Mapping Attack Techniques

Mapping ATT&CK Techniques

ATT&CK is a shared vocabulary, not a methodology. Its value is that offense, detection, and response can name the same behaviour — which makes this skill a router, not a technique catalogue. It resolves a technique to the skill that holds the actual procedure, and it runs the loop that connects the two sides.

When to Use

• A request names a technique ID (T1003.001), a technique name

("Kerberoasting"), or a tactic ("we need lateral movement coverage")

• Converting a threat intel report or an adversary emulation plan into work
• Planning or reporting coverage against the matrix
• Running a purple team exercise: emulate, detect, validate, close the gap
• Choosing which skill applies when a request spans offense and defense

When NOT to Use

• A plain-language request ("dump creds off this host") — the domain skills

trigger directly on that; routing through here adds a hop for nothing

• Code-level vulnerability work — ATT&CK does not model source defects; use

auditing-code-for-vulnerabilities with CWE and ASVS instead

• AI/LLM systems — use securing-ai-systems; the framework there is MITRE

ATLAS, not ATT&CK Enterprise

• Mobile targets — testing-mobile-applications; the Mobile matrix has its

own IDs that do not correspond to Enterprise ones

The Index

secskills-core/ttp-index.json maps techniques to the skills that cover them. Read it directly to resolve a lookup:

# Which skill covers this technique?
python3 -c "
import json;d=json.load(open('secskills-core/ttp-index.json'))
print([r for r in d['techniques'] if r['id']=='T1003.001'])"

# Everything under one tactic
python3 -c "
import json;d=json.load(open('secskills-core/ttp-index.json'))
[print(r['id'], r['name'], '→', ', '.join(r['skills']))
 for r in d['techniques'] if 'TA0008' in r['tactics']]"

# Search by name when you have words, not an ID
rg -i 'kerberoast|pass the hash' secskills-core/ttp-index.json

Each skill also carries a generated ## ATT&CK Coverage section listing its techniques. That section and the index are kept in sync by scripts/sync_attack.py; the index is the source of truth.

Three things the index deliberately does not do. It does not claim coverage of every technique — the _unmapped block names the skills that use a different framework and says which. It does not repeat detection and hunting on every row, because those apply to all of them. And it is hand-curated, so technique IDs drift as ATT&CK releases new versions: re-verify against attack.mitre.org before citing an ID in a report.

Resolving a Request

Technique ID or name  → look up in the index → load the named skill
Tactic               → list the tactic's techniques → ask which procedure
Intel report         → extract TTPs (not IOCs) → map each → prioritize by
                       what your environment actually exposes
Group / APT name     → pull the group's technique list from ATT&CK → intersect
                       with your attack surface → hunt the intersection

Techniques are not procedures. T1055 (Process Injection) has a dozen materially different implementations, and a detection for one catches none of the others. When a request arrives as a bare technique ID, the useful next question is which procedure — the specific API sequence, tool, or command variant. Answering "we cover T1055" without naming a procedure is the most common way ATT&CK is used to mislead.

The Purple Team Loop

This is what the shared vocabulary is for. Each step hands to a different skill, and the technique ID is what keeps them talking about the same thing.

1. Select    → pick a technique by threat relevance, not matrix tidiness
2. Emulate   → run the procedure (offensive skill, or Atomic Red Team)
3. Observe   → did telemetry capture it? which data source, which fields?
4. Detect    → write the rule against the behaviour  → engineering-detections
5. Validate  → re-run the emulation; confirm the alert fires and is triageable
6. Hunt      → search historically for prior instances → hunting-threats
7. Record    → tested / untested / no-telemetry, per technique

Step 3 is the one that produces the real finding. A technique that executes with no telemetry at all is a visibility gap, and that outranks a missing rule — you cannot write a detection for data you do not collect.

Select techniques by relevance: what actors targeting your sector actually use, what your crown-jewel assets are reachable through, and where you already suspect a gap. Working left-to-right across the matrix produces even coverage of things nobody does to you.

Coverage Reporting

Report per technique in three states, never as a single percentage:

| State | Means | | --- | --- | | Tested | Emulated, telemetry confirmed present fleet-wide, rule fired, triage steps exist | | Untested | A rule exists but has never been validated against an emulation | | No telemetry | The data source is not collected, or not on all platforms |

A green ATT&CK Navigator layer built from untested rules is the most common self-deception in security programs. If you generate a layer, encode the three states as distinct colours and say in the legend what each means.

# Navigator layer from the index (coverage claimed, not coverage tested)
python3 -c "
import json;d=json.load(open('secskills-core/ttp-index.json'))
print(json.dumps({'name':'SecSkills skill coverage','versions':{'layer':'4.5'},
 'domain':'enterprise-attack',
 'description':'Skills that cover each technique. Claimed, not validated.',
 'techniques':[{'techniqueID':r['id'],'comment':', '.join(r['skills']),'score':1}
   for r in d['techniques']]}))" > coverage-layer.json

Label any generated layer as claimed coverage. Turning it into tested coverage requires the loop above, one technique at a time.

Rationalizations to Reject

• "We cover that technique." Which procedure, validated how, with which

telemetry, on which platforms?

• "Let's get coverage across the whole matrix." Even coverage is a

misallocation. Prioritize by what is actually used against you.

• "The technique ID is in the rule's tags, so it's mapped." Tagging is not

testing.

• "ATT&CK doesn't have an ID for this, so it's out of scope." The matrix is

a model of observed behaviour, not a boundary. Code-level bugs, AI system attacks, and Web3 exploits have no Enterprise IDs and still matter — say which framework you used instead.

• "The intel report lists these IOCs, so hunt those." Hunt the TTPs. The

hashes and IPs in a published report are already dead.

• "We emulated it and nothing alerted, so the rule is broken." Check

telemetry first. Usually the data was never collected.

Reading External Sources

Fetch public advisories, specifications, and vendor reports as Markdown:

curl -sL "https://defuddle.md/"      # scheme in the path is optional

This strips page boilerplate — roughly 78% fewer tokens on a prose page — and returns the full text rather than a summary, so you can grep it and trust a negative result.

Three things it is not for. Fetch JSON and API responses raw, because readability extraction mangles structured data. Fetch authenticated or JavaScript-rendered pages directly, because it retrieves them anonymously. And never route adversary infrastructure (phishing links, C2, malware hosting), client-owned hosts, or engagement URLs through it — the request leaves your machine to a third party, and for live adversary infrastructure it also tips off the operator.

Some sites block the extractor and return an error blob rather than the page — {"error":"Failed to fetch: 418 I'm a teapot"} from freedesktop.org, for instance. That is the fetch being refused, not the source saying the thing does not exist. Re-fetch the URL directly before drawing any conclusion from it.

References

• engineering-detections — writing and validating the rule for a technique
• hunting-threats — historical search for a technique in your environment
• responding-to-incidents — mapping observed attacker activity to techniques
• secskills-core/ttp-index.json — the technique-to-skill index this skill reads
• MITRE ATT&CK, ATT&CK Navigator, Atomic Red Team, CALDERA, MITRE ATLAS (AI)

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: EvilFreelancer
• Source: EvilFreelancer/secs
• License: Apache-2.0

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.