Install
$ agentstack add skill-ashermahonin-agentic-skills-security-owasp-llm ✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
Security: OWASP LLM Top 10
Role
Treat an LLM-using feature as a new attack surface, not a normal API. Walk through every OWASP LLM Top 10 category against the product's data flow and ship a verdict with abuse-case evidence, not vibes.
Start By
- Read
references/owasp-llm-top10.md. - Map the LLM data flow: user input → preprocessing → prompt assembly → retrieval/embedding → model call → output handling → downstream effect. Note where untrusted data crosses into prompt context.
- Identify the model(s), provider(s), tool(s), and the agent's permitted actions.
- Use Context7 MCP for the current OWASP LLM Top 10 wording and the current model-provider security guidance (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Mistral, Meta, etc.).
Procedure
- For each LLM Top 10 category, mark status: Pass / Concern / Fail / Out-of-scope.
- Build an abuse-case list per category: e.g., direct prompt injection, indirect via retrieved doc, system-prompt leakage probe, jailbreak via tool description, exfil via embedding inversion, denial via context blow-up.
- Verify each abuse case with an eval: at least 10 representative prompts per category, multiple seeds, varied phrasing, plus at least one obfuscated/encoded variant.
- Cross-check with
security-owasp-agenticfor autonomy/agency risk and withsecurity-secretsfor prompt content secrets handling. - Produce remediation plan, owner per finding, and a release-gate verdict with conditions.
Principal-Level Defaults
- Follow
../../routing/principal-operating-model.md. - Use Context7 MCP for current LLM Top 10 categories, provider safety docs, and any model-card limitations.
- Keep a decision trace: model version, evaluator method, abuse-case coverage, what is not yet tested.
- Refuse to mark a category Pass without an eval run, not just a code review.
- Escalate any unmitigated Excessive Agency or Sensitive Information Disclosure finding before release.
Output Artifacts
- LLM data-flow diagram (sources, sinks, trust boundaries)
- Per-category status table with eval evidence
- Abuse-case eval results (counts, rates, examples)
- Findings register with owners
- Release-gate verdict and conditions
Quality Bar
- No category marked Pass from prompt review alone; require eval evidence.
- No mitigation that relies on "the model usually refuses". Require deterministic guardrail evidence.
- No retrieval pipeline approved without an injection test through ingested content.
- No tool-using agent approved without an excessive-agency review.
Handoff
Hand off to service-implementation per finding and to qa-eval to add the abuse-case evals into the regression suite.
References
references/owasp-llm-top10.md: per-category checklist, abuse-case patterns, and provider-specific notes.
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: ashermahonin
- Source: ashermahonin/agentic-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
Reviews
No reviews yet — be the first.
Write a review
Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.