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SKILL unreviewed MIT Self-run

Setup Permissions

skill-ada-ggf25-ai-tools-setup-permissions · by ada-ggf25

Scan the current repository's stack and propose scoped Codex sandbox, trust, and command-approval guidance for common test, lint, build, package, git, and external-tool workflows. Writes only after explicit approval. Global and project-agnostic. Trigger when the user says "set up permissions", "setup-permissions", "configure Codex permissions for this repo", "what permissions do I need", "allowli…

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-ada-ggf25-ai-tools-setup-permissions

Open-source listing, not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.

Security review

⚠ Flagged

1 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures
  • high Pipes remote content directly into a shell (remote code execution).

What it can access

  • Network access Used
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets Used
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

Reliability & compatibility

Not yet reviewed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
3mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.

How agent discovery & health will work →
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About

Set Up Codex Permissions

Review the repo and propose narrow Codex permission/config guidance before the user hits repeated approval prompts. Treat permissions and sandbox settings as a security boundary.

Targets

Prefer the least invasive target:

  • Project guidance in AGENTS.md: default for documenting commands that should be

run and which ones need care.

  • Project trust in ~/.codex/config.toml: only if the user explicitly wants this

repo trusted and understands it is personal machine config.

  • Codex hooks or plugin config: only for deterministic automation that should always

run.

  • Global config: only for genuinely global, user-approved behavior.

Do not silently edit ~/.codex/config.toml; show the exact change first.

Rule Of Thumb

Propose narrow, frequent, low-risk operations. Do not propose broad or destructive allows.

Good examples:

  • test commands from project manifests;
  • lint/format commands;
  • build/type-check commands;
  • read-only gh status and PR inspection;
  • scoped package manager commands that do not publish or mutate global state.

Do not propose:

  • rm, sudo, force-push, destructive git reset/checkout, deploys, releases, publish

commands, secret reads, .env reads, or curl ... | sh;

  • broad shell rules that would cover unrelated commands.

Procedure

1. Orient

  • Read existing AGENTS.md, .codex/, .agents/, README, and manifests.
  • Check whether the repo is already trusted in ~/.codex/config.toml if local access is

available.

  • Do not treat Claude .claude/settings*.json permission rules as Codex config; use

them only as hints about repeated workflows.

2. Scan The Stack

Read manifests/configs such as package.json, pyproject.toml, Makefile, justfile, go.mod, Cargo.toml, CI workflows, lint/format config, and test config.

Identify:

  • test runner;
  • linter/formatter/type checker;
  • build tool;
  • package manager;
  • GitHub/GitLab/other external tooling;
  • commands likely to need network or writes outside the workspace.

3. Propose

Group proposals by category: tests, lint/format, build/type-check, package management, git/GitHub, local tools, and documentation.

For each proposal include:

  • command or config change;
  • target location;
  • what it enables;
  • what it deliberately does not enable.

Include a "Deliberately not proposed" section for dangerous operations withheld.

4. Write Only Approved Changes

After explicit approval, apply only the selected changes. Preserve existing config and dedupe entries. If the approved change is global/personal config, make the scope obvious in the final report.

Guardrails

  • Proposal first, write second.
  • Never silently edit global Codex config.
  • Never propose broad shell or destructive permissions.
  • Merge, never clobber.
  • Base every proposed command on files observed in the repo.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.