Ops Docker
Docker and Docker Compose containerization. Trigger when the user wants to dockerize an application or create containers.
Install
$ agentstack add skill-christopherlouet-claude-base-ops-docker ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ● Environment & secrets Used
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Links to your public security report.[](https://agentstack.voostack.com/security/report/skill-christopherlouet-claude-base-ops-docker) Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Docker Containerization (pointer)
Dockerfile syntax, Compose schema and image-publish flows drift on each release and are canonical at:
- Docker official — docs.docker.com (Engine + Compose + Buildx)
- Dockerfile best practices — docs.docker.com/develop/develop-images/dockerfile_best-practices
- Snyk Container Security — snyk.io/learn/container-security (vulnerability scanning, base-image hardening)
- Hadolint — github.com/hadolint/hadolint (Dockerfile linter, CI-integrable)
- Dive — github.com/wagoodman/dive (image layer analysis)
Foundation discipline (keep across releases)
- Multi-stage builds: always separate build deps from runtime image. The "node:20 with full npm" image weighs 1GB+; the runtime layer should be ~100MB. Build stage produces artifacts, runtime stage copies them in.
- Non-root user:
RUN addgroup -S app && adduser -S app -G app && USER app— never run app code as root inside the container, even if "it's just a sandbox". - .dockerignore mandatory: forgotten
.git/ornode_modules/in the build context bloats images by hundreds of MB and leaks secrets. The.dockerignorerules mirror your.gitignoreplus build artifacts. - HEALTHCHECK at the Dockerfile level: not just at the orchestrator level. Lets Docker/Compose detect unhealthy containers before the orchestrator does.
- Pin base image major+minor (
node:20-alpine, notnode:latestor barenode:20): floating tags break reproducibility; SHA pinning is overkill for most apps but worth it for security-critical builds. - Secret management: never
COPY .envor hardcode credentials inENV. Use BuildKit secrets (--mount=type=secret) or runtime-injected env vars from the orchestrator.
See also
/ops:ops-deploy— deployment checklist consumes the built image/ops:ops-database— Compose patterns for DB services (depends_on: { condition: service_healthy })qa-security— image scanning gate (Snyk/Trivy) before pushops-ci— Hadolint + image scan as CI steps
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: christopherlouet
- Source: christopherlouet/claude-base
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://christopherlouet.github.io/claude-base/
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.