available for headless/automation callers.

> Status: a working proof-of-concept, read-only by default. Reads are live-verified on a free-tier > BTP account; writes (app lifecycle, service create/delete) execute only when explicitly enabled and > only against allowlisted targets. See [Status](#status).

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What it is

An MCP server (same lineage as arc-1, which does this for ABAP) that gives Claude — or any MCP client — a small, safe set of tools over:

• SAP BTP account — subaccounts, environments, entitlements (via the btp CLI server APIs).
• Cloud Foundry — orgs, spaces, apps, services (via the Cloud Controller v3 API).

The point of difference is identity: the server is its own OAuth authorization server that proxies login to IAS, seals the user's credential into its own token, and then acts as that user on every call — CF enforces their org/space roles, BTP enforces their global-account roles. It reimplements the btp CLI server protocol over plain HTTPS, so there is no CLI binary in the container.

What you can do

Reads and writes are separate tools so each read tool is honestly readOnlyHint:true (hosts auto-approve, no confirm friction), and a read-only deployment renders only the two Inspect tools:

| Tool | Actions | Notes | |---|---|---| | CFInspect (read) | orgs, spaces, apps, services, routes, app_detail, app_processes | Cloud Controller v3; as the user or a shared CF token. app_processes = instance health/state | | BTPInspect (read) | subaccount, subaccounts, global_account, environments, entitlements, subscriptions | entitlements = global-account catalog, or a subaccount's plan assignments if you pass a subaccount | | whoami | — | diagnostic: resolved scopes + token claims | | CFApps / BTPServices (write) | restart/stop/start an app · create/delete service instances | per-user (OAuth) only; hidden unless ALLOW_WRITES=true; targets must be allowlisted — CFApps resolves the app's real space server-side |

A deliberately small surface (fewer tools select more accurately). Every action is defined once in a single-source registry (src/registry.ts); the schema, scopes, MCP annotations, and dispatch all derive from it — so growing capability is adding a row, not a tool.

Use cases

• "Which of my apps are running, and is anything crashed?" — an AI ops helper over CFInspect.apps

for a developer, scoped to exactly the spaces they have roles in.

• "What service plans is this account entitled to, and how much quota is left?" — BTPInspect.entitlements

for capacity/licensing questions, without opening the cockpit.

• "List my subaccounts and their environments" — a quick BTP-account overview from chat.
• Team read-only assistant — point a shared, read-only technical user (Global Account Viewer +

Subaccount Viewer) at a support channel so anyone can ask about the landscape, with one auditable identity.

• Per-developer accountability — each developer's assistant logs in as them, so it sees only what

they're entitled to and every action is attributed to the real person.

How it works

 MCP client ──OAuth (this server IS the auth server, proxying to IAS)──▶ [btp-cf-mcp]
      │  or  Authorization: Bearer                                   │ MCP token = a sealed JWE
      ▼                                                                       │ holding the user's IAS credential
   IAS login (browser, once)  ◀───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
                                  per request: unseal → IAS app-to-app exchange │
                    ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    ▼ CFInspect                            ▼ BTPInspect
        CF UAA → Cloud Controller v3 (as you)   btp CLI *server* REST (as you) — no binary

• Inbound — the server exposes OAuth (/authorize /token /register + discovery), proxies login to

IAS, and issues its own token: a sealed, audience-bound JWE of the IAS credential (never a passthrough). DCR is guarded by a consent gate so a user always sees which client they're authorizing.

• Outbound — per request it unseals the credential, does the IAS app-to-app exchange, and calls CF

(via CF UAA) and BTP (via the CLI-server protocol) as the user.

Full design + the hard-won auth details: [docs/guides/per-user-ias-auth-setup.md](docs/guides/per-user-ias-auth-setup.md).

Two identity models

• Per-user ("acts as you") — best audit + least-privilege; each user logs in via IAS.
• Shared read-only technical user — one service account (Global Account Viewer + Subaccount Viewer) for

headless/API-key callers; simpler, one audited identity.

Both can run on the same instance — an OAuth caller runs per-user, an API-key caller uses the tech user. Setup + trade-offs: [docs/guides/admin-deployment.md](docs/guides/admin-deployment.md) → "Identity models".

Safety

• Read-only by default (ALLOW_WRITES=false); writes need explicit enablement + a fail-closed target

allowlist (ALLOWED_SUBACCOUNTS/ORGS/SPACES) + per-action DENY_ACTIONS.

• Scopes (read/write/admin) prune the tool list — the LLM only sees what the caller may do.
• Two authz layers — the server's scope gate and the user's real BTP/CF roles (defense in depth).
• Consent gate on the OAuth proxy (confused-deputy defense); secrets never logged; sealed tokens are

audience-bound so they can't be replayed at a sibling service.

Quick start

Deploy to BTP Cloud Foundry (IAS-first, per-user):

npm ci && npm run build                # dist/ is not committed — build before pushing
cf push btp-cf-mcp                     # or: mbt build && cf deploy (secrets via an mtaext OUTSIDE the repo — see mta.yaml)
# then set the IAS-first config (secrets via cf set-env, never manifest.yml):
cf set-env btp-cf-mcp SEALING_SECRET "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
cf set-env btp-cf-mcp IAS_ISSUER https://.accounts.ondemand.com
cf set-env btp-cf-mcp IAS_CLIENT_ID    # + IAS_CLIENT_SECRET, CF_PLATFORM_CLIENT_ID,
cf set-env btp-cf-mcp CF_UAA_URL ...        #   CF_UAA_URL, CF_API, BTP_GA_SUBDOMAIN, PUBLIC_URL
cf restage btp-cf-mcp

Point an MCP client (Claude, npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector) at https:///mcp → it discovers OAuth, you log in via IAS, and tool calls run as you. Full step-by-step (IAS app, the roles that make reads return data, troubleshooting, caveats): [docs/guides/admin-deployment.md](docs/guides/admin-deployment.md).

Status

Shipped + live-verified (free-tier BTP account):

• ✅ IAS-first per-user inbound (OAuth proxy) + a signed, browser-bound consent gate.
• ✅ Per-user Cloud Foundry (Cloud Controller, as the user) and BTP account reads (CLI-server protocol, no binary).
• ✅ Shared read-only technical user mode (username/password login).
• ✅ Read-only safety gate + scope-based tool pruning; sealing-key rotation; refresh-token rotation; session caching.

• ✅ Read/write-split tool surface (CFInspect/BTPInspect + write tools) with honest MCP annotations.

• ✅ Writes: CF app lifecycle (restart/stop/start) + Service Manager create/delete — off by default,

fail-closed target allowlists, and CFApps gates on the app's server-resolved space (never a caller-supplied value).

PoC boundaries:

• ⏳ Async job polling for service create/delete is manual (verify via BTPInspect.service_instances).
• ⏳ Mapping IAS groups → scopes and an MTA-only deploy are future work.

Documentation

• [docs/guides/admin-deployment.md](docs/guides/admin-deployment.md) — deploy + configure (start here)
• [docs/guides/connect-mcp-clients.md](docs/guides/connect-mcp-clients.md) — connect Copilot / Claude Desktop / Codex / VS Code / Cursor
• [docs/guides/per-user-ias-auth-setup.md](docs/guides/per-user-ias-auth-setup.md) — the IAS per-user auth recipe
• [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md) — what works today vs what's planned · [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) — dev setup
• [docs/README.md](docs/README.md) — full docs index · [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) — codebase guide for AI agents

Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: marianfoo
• Source: marianfoo/btp-cf-mcp
• License: MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.