Aip

Agent Identity Protocol (AIP)

[](https://pypi.org/project/agent-identity-protocol/) [](https://pypi.org/project/aip-agents/) [](https://pypi.org/project/agent-identity-protocol/) [](LICENSE)

Verifiable identity and scoped delegation for AI agents across MCP and A2A.

IETF Internet-Draft | arXiv Paper | Project Hub | Quickstart

The problem

MCP has no authentication. A2A has self-declared identities with no attestation. Your agents call tools anonymously, delegate to other agents without verification, and leave no audit trail. When something goes wrong, you have no way to trace who authorized what.

  Agent A            Agent B            MCP Server
  ───────            ───────            ──────────
     │                  │                   │
     │  AIP Token       │                   │
     │  (signed,        │                   │
     │   scoped)        │                   │
     ├─────────────────▶│                   │
     │                  │  Delegated Token  │
     │                  │  (narrowed scope, │
     │                  │   chained sig)    │
     │                  ├──────────────────▶│
     │                  │                   │ Verify chain
     │                  │                   │ Check scope
     │                  │                   │ Audit trail ✓
     │                  │       200 OK      │
     │                  │◀──────────────────┤

Why not OAuth / UCAN / Macaroons?

| Approach | Limitation for agents | |----------|----------------------| | OAuth 2.1 | Client-to-server only. Tokens are opaque to intermediaries, so delegation context is lost in multi-hop chains. Requires centralized auth server per domain. | | UCAN | DID dependency inherits key management complexity. Nested JWTs create token bloat in deep chains. No policy language beyond capability URIs. | | Macaroons | Shared-secret verification (HMAC) means the verifier holds the root secret. Single point of compromise. Caveats too simple for complex policies. | | SPIFFE/SPIRE | Heavy infrastructure (SPIRE server). X.509 rotation complexity. Not designed for ephemeral agent creation. | | IETF AIMS/WIMSE | AIMS has no token format or delegation semantics. WIMSE is two-party only (no multi-hop A to B to C). |

AIP uses Ed25519 + Biscuit with Datalog policies. Public-key verification (no shared secrets), holder-attenuable scope (each hop can only narrow, never widen), and DNS-based identity (no blockchain). [Full comparison](docs/competitive-analysis.md)

Get started

pip install aip-agents[crewai]

from aip_agents.adapters.crewai import CrewAIPlugin

plugin = CrewAIPlugin(app_name="my-app")
plugin.setup(crew)  # every agent gets a cryptographic identity
headers = plugin.get_auth_headers("researcher")  # signed token for tool calls

That's it. Every agent now has an Ed25519 identity, scoped delegation tokens, and MCP-compatible auth headers.

Google ADK

pip install aip-agents[adk]

from aip_agents.adapters.adk import ADKPlugin

plugin = ADKPlugin(app_name="my-app")
plugin.setup(root_agent)  # walks the agent tree, assigns identities
headers = plugin.get_auth_headers("specialist")

LangChain

pip install aip-agents[langchain]

from aip_agents.adapters.langchain import LangChainPlugin

plugin = LangChainPlugin(app_name="my-app")
plugin.register(executor, name="researcher")
headers = plugin.get_auth_headers("researcher")

What this gives you

• Cryptographic identity -- every agent gets an Ed25519 keypair and an AIP identifier
• Scoped delegation -- when agents delegate, each hop can only narrow scope, never widen
• MCP auth headers -- signed X-AIP-Token headers that any MCP server can verify
• Audit trail -- every token records who authorized what, through which agents, with what scope
• Two token modes -- compact (JWT) for single-hop, chained (Biscuit) for multi-agent delegation

Performance

Benchmarked on compact and chained token operations (1000 iterations):

| Operation | Python | Rust | |-----------|--------|------| | Token create (compact) | 0.086 ms | 0.018 ms | | Token verify (compact) | 0.189 ms | 0.049 ms | | Delegation append (chained) | 0.042 ms | 0.073 ms | | Verify 5-hop chain | 0.447 ms | 0.744 ms | | Token size (compact) | 356 bytes | 356 bytes | | Token growth per hop | +340 bytes | +388 bytes |

End-to-end overhead for a 2-hop delegation: AIP adds ~2.3 ms vs OAuth's ~20 ms (token exchange simulation). 100% rejection rate on unauthorized token operations across 100 attack scenarios. 160+ tests passing across both languages.

Full benchmark code in paper/benchmarks/.

Multi-agent delegation

When agents delegate to other agents, each hop cryptographically narrows scope:

from aip_core.crypto import KeyPair
from aip_token.chained import ChainedToken

root_kp = KeyPair.generate()

# Orchestrator: broad authority
token = ChainedToken.create_authority(
    issuer="aip:web:myorg.com/orchestrator",
    scopes=["tool:search", "tool:email"],
    budget_cents=500,
    max_depth=3,
    ttl_seconds=3600,
    keypair=root_kp,
)

# Delegate to specialist: only search, lower budget
delegated = token.delegate(
    delegator="aip:web:myorg.com/orchestrator",
    delegate="aip:web:myorg.com/specialist",
    scopes=["tool:search"],
    budget_cents=100,
    context="research task for user query",
)

# Specialist can search, but not email
delegated.authorize("tool:search", root_kp.public_key_bytes())  # passes
delegated.authorize("tool:email", root_kp.public_key_bytes())   # raises

A2A Integration

Wrap any A2A task handler with A2AVerifyMiddleware to verify incoming AIP tokens, check audience and scope, and pass the verified identity to your handler:

from aip_a2a import A2AVerifyMiddleware

middleware = A2AVerifyMiddleware(
    your_handler,
    own_aip_id="aip:web:acme.com/agent",
    root_public_key_bytes=root_pubkey,
    required_scope="research:read",
)

The middleware extracts the chained token from metadata.aip_token (per spec §3), verifies the full chain end-to-end (signatures, attenuation, depth, expiry, audience), and only then calls your handler with context.subject / context.chain_depth / context.issuer.

Use append_delegation_block() from the same module before forwarding tasks to attenuate scope down the chain.

A2A integration guide | Multi-hop delegation guide

MCP Auth Proxy

Protect any MCP server with one command:

pip install agent-identity-protocol
aip-proxy --upstream http://localhost:3000 --port 8080 --trust-key z6Mkf...

The proxy verifies every request's AIP token, runs a security self-audit (TTL, scope, budget, chain depth), and forwards to your MCP server. Rejects anything unauthorized. Zero changes to your server code.

MCP proxy guide | Security model

Installation

# Core library (if building directly on the protocol)
pip install agent-identity-protocol

# Framework adapters (recommended)
pip install aip-agents[crewai]    # CrewAI
pip install aip-agents[adk]       # Google ADK
pip install aip-agents[langchain] # LangChain
pip install aip-agents[all]       # all frameworks

The package ships four sub-packages: aip_core (crypto, identity), aip_token (compact + chained tokens), aip_mcp (MCP binding + auth proxy), and aip_a2a (A2A binding: middleware, chain verification, delegation helpers).

PyPI: agent-identity-protocol | aip-agents

Rust reference implementation available in rust/.

Integrations

• aip-gateway -- drop-in MCP/A2A policy proxy with YAML policy and audit logs
• aip-node -- TypeScript SDK (@aip-sdk/core, @aip-sdk/token, @aip-sdk/mcp, @aip-sdk/agents)
• aip-openclaw -- OpenClaw plugin for skill signing and runtime capability enforcement
• aip-claude-code -- Claude Code plugin: signs outgoing MCP tool calls with Ed25519 CompactToken (npm)

Documentation

• sunilprakash.com/aip/ -- project hub with guides and tutorials
• Quickstart -- 5 minutes to your first AIP token
• [Delegation guide](docs/guide-delegation.md) -- chained tokens, scope attenuation, policy profiles
• [Competitive analysis](docs/competitive-analysis.md) -- AIP vs OAuth, DID, UCAN, Macaroons, Biscuit, SPIFFE
• [Specification](SPEC.md) -- full protocol spec

Examples

• [Single-agent MCP](examples/single-agent-mcp/) -- agent authenticates to MCP tool server
• [Multi-agent delegation](examples/multi-agent-delegation/) -- orchestrator delegates to specialist, calls tool server

Paper & Standards

> Sunil Prakash. AIP: Agent Identity Protocol for Verifiable Delegation Across MCP and A2A. arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.24775, 2026. > https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.24775

• IETF Internet-Draft: draft-prakash-aip-00 (expires 2026-09-28)
• NIST: Under evaluation for the NCCoE agent identity demonstration project

@article{prakash2026aip,
  title={AIP: Agent Identity Protocol for Verifiable Delegation Across MCP and A2A},
  author={Prakash, Sunil},
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.24775},
  year={2026}
}

Related papers

AIP is part of a multi-agent trust stack:

| Layer | Paper | arXiv | |-------|-------|-------| | Identity | AIP: Verifiable Delegation Across MCP and A2A | 2603.24775 | | Provenance | The Provenance Paradox in Multi-Agent LLM Routing | 2603.18043 | | Protocol | LDP: An Identity-Aware Protocol for Multi-Agent LLM Systems | 2603.08852 | | Reasoning | DCI: Structured Collective Reasoning with Typed Epistemic Acts | 2603.11781 |

Tests

cd python && pytest tests/ -v

License

Apache 2.0

Source & license

This open-source MCP server is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: sunilp
• Source: sunilp/aip
• License: Apache-2.0
• Homepage: https://sunilprakash.com/aip/

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.