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Install
$ agentstack add skill-45ck-llm-agent-security-skills-tool-permission-boundary-checker ✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
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tool-permission-boundary-checker
Purpose
Check whether agent tools, function calls, and external actions are bounded by explicit permissions, approval gates, and least-privilege rules.
Trigger this skill when
- The current artifact has LLM, prompt, retrieval, memory, or agent-tooling behavior that needs structured review or hardening.
- You need to turn vague AI safety or agent security concerns into concrete findings, controls, or requirements.
- You want the next agent-security-focused action to be explicit rather than ad hoc.
Expected inputs
- tool list
- tool schemas
- approval rules
- side-effecting actions
- agent role description
Deliverables
- permission boundary review
- tool risk inventory
- missing approval gates
- least-privilege recommendations
- recommended next skill
Operating procedure
- Read the artifact from an agent-security perspective and identify the concrete trust, autonomy, and side-effect model.
- Separate facts from assumptions and call out missing details that materially affect risk or confidence.
- Start with the highest-impact abuse paths rather than trying to describe every possible issue equally.
- Translate findings into explicit controls, approvals, isolation boundaries, or policy language that builders can act on.
- Prefer concrete exploit paths, sinks, boundaries, and failure conditions over generic AI-safety slogans.
- Finish with the most sensible handoff skill based on the dominant risk pattern you found.
Quality gates
- Findings are specific to the actual prompt, retrieval, memory, tool, or runtime design rather than generic AI risk boilerplate.
- Output separates facts, assumptions, risks, controls, and recommended next action.
- Prioritization reflects impact, privilege, and automation potential rather than just issue count.
- Recommendations are implementable and framed in a way that can be tested or reviewed later.
Handoff targets
- agent-agency-reviewer
- guardrail-policy-writer
- agent-sandbox-reviewer
Output style
- Be explicit about uncertainty.
- Prefer concrete abuse paths and control implications over generic safety slogans.
- Separate facts, risks, recommendations, and next steps.
- Make the output usable by engineers, reviewers, security testers, and policy owners.
Failure modes to avoid
- Do not treat "the model should know better" as a security control.
- Do not bury high-impact autonomous action risk behind long, unprioritized issue lists.
- Do not recommend guardrails without explaining the exploit or failure they address.
- Do not hide uncertainty when prompt assembly, retrieval, memory, or runtime details are missing.
Minimum output skeleton
## Summary
## Findings
## Structured outputs
## Risks
## Recommendations
## Recommended next skill
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: 45ck
- Source: 45ck/llm-agent-security-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.