Install
$ agentstack add skill-briiirussell-cybersecurity-skills-incident-triage ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Incident Triage — Security Incident Response
Guide rapid triage and initial response to security incidents. Follow NIST SP 800-61 methodology.
Cross-references: siem-detection for the rules that produced the alert this triage is responding to, disk-forensics for deeper disk and memory analysis once a host is contained, breach-patterns for the post-incident pattern extraction that hardens against recurrence, soc-operations for the operational layer above this skill (runbooks, escalation, handoff), security-comms for the stakeholder / customer notifications the response generates, privacy-engineering / hipaa-audit / pci-audit for the regulatory-clock determination when personal data, PHI, or cardholder data is involved, ai-risk-management for AI-specific incident classes (model failure, fairness drift, jailbreak exploitation in production).
Priorities (in order)
- Preserve human safety
- Contain the incident to prevent further damage
- Preserve evidence for investigation
- Identify root cause and scope
- Document everything
Step 1: Classification
Determine incident type:
- Malware: ransomware, trojan, worm, cryptominer
- Unauthorized access: compromised credentials, exploitation
- Data exfiltration: data theft, insider threat
- Denial of service
- Web compromise: defacement, skimming, backdoor
- Phishing / social engineering
Determine severity:
- Critical: active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading, critical system compromise
- High: confirmed compromise, malware detected, unauthorized access
- Medium: suspicious activity, potential indicators, failed attacks
- Low: policy violation, reconnaissance detected, likely false positive
Step 2: Initial Containment
Based on type and severity:
- Network: block suspicious IPs/domains at firewall
- Host: isolate affected system (network disconnect, NOT power off — volatile memory is evidence)
- Account: disable compromised accounts, force password resets
- Application: disable affected service if safe to do so
Critical: Do NOT power off systems. Volatile memory contains evidence.
Step 3: Evidence Preservation
Capture in order of volatility (most volatile first):
# 1. Running processes
ps auxf # Linux
tasklist /v # Windows
# 2. Network connections
ss -tupn # Linux
netstat -anob # Windows
# 3. Logged-in users
who -a # Linux
query user # Windows
# 4. Open files
lsof -nP # Linux
# 5. System logs
journalctl --since "1 hour ago" # Linux/systemd
If memory forensics tools are available (LiME, WinPmem), capture a memory dump before anything else.
Step 4: Initial Analysis
For each suspicious indicator, document:
- What: describe the artifact
- When: timestamps in UTC
- Where: affected system(s)
- How: how it was detected
Common analysis:
- Process tree: look for unusual process names, paths, or parent-child relationships
- Network indicators: unusual outbound connections, DNS queries to suspicious domains, beaconing patterns (regular intervals)
- File indicators: recently modified files in unusual locations, hidden files, new executables
- Log analysis: authentication failures, privilege escalation, service changes, cleared logs
- Persistence: crontab, systemd units, registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, startup items
Step 5: IOC Extraction
Extract and document all indicators of compromise:
| Type | Examples | |------|---------| | IP addresses | Source and destination IPs | | Domains | C2 domains, phishing domains | | File hashes | MD5 and SHA256 of suspicious files | | File paths | Malware locations, dropped files | | Email addresses | Phishing sender addresses | | URLs | Malicious URLs, C2 endpoints | | User agents | Unusual or known-malicious user agents |
Output Format
# Incident Triage Report
## Incident ID: [ID]
## Date/Time: [UTC]
## Severity: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
## Classification: [incident type]
## Status: [Triage/Contained/Analyzing/Resolved]
### Summary
[2-3 sentence overview]
### Affected Systems
| Hostname | IP | Role | Status |
|----------|-----|------|--------|
### Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Source | Notes |
|------------|-------|--------|-------|
### Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value | Context | Confidence |
|------|-------|---------|------------|
### Containment Actions Taken
- [ ] [Action and result]
### Evidence Preserved
| Type | Location | Hash | Notes |
|------|----------|------|-------|
### Recommended Next Steps
1. [Immediate priority]
2. [Short-term action]
3. [Follow-up investigation]
### Escalation Checklist
- [ ] Management notified
- [ ] Legal notified (if data breach)
- [ ] Law enforcement (if applicable)
- [ ] Affected parties notified (if data breach)
Boundaries
- Focus on defense and containment, not counter-attack
- Preserve evidence — never modify logs or timestamps
- Recommend legal/management escalation for confirmed breaches
- If unsure about a containment action's impact, advise caution and ask
- Never recommend "hacking back" or retaliatory actions
- Refuse requests to cover up incidents or tamper with evidence
References
- NIST SP 800-61r2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
- SANS Incident Handler's Handbook
- MITRE ATT&CK Framework
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: briiirussell
- Source: briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.