Install
$ agentstack add skill-byamb4-find-cve-agent-command-injection Open-source listing, not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.
Security review
⚠ Flagged2 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- • Prompt-injection patterns
- • Secret / credential exfiltration
- • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- • Untrusted network calls
- • Known-malicious package signatures
- high Dangerous shell/eval execution.
- high Destructive filesystem operation.
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ● Shell / process execution Used
- ● Environment & secrets Used
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Command Injection Detection
When to Use
Audit any package that wraps CLI tools, runs build commands, processes files via external programs, or interfaces with git/ffmpeg/imagemagick/pandoc/etc.
CVSS is typically CRITICAL 9.8 for confirmed RCE.
Key Distinctions
Command Injection vs Argument Injection
- Command injection: Attacker breaks out of the intended command entirely (
; rm -rf /) - Argument injection: Attacker adds flags to the intended command (
--upload-pack=malicious) - Both are reportable. Command injection is CRITICAL, argument injection is HIGH.
Shell vs No-Shell Execution
- Shell execution (exec, system, os.popen): Command string passed to shell interpreter. Metacharacters (
;,|,&&, backticks,$()) are interpreted. DANGEROUS. - Direct execution (execFile, spawn without shell, subprocess with list args): Arguments passed directly to the program. No shell interpretation. SAFER but argument injection may still work.
Process
Step 1: Find Shell Execution Sinks
# JavaScript/TypeScript — look for child_process usage
grep -rn "child_process" .
grep -rn "\.exec\('" .
grep -rn "\.execSync\(" .
grep -rn "spawn.*shell.*true" .
grep -rn "shelljs" .
# Python
grep -rn "os\.system\|os\.popen" .
grep -rn "subprocess.*shell.*True" .
grep -rn "commands\.getoutput\|commands\.getstatusoutput" .
# Go
grep -rn 'exec\.Command.*"bash"\|exec\.Command.*"sh"' .
# Ruby
grep -rn "system(\|%x{" . --include="*.rb"
grep -rn "IO\.popen\|Open3" .
# PHP
grep -rn "system(\|passthru(\|shell_exec(\|popen(" .
grep -rn "proc_open\|pcntl_exec" .
Step 2: Trace User Input to Sink
For each sink:
- What command string is constructed?
- Is any part from user input (HTTP params, filenames, config values)?
- Is the user input interpolated into a shell string or passed as an argument array?
Step 3: Check Sanitization
grep -rn "escapeshellarg\|escapeshellcmd\|shlex\.quote\|shellescape" .
grep -rn "sanitize\|escape\|clean\|validate" .
Verify sanitization is:
- Applied to ALL user-controlled parts (not just some)
- Using the right function (escapeshellarg vs escapeshellcmd)
- Not bypassable (blocklists are almost always bypassable)
Step 4: Check for Argument Injection
Even with execFile/spawn (no shell), check for:
--flaginjection: user input starts with-or--- Git-specific:
--upload-pack,-c core.fsmonitor,--config - Arguments that accept commands:
--exec,--filter,--diff-filter - Double-dash (
--) separator missing before user-controlled args
Common Vulnerable Patterns
Pattern 1: String Interpolation in Shell Execution
// VULNERABLE — shell interprets metacharacters
const cp = require('child_process');
cp.exec(`convert ${inputFile} ${outputFile}`);
// Exploit: inputFile = "; id; #"
Pattern 2: Filename-Based Injection
cp.exec(`file "${filename}"`);
// Exploit: filename = '$(id).txt' or filename = '"; id; #"'
Pattern 3: Git Argument Injection
// Even without shell, git interprets dangerous flags
cp.execFile('git', ['clone', userUrl, '--config', 'core.fsmonitor=id']);
Pattern 4: Environment Variable Injection
cp.exec(command, { env: { ...process.env, USER_INPUT: untrusted } });
// If command references $USER_INPUT or uses env vars unsafely
Pattern 5: Newline Injection
cp.execFile('program', ['--option=' + userInput]);
// Exploit: userInput = "value\n--dangerous-flag"
Grep Patterns by Vulnerability Type
Direct Shell Injection
grep -rn "exec\(.*\+" . # String concatenation in exec
grep -rn "exec\(.*\$\{" . # Template literal in exec
grep -rn "exec\(.*%" . # Format string in exec (Python)
Argument Injection
grep -rn "execFile\|spawn" .
# Then check if user input is in the args array without -- separator
CVSS Guidance
- Unauthenticated RCE: CRITICAL 9.8
- Authenticated RCE (low-priv): HIGH 8.8
- Argument injection (limited impact): HIGH 7.5-8.1
- Requires specific config/setup: HIGH 7.2 (AC:H)
References
- [Sinks](references/sinks.md) — Shell execution sinks by language
- [False Positive Indicators](references/false-positive-indicators.md) — When this isn't exploitable
- [PoC Skeleton](references/poc-skeleton.md) — Command injection PoC template
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: ByamB4
- Source: ByamB4/find-cve-agent
- License: Apache-2.0
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
Reviews
No reviews yet, be the first.
Write a review
Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.