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SKILL verified Apache-2.0 Self-run

Sre Incident Investigation

skill-bryann2k-skills-sre-incident-investigation · by BRYANN2K

Use when triaging, investigating, mitigating, or reviewing production incidents using metrics, logs, traces, events, deployments, and system context. Runs hypothesis-driven read-only investigation, separates evidence from inference, and gates every remediation.

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-bryann2k-skills-sre-incident-investigation

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Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

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Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

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About

SRE Incident Investigation

Overview

Unify incident command and technical investigation. Stabilize coordination, establish a timeline, test hypotheses across metrics/logs/traces/changes, then propose the smallest reversible mitigation. Preserve uncertainty instead of manufacturing a root cause.

Investigation is read-only. Do not restart, scale, fail over, rollback, disable controls, modify traffic, rotate credentials, patch configuration, execute database changes, or acknowledge/close an incident unless the user explicitly authorizes the exact action. Never query or print secret values or unnecessary personal data.

When to use

  • Active production degradation, outage, alert storm, latency/error spike, saturation, or dependency failure.
  • Root-cause investigation across metrics, logs, traces, events, deploys, and configuration changes.
  • Mitigation planning, incident updates, handoffs, or evidence-based postmortems.

Do not use for speculative performance tuning without an incident signal. Use cloud-architecture-review for broad design assessment.

Modes

| Mode | Goal | Default boundary | |---|---|---| | Triage | Establish impact, severity, ownership, and first hypotheses | Read-only | | Investigate | Discriminate causes using correlated evidence | Read-only | | Mitigate | Propose/execute smallest reversible stabilizer | Approval required | | Learn | Build blameless timeline, causes, and actions | Documents only |

Select one primary mode and state it. Active incidents prioritize restoration over exhaustive diagnosis.

Workflow

1. Open the incident frame

Capture:

  • start/detection time, current time window, environment, services, regions/tenants;
  • user-visible impact and affected critical journeys;
  • severity criteria, incident commander, technical lead, communications owner;
  • known recent changes and external dependencies;
  • available telemetry and access limitations.

If formal roles do not exist, name temporary roles without creating bureaucracy. Never invent impact numbers.

Complete when: scope, impact, severity rationale, owner, and observation window are explicit.

2. Establish a minimal timeline

Record only sourced events: alert fired, deployment, config change, traffic shift, dependency error, saturation onset, mitigation, recovery. Normalize timestamps to one timezone and preserve source links/query identifiers.

Use templates/incident-report.md as the live notebook. Facts and hypotheses belong in separate sections.

3. Form competing hypotheses

Start with 2–5 hypotheses that predict observable signals. Include at least one alternative to the leading theory. Use the table in references/hypothesis-and-signal-correlation.md.

Bad: “The database is slow.”

Good: “A connection-pool limit introduced in deploy X causes request queueing; predicts rising acquisition latency, flat DB CPU, and failures concentrated on new pods.”

4. Query from broad to discriminating

Use the smallest query that can reject or support a hypothesis:

  1. user-facing rate/errors/duration and affected segment;
  2. resource saturation and queueing;
  3. service/dependency topology and trace exemplars;
  4. structured logs around trace/request IDs;
  5. deployment/config/infrastructure events;
  6. deeper platform queries only when needed.

Prefer rate and ratio over raw cumulative counters. Compare against a useful baseline. Check aggregation, label cardinality, sampling, clock skew, retention, and missing telemetry before interpreting absence.

For query discipline and anti-cardinality safeguards, load references/hypothesis-and-signal-correlation.md.

Complete when: each query changes the probability of a hypothesis or is explicitly marked inconclusive.

5. Correlate signals

Build a causal narrative only when ordering and mechanism agree:

  • metrics establish when/where/how much;
  • traces establish which path/dependency;
  • logs establish what the component reported;
  • changes establish what could have altered behavior;
  • topology establishes how failure propagates.

Correlation with a deploy is not causation. Look for canary/control populations, version split, regional difference, rollback response, or a mechanism in code/config.

6. Update confidence and stop intelligently

Label every conclusion:

  • Confirmed — direct evidence and mechanism, meaningful alternatives contradicted.
  • Likely — multiple independent signals align; one material gap remains.
  • Possible — plausible but weak or non-discriminating evidence.
  • Unknown — evidence unavailable or contradictory.

Stop expanding when the leading hypothesis is actionable and alternatives no longer change mitigation, or when evidence limits are reached. State why.

7. Select mitigation

Rank candidates by time-to-effect, blast radius, reversibility, confidence, and new risk. Prefer configuration/traffic/release rollback over unbounded manual repair when it safely restores service.

Before any approved action provide:

  • exact target and command/procedure;
  • expected signal and observation window;
  • abort threshold;
  • rollback/reversal;
  • owner and communication impact.

Execute one meaningful change at a time when possible; otherwise causality is lost.

8. Verify recovery

Recovery requires user-facing and system evidence across a stable observation window:

  • critical SLI returned to acceptable range;
  • saturation/queue/backlog is draining;
  • no displaced failure appeared elsewhere;
  • synthetic/real journey succeeds;
  • alerts are resolving for the right reason.

“Pods are running” or “command succeeded” is not service recovery.

9. Learn without hindsight bias

For postmortem depth load references/postmortem-and-actions.md. Preserve detection, contributing conditions, propagation, response, and recovery. Avoid a single-person “root cause” when system controls could have prevented or contained the event.

Output contract

Active incident update

  • Status and severity
  • User impact
  • Timeline since last update
  • Confirmed facts
  • Hypotheses with confidence
  • Actions taken and observed result
  • Next read-only query or proposed gated mitigation
  • Risks/blockers
  • Next update time/condition

Investigation report

  • Scope/evidence limitations
  • Timeline
  • Hypothesis matrix
  • Findings and confidence
  • Causal/contributing factors
  • Mitigation and recovery evidence
  • Follow-up actions with owners and validation

Common pitfalls

  • Querying everything and drowning in non-discriminating data.
  • Treating the first correlated deploy as root cause.
  • Using high-cardinality labels or regex queries that worsen the incident.
  • Restarting workloads before capturing previous state/logs.
  • Confusing mitigation with permanent correction.
  • Declaring recovery from control-plane health only.
  • Writing a clean causal story that hides uncertainty or contradictory evidence.
  • Creating vague actions such as “improve monitoring.”

Verification checklist

  • [ ] Impact, severity, ownership, target, and time window are explicit.
  • [ ] Timeline entries and claims link to evidence.
  • [ ] Competing hypotheses were tested with discriminating queries.
  • [ ] Confidence labels reflect evidence quality.
  • [ ] No mutation occurred during investigation without authorization.
  • [ ] Mitigation included expected signal, abort, and rollback.
  • [ ] Recovery is proven at the user and system levels.
  • [ ] Follow-ups have owners, due criteria, and measurable validation.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.