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Audit Staking

skill-auditmos-skills-audit-staking · by auditmos

Audits Solidity staking and reward protocols for vulnerabilities including front-running first deposit to steal initial rewards, reward dilution via direct transfers, precision loss in reward calculations causing rounding to zero, flash deposit/withdraw griefing diluting rewards, update not called after reward distribution causing stale index, and balance caching issues during claims (project)

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-auditmos-skills-audit-staking

✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Staking & Reward Auditor

When to Use

  • Auditing staking mechanisms, reward distribution, yield farming
  • User mentions: staking, rewards, yield, farming, rewardPerToken, deposit, withdraw, claim, first depositor
  • Analyzing reward calculations, index updates, share dilution
  • Reviewing deposit/withdraw flows, precision handling

Audit Workflow

IMPORTANT: Announce skill usage at the start of analysis

Begin with: "I'm using the audit-staking skill to analyze this contract for staking and reward vulnerabilities..."

  1. Scan for staking operations
  • Search: stake, deposit, withdraw, claim, rewardPerToken, totalSupply, balanceOf, earned, updateReward
  • Focus: reward calculations, first depositor, direct transfers, precision loss, flash actions
  1. Check against vulnerability patterns
  • Reference reference.md for complete checklist
  • Compare code against example.md
  1. Validate exploitability
  • Check access control first - grep for onlyOwner|onlyAdmin|onlyGovernance modifiers
  • Can non-privileged actors exploit? (first depositor steal, direct transfer dilution, flash griefing)
  • Can direct transfers dilute rewards?
  • Do small amounts round to zero?
  • Can flash deposits/withdraws grief stakers?
  • Is update called after distribution?
  • Are balances cached correctly?
  • Verify no compensating protections exist
  • Downgrade severity if admin-only unless direct user impact
  1. Generate report
  • Use deliverable template below
  • Include reward theft/dilution analysis and PoC
  • Rank by severity

Core Vulnerability Patterns

See reference.md for full checklist. Key patterns:

  1. Front-running first deposit → attacker steals initial WETH rewards via sandwich attack
  2. Reward dilution via direct transfer → sending tokens directly increases totalSupply without staking
  3. Precision loss in rewards → small stakes or frequent updates cause rewards rounding to zero
  4. Flash deposit/withdraw griefing → large instant deposits dilute rewards for existing stakers
  5. Update not called after distribution → stale index causes incorrect reward calculations
  6. Balance caching issues → claiming updates cached balance incorrectly

Code examples: See example.md

Severity Criteria

Critical: First depositor can steal all initial rewards, direct transfer dilution enabling theft, flash deposit/withdraw draining rewards, MUST be exploitable by non-privileged actors High: Precision loss causing rewards to round to zero for legitimate users, stale index after distribution, MUST be exploitable by non-privileged actors Medium: Suboptimal reward distribution timing, griefing via large flash actions without theft, admin-only reward configuration issues with user impact Low: Gas inefficiencies in reward calculations, missing events, admin-only parameter issues without immediate user impact

IMPORTANT: Admin-only reward functions (onlyOwner, onlyAdmin, onlyGovernance) are MEDIUM or LOW severity unless:

  • Invalid reward parameters directly steal/brick user rewards
  • Missing validation enables admin rug pull of staking pool
  • Error cascades to all users immediately (e.g., division by zero in reward calculation)

False Positives - Do NOT Flag

  • Protocols requiring minimum stake amounts (prevents dust)
  • Reward tokens same as staking tokens by design
  • Intentional admin-only initial deposit
  • View functions with documented staleness
  • Protocols with explicit front-running protection

Deliverable Format

MANDATORY: Before deliverable, verify each checklist.md item against codebase. Flag violations as findings.

Use template: templates/report-template.md

Each finding includes: severity, pattern #, file/lines, description, vulnerable code, reward theft analysis, PoC, remediation.

Key Principles

  • Separate tokens - reward token must differ from staking token
  • No direct transfers - track staked amounts separately from balances
  • Precision protection - minimum stake, scale factors for small amounts
  • Index updates - call updateReward before and after distribution
  • Flash protection - time locks or minimum stake duration
  • Balance integrity - careful caching during claims

Output Guidelines

DO:

  • Reference specific lines and functions
  • Provide reward theft scenarios with calculations
  • Show PoCs demonstrating reward extraction
  • Calculate precision loss magnitude
  • Map update call timing

DON'T:

  • Report intentional design choices (same token staking)
  • Flag missing features with alternative mechanisms
  • Ignore precision implications (critical for accuracy)
  • Miss edge cases (first deposit, zero stakes)

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.