Talos Linux MCP Server

talos-mcp

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An MCP server that exposes Talos Linux cluster management to AI agents (Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, and any MCP-compatible client). Instead of pasting talosctl output into chat, the agent calls structured tools that return machine-readable JSON directly from the Talos gRPC API — zero token cost for intermediate output.

Connects to your cluster via the native Talos gRPC API using the same mTLS credentials as talosctl (~/.talos/config).

Installation

Via npm (no Go required, Linux/macOS, amd64/arm64):

npx talos-mcp

Via npm (global install) for persistent invocation from $PATH:

npm install -g talos-mcp

Installs the binary as /bin/talos-mcp. Verify with:

which talos-mcp        # path
talos-mcp --version    # version + commit hash
npm list -g talos-mcp  # npm's view of the installed version

Upgrade to the latest published release:

npm install -g talos-mcp@latest

New releases appear on npmjs.com within minutes of every feat: / fix: / perf: (or breaking) merge to main — see [CONTRIBUTING.md § Post-merge release pipeline](./CONTRIBUTING.md#post-merge-release-pipeline) for the mechanism.

Download binary (Linux/macOS, amd64/arm64):

Download the latest release from GitHub Releases, extract, and place the binary in your $PATH.

Build from source (requires Go 1.21+):

git clone https://github.com/Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server
cd talos-mcp
go build -o talos-mcp ./cmd/talos-mcp

Configuration

Reads ~/.talos/config by default (the same file talosctl uses). Override via environment variables:

| Variable | Default | Description | |---|---|---| | TALOSCONFIG | ~/.talos/config | Path to talosconfig file | | TALOS_CONTEXT | active context | Context name to use | | TALOS_ENDPOINTS | from config | Comma-separated endpoint overrides | | TALOS_MCP_READ_ONLY | false | Set to true to disable all mutating tools at startup | | TALOS_MCP_HTTP_ADDR | (unset) | If set (e.g. :8080), serve Streamable HTTP instead of stdio | | TALOS_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN | (unset) | Required bearer token when HTTP mode is active | | TALOS_MCP_ALLOWED_NODES | (unset) | Comma-separated IPs, hostnames, and CIDR ranges permitted as tool targets. Unset allows all. | | TALOS_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS | (all) | Comma-separated path prefixes allowed for talos_read_file and talos_list_files (e.g. /etc,/proc). Defense-in-depth only — checks run on the MCP server host and do not resolve symlinks on the remote Talos node, so a symlink under an allowed prefix that points elsewhere is not detected. | | TALOS_MCP_SKIP_VERSION_CHECK | false | Set to true to bypass upgrade path validation (e.g. for factory images or custom tags) | | TALOS_MCP_ENABLE_INSECURE | false | Unlock insecure=true on talos_apply_config / talos_get / talos_version / talos_meta. Bypasses mTLS — REQUIRES TALOS_MCP_INSECURE_ALLOWED_NODES. | | TALOS_MCP_INSECURE_ALLOWED_NODES | (unset) | Comma-separated IPs / CIDRs permitted as maintenance-mode endpoints. Required when TALOS_MCP_ENABLE_INSECURE=true. Refused: 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0, IPv4 mask `` (server SHA-256 fingerprint, copied from the Talos console banner) to enable leaf-cert verification. Without it, the connection is MITMable by anyone on-path between the MCP server and the target node.

• META write/delete safelist. talos_meta write/delete is restricted to meta.UserReserved1/2/3. Privileged keys (Upgrade, StateEncryptionConfig, …) must be enumerated in TALOS_MCP_META_PRIVILEGED_KEYS (per-key, not a blanket flag).

Prompts

| Prompt | Description | |---|---| | diagnose-node | Guided diagnosis workflow for a single node. | | investigate-etcd | Focused investigation of an etcd cluster anomaly. | | debug-service | Service-specific diagnostic workflow (kubelet, containerd, etcd, …). | | pre-upgrade-checklist | Pre-flight verification before a Talos upgrade. | | apply-config | Guided flow for applying a machine config patch (registered only when TALOS_MCP_READ_ONLY is unset). |

Resources and Subscriptions

The server exposes Talos COSI resources as MCP resources:

• talos://cluster/version — static cluster version info.
• talos://cluster/resource-definitions — discover resource types.
• talos://{node}/resource/{namespace}/{type}[/{id}] — list or get COSI resources on a specific node.

MCP clients that implement resources/subscribe (Claude Desktop, Cursor) receive notifications/resources/updated whenever the underlying resource changes — no polling required. Subscriptions are backed by the Talos COSI Watch / WatchKindAggregated streams and honour the same TALOS_MCP_ALLOWED_NODES allowlist as reads.

Subscribable resource types (canonical names):

• MachineStatuses.runtime.talos.dev (MachineStatus)
• Members.cluster.talos.dev (Member)
• NodeAddresses.net.talos.dev (NodeAddress)
• Services.v1alpha1.talos.dev (Service)

Aliases resolve to the canonical type before the allowlist check, so a client subscribing to talos://{node}/resource/runtime/ms/... (alias for MachineStatus) succeeds. Other COSI types reject with resource type %q is not subscribable. Static talos://cluster/* URIs are not subscribable (no COSI backing).

Delivery is rate-limited per (session, URI) via TALOS_MCP_SUBSCRIPTION_RATE / TALOS_MCP_SUBSCRIPTION_BURST; over-rate events are dropped and the client re-reads the resource to catch up. The initial Bootstrapped event is intentionally not forwarded — the client is expected to call resources/read once after subscribe for initial state.

Security Model

Trust Boundaries

MCP Client (Claude Code / Codex)
        │  stdio / JSON-RPC
        ▼
   talos-mcp  ◄── reads TALOSCONFIG (~/.talos/config)
        │  gRPC + mTLS
        ▼
  Talos API (each node)
        │
        ▼
    Node OS

Data flow warning: Tool responses flow directly into the LLM's context window and are sent to the LLM provider. Anything a tool returns — node IPs, hostnames, service configurations, kernel logs, file contents — becomes part of the prompt sent over the network. Do not use this server with clusters containing data you would not be comfortable sending to your LLM provider.

Talos RBAC is server-side enforced. The credentials in your talosconfig determine what operations are permitted on each node. talos-mcp cannot bypass Talos RBAC — a request that the API rejects will fail with an error, not silently succeed.

Tool Classification and Minimum Required RBAC Role

| Tool | RBAC minimum | |---|---| | talos_resource_definitions, talos_get, talos_version, talos_services, talos_containers, talos_processes, talos_health, talos_logs, talos_dmesg, talos_events, talos_list_files, talos_read_file | os:reader | | talos_etcd, talos_service_action, talos_reboot, talos_upgrade, talos_rollback | os:operator | | talos_patch_config | os:admin |

Safety Mechanisms

| Mechanism | How it works | |---|---| | Read-only mode | TALOS_MCP_READ_ONLY=true registers only read-only tools at startup; mutating tools are never exposed to the LLM | | Path allowlist | TALOS_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS=/etc,/proc restricts talos_read_file and talos_list_files to specified prefixes. Defense-in-depth, not a hard boundary: the check is local to the MCP server — symlinks on the remote Talos node that resolve outside an allowed prefix are not detected. | | Confirm gates | Always require confirm=true: talos_service_action, talos_reboot, talos_upgrade, talos_rollback, talos_reset. Require confirm=true when dry_run=false: talos_patch_config, talos_apply_config. All enforced server-side. | | Preserve default | talos_upgrade defaults preserve to true (keep EPHEMERAL partition) — differs from talosctl default of false | | Dry-run default | talos_patch_config defaults to dry_run=true; applying requires both dry_run=false and confirm=true | | Audit logging | All mutating tool calls (talos_service_action, talos_reboot, talos_upgrade, talos_rollback, talos_reset, talos_patch_config, talos_apply_config) emit a structured log line to stderr: AUDIT timestamp= tool= nodes= args= (patch content is redacted) |

What Is Not in the Threat Model

• The LLM itself — prompt injection, hallucinated tool arguments, and LLM provider data retention are outside the scope of this server
• The MCP client — security of Claude Code, Codex, or other MCP clients is the responsibility of those projects
• Network path between talos-mcp and Talos nodes — protected by mutual TLS using the credentials in your talosconfig

Least-Privilege Credential Setup

Create a dedicated talosconfig with minimal permissions for use with this server:

Read-only access (recommended for most use cases):

# Generate a reader-only talosconfig
talosctl config new --roles=os:reader talosconfig-readonly

Then set TALOSCONFIG=/path/to/talosconfig-readonly and TALOS_MCP_READ_ONLY=true for maximum restriction. With this setup, the server exposes only read-only tools and the credentials cannot perform any mutating operations even if a tool were somehow bypassed.

Operator access (for service management, reboot, upgrade):

talosctl config new --roles=os:operator talosconfig-operator

This covers all tools except talos_patch_config (which requires os:admin).

Full access (required for config patching):

Use your default talosconfig or generate one with os:admin. Reserve this for setups where config patch capability is explicitly needed.

Verifying Downloads

Checksums (integrity)

Each release includes a talos-mcp__checksums.txt file with SHA-256 hashes of all archives. Verify the binary after downloading:

# Download archive and checksums
curl -LO https://github.com/Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server/releases/download/v/talos-mcp__linux_amd64.tar.gz
curl -LO https://github.com/Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server/releases/download/v/talos-mcp__checksums.txt

# Verify
sha256sum --check --ignore-missing talos-mcp__checksums.txt

This detects corruption or truncated downloads. It does not protect against a compromised release pipeline.

GitHub Artifact Attestations (SLSA L2 provenance)

Each release includes a GitHub-native build provenance attestation that cryptographically links the binary to the specific commit and workflow run that produced it:

gh attestation verify talos-mcp__linux_amd64.tar.gz \
  --repo Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server

This requires the GitHub CLI. A passing verification means the artifact was produced by the official release workflow in this repository, not a third-party build.

npm Package Provenance

The npm package is published with provenance attestation:

npm audit signatures

A passing result means the package was published by the official GitHub Actions release workflow via OIDC trusted publishing.

Development

# Build
go build -o talos-mcp ./cmd/talos-mcp

# Test
go test -race ./...

# Lint (requires golangci-lint v2)
golangci-lint run

# Format check
gofmt -l .

License

[MIT](LICENSE)

Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: Nosmoht
• Source: Nosmoht/talos-mcp-server
• License: MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.