Install
$ agentstack add skill-docker-skills-docker-sandboxes-lifecycle ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Docker Sandboxes: Local Lifecycle & Workspace Isolation
Overview
Docker Sandboxes (sbx) runs an AI coding agent inside an isolated microVM with its own filesystem, network, and Docker daemon. This skill owns the local sandbox lifecycle — creating, reattaching to, listing, stopping, and removing sandboxes — and the workspace isolation choice (direct bind mount vs. --clone). It does not cover network policy, credentials, sbxenv.yaml, or kit authoring — see Related skills.
When to use this skill
Activate this skill when:
- The user wants to start, reattach to, stop, or remove a local
sbxsandbox. - The user wants an agent to work on a repository without giving it a
writable bind mount of the host working tree (--clone).
- The user wants extra read-only (or write-restricted) workspaces mounted
alongside the primary one.
- The user is copying files between host and sandbox, publishing a sandbox
port, or running an ad-hoc command inside a sandbox (sbx exec).
- The user wants to clean up stopped sandboxes (
sbx prune) or remove a
specific one (sbx rm), with the destructive consequences understood.
Do not use this skill when
Do not use this skill when:
- The task is running
docker agent run --sandboxor managing its
docker agent sandbox allowlist — use docker-agent-run. If the CLI is unclear, establish whether the user runs Docker Agent or standalone sbx before choosing commands.
- The task is about what a sandbox can reach on the network or which
credentials it uses — use docker-sandboxes-network-credentials.
- The task is authoring or running a declarative
sbxenv.yamlfile — use
docker-sandboxes-env.
- The task is authoring, packaging, signing, or composing a kit
spec.yaml
— use docker-sandboxes-kits.
- The task is about
sbx --cloud(Docker Cloud Sandboxes) — out of scope for
this skill set, which covers the local daemon only.
Core guidance
Creating vs. running
- Use
sbx run AGENT [PATH...]to create-if-needed and attach in one
step. Use sbx create AGENT [PATH...] to create without attaching, then sbx run --name SANDBOX to attach later. Pass --detached/-d to sbx run to print the sandbox ID and exit without an interactive session. ``bash sbx run shell # create (if needed) and attach, cwd mounted sbx create shell . # create only, cwd mounted, do not attach sbx run --name my-sandbox # reattach later ``
AGENTis a built-in name (claude,codex,cursor,devin,
docker-agent, gemini, opencode, shell) or a sandbox kit reference (local directory, ZIP, git, or OCI). A relative local kit reference MUST be an explicit path (./my-kit, a parent-relative .zip path) — a bare my-kit is read as an agent/sandbox name, never a directory beside the cwd.
- Omitting the path is not the same for every subcommand.
sbx run claude
with no path mounts the current directory. sbx create claude with no path mounts nothing at all — the agent then works only in the container's own filesystem. Always pass a path explicitly with sbx create if you intend to give the agent a workspace.
- **Prefer
--nameto reattach; a bare positional name still works but is
deprecated. sbx run --name NAME (agent positional optional, read from the sandbox's own spec) is the recommended form. A bare sbx run NAME — a positional that is neither a known agent nor an explicit kit reference — is still accepted** as a legacy re-attach shorthand, but prints a deprecation warning ("sbx run NAME is deprecated; use sbx run --name NAME instead") and may be removed in a future release. Always write --name explicitly rather than relying on the legacy form. ``bash sbx run --name existing-sandbox # reattach, agent read from spec sbx run claude --name existing-sandbox # reattach, verify expected agent ``
Workspace isolation: bind mount vs. --clone
- Default (bind mount): the workspace path is mounted read/write inside
the sandbox at the same path as on the host. The agent can write directly to your working tree.
--clone(creation-time only): the agent runs against a private
in-container clone of the host Git repository. The host repo is mounted read-only; the agent's commits land in the in-container clone and are reachable from the host via a sandbox- git remote — fetch or pull from it to bring commits back. ``bash sbx create --clone --name demo claude . # on the host, later: git fetch sandbox-demo ``
--clonehas real preconditions, checked at creation time, and fails
loudly if any is unmet:
- an explicit
PATHmust be given (there must be a workspace to clone
from);
- that path must be inside a Git repository;
- it must NOT be a Git worktree (the in-container clone cannot follow a
worktree's .git pointer out to a common dir elsewhere);
- its
.gitmust be a real directory, not a file (a submodule or a
--separate-git-dir setup points .git elsewhere, which the read-only source mount would not include).
- **
--cloneonsbx runwhen reattaching is a no-op ONLY on a sandbox
already created in clone mode — it re-validates nothing new and simply keeps running the existing in-container clone. Passing --clone while reattaching to a sandbox that was created without it (a plain bind-mounted sandbox) is not** a silent no-op: it fails with an error telling you to recreate the sandbox with sbx create --clone .... Neither form can convert an existing sandbox's mode after creation.
- **Removing or pruning a clone-mode sandbox permanently discards every
commit the agent made that was never fetched back to the host** — the in-container clone lives on the sandbox's own filesystem and is deleted with it. Before removing a clone-mode sandbox, fetch its work first: ``bash git fetch sandbox-demo ` Fetching populates two refspecs: the ordinary refs/remotes/sandbox-demo/ (deleted along with the remote when the sandbox is removed) and a survivor copy at refs/sandboxes/demo/ (outside the remote namespace, so it is **not** deleted when the remote goes). Recover a branch from the survivor copy after removal with: `bash git branch refs/sandboxes/demo/ ` sbx rm/sbx prune print this warning automatically for any clone-mode sandbox they are about to remove; read it before confirming, don't suppress it with --force` out of habit.
- Additional workspaces are extra positional paths after the first. Append
:ro to mount one read-only. :ro blocks writes, not reads — the sandbox can still read every file under a :ro mount; it is not a way to hide sensitive content, only to stop the sandbox from modifying it. A read-only argument may name a single file rather than a directory, holding just that one path out of reach for writes inside a workspace the sandbox can otherwise write. ``bash sbx run claude . /path/to/docs:ro ` **Never mount a secrets/credentials file this way** (:ro or otherwise) — a read-only mount still lets the sandbox (and, through it, the proxy-less agent process) read the secret in the clear. Use the credential store instead; see docker-sandboxes-network-credentials`.
Reattaching, stopping, and removing
sbx lslists sandboxes with agent, status, published ports, and
workspace (--json, -q/--quiet for scripting).
sbx stop SANDBOX [SANDBOX...]stops without removing; state is retained
and the sandbox restarts with sbx run --name.
sbx rm [SANDBOX...] [--all] [--force]removes sandboxes, their
containers, Git worktrees, state, and sandbox-scoped secrets. This cannot be undone, and for a clone-mode sandbox it discards every unfetched commit (see above). Only use --force when you have already reviewed what will be destroyed and consented — for scripted teardown of resources this session itself created and uniquely named, not as a default habit.
sbx prune [--dry-run] [--filter until=VALUE] [--force]removes only
stopped sandboxes — a running sandbox is never touched — but this is still a destructive, irreversible bulk removal: every matching stopped sandbox's state, secrets, and (for clone-mode sandboxes) any unfetched commits are gone. Always preview with --dry-run first and read the clone-commit warning it prints before removing for real; do not pass --force as a default.
- Current source flag is
--filter until=VALUE, notsince=.VALUE
may be an RFC 3339 timestamp, a Unix timestamp, or a Go duration relative to now (e.g. until=168h keeps anything stopped within the last week — i.e. prunes what stopped before that point). This is a source-only behavior at the pinned commit that differs from some installed builds: an older installed sbx may still advertise --filter since=DURATION as a legacy alias; prefer until= and treat since= as legacy-only if your installed --help output does not show until=. ``bash sbx prune --dry-run --filter until=168h # after reviewing the dry-run output and any clone-commit warnings: sbx prune --filter until=168h ``
Copying files and running ad-hoc commands
sbx cp SRC DSTcopies between host and sandbox; exactly one side must be
SANDBOX:PATH. Copying between two sandboxes is not supported. ``bash sbx cp ./config.json my-sandbox:/home/agent/ sbx cp my-sandbox:/home/agent/output.log ./ ``
sbx exec [flags] SANDBOX COMMAND [ARG...]runs a command in a sandbox
(starting it first if stopped); flags mirror docker exec (-it, -d, -u, -w, -e, --env-file, --privileged). ``bash sbx exec -it my-sandbox bash sbx exec -u root my-sandbox apt-get update ``
sbx ports SANDBOX [--publish SPEC] [--unpublish SPEC]manages published
ports after creation; -p/--publish on sbx create/sbx run only takes effect when the sandbox is created, not on reattach.
Sizing and naming
--cpus(0 = auto: all host CPUs) and--memory/-m(default 50% of
host memory, clamped 512 MiB–32 GiB) are create-time-only knobs.
--namesets the sandbox name (default-); at least two
characters, starting with a letter or number, letters/numbers/hyphens/ periods only, at most 63 ASCII characters, ending in a letter or number; default is reserved.
Related skills
- For
docker agent run --sandboxanddocker agent sandboxcommands,
use docker-agent-run.
- For network egress policy and service/registry credentials, use
docker-sandboxes-network-credentials.
- For declarative, checked-in
sbxenv.yamlenvironments that wrap this same
create/run/rm lifecycle, use docker-sandboxes-env.
- For authoring or composing the kit
spec.yamlanAGENTreference can
point to, use docker-sandboxes-kits.
References
references/sources.md— provenance for every rule above (help captures, source paths, docs URLs).
Assets
- None.
Checks
checks/verification.md— Verification runbook for sandbox lifecycle commands (unexecuted runbook; run manually with an isolated--app-name, never with--forceexcept consented cleanup of the runbook's own uniquely-named test sandboxes).
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: docker
- Source: docker/skills
- License: Apache-2.0
- Homepage: https://docs.docker.com/ai/skills/
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.