Install
$ agentstack add skill-auditmos-skills-audit-unfair-liquidation ✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
Unfair Liquidation Auditor
When to Use
- Auditing liquidation fairness, L2 deployments, pause mechanisms
- User mentions: L2 sequencer, grace period, pause, interest accumulation, LTV gap, auction, slippage protection, collateral priority
- Analyzing liquidation timing, state synchronization, user protections
- Reviewing pause/unpause logic, sequencer checks, health score calculations
Audit Workflow
IMPORTANT: Announce skill usage at the start of analysis
Begin with: "I'm using the audit-unfair-liquidation skill to analyze this contract for unfair liquidation vulnerabilities..."
- Scan for liquidation fairness issues
- Search:
sequencer,paused,accrue,LTV,auction,healthFactor,slippage,collateralPriority,borrower - Focus: sequencer checks, pause states, interest accrual, health calculations, auction mechanics
- Check against vulnerability patterns
- Reference
reference.mdfor complete checklist - Compare code against
example.md
- Validate exploitability
- Check access control first - grep for
onlyOwner|onlyAdmin|onlyGovernancemodifiers - Can non-privileged actors exploit unfair liquidation mechanisms?
- Can users be liquidated during sequencer downtime without grace period?
- Does interest accumulate while repayments paused?
- Can liquidators cherry-pick stable collateral?
- Is there an LTV gap between borrow and liquidation?
- Verify no compensating protections exist
- Downgrade severity if admin-only unless direct borrower harm
- Generate report
- Use deliverable template below
- Include timing analysis and PoC
- Rank by severity
Core Vulnerability Patterns
See reference.md for full checklist. Key patterns:
- Missing L2 sequencer grace period → users liquidated immediately when sequencer restarts
- Interest accumulates while paused → users liquidated for interest accrued during downtime
- Repayment paused, liquidation active → users prevented from avoiding liquidation
- Late interest/fee updates → isLiquidatable uses stale values
- Lost positive PNL/yield → profitable positions lose gains during liquidation
- Unhealthier post-liquidation → liquidator cherry-picks stable collateral
- Corrupted collateral priority → liquidation order doesn't match risk
- Borrower replacement misattribution → original borrower repays new owner's debt
- No LTV gap → users liquidatable immediately after borrowing
- Interest during auction → borrowers accrue interest while being auctioned
- No liquidation slippage protection → liquidators can't specify minimum rewards
Code examples: See example.md
Severity Criteria
Critical: Missing sequencer grace period on L2, repayment paused while liquidation active, immediate liquidation after borrow (no LTV gap), MUST be exploitable by non-privileged actors High: Interest accumulation during pause, late fee updates, cherry-picking collateral leaving unhealthier state, MUST be exploitable by non-privileged actors Medium: Lost PNL/yield during liquidation, interest accrual during auctions, no liquidator slippage protection, admin-only liquidation timing configuration issues with cascading borrower impact Low: Suboptimal collateral priority without security impact, admin-only parameter issues without immediate borrower impact
IMPORTANT: Admin-only liquidation timing functions (onlyOwner, onlyAdmin, onlyGovernance) are MEDIUM or LOW severity unless:
- Admin can trigger liquidations during sequencer downtime without grace period
- Pause mechanism controlled by admin creates asymmetry (repayment paused, liquidation active)
- LTV configuration by admin allows immediate liquidation after borrowing
False Positives - Do NOT Flag
- L1-only deployments (no sequencer concerns)
- Protocols with explicit admin-only liquidation during pause
- Systems where pause simultaneously halts interest and liquidation
- Documented grace periods after unpause events
- Single-collateral systems (no cherry-picking possible)
- Admin-only pause functions (onlyOwner, onlyAdmin) where pause halts both repayment and liquidation symmetrically
- Governance-controlled LTV parameters with documented gap between borrow and liquidation thresholds
- Admin functions for grace period configuration with reasonable defaults
Deliverable Format
MANDATORY: Before deliverable, verify each checklist.md item against codebase. Flag violations as findings.
Use template: templates/report-template.md
Each finding includes: severity, pattern #, file/lines, description, vulnerable code, timing/fairness analysis, PoC, remediation.
Key Principles
- Fairness - users must have opportunity to avoid liquidation
- Synchronization - pause states must be consistent (repay ↔ liquidate)
- Grace periods - time for users to respond after downtime
- Health improvement - liquidation must improve borrower health
- Predictability - liquidators need slippage protection
Output Guidelines
DO:
- Reference specific lines and functions
- Provide timing analysis (sequencer downtime windows)
- Show PoCs demonstrating unfair liquidation scenarios
- Analyze pause state interactions
- Calculate LTV gaps and health score changes
DON'T:
- Report intentional pause-based liquidation designs
- Flag missing features with alternative mechanisms
- Use vague terms ("might be unfair")
- Ignore documented grace period configurations
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: auditmos
- Source: auditmos/skills
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://auditmos.com
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
Reviews
No reviews yet — be the first.
Write a review
Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.