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$ agentstack add skill-geledek-enterprise-ai-transformation-skills-tech-data-deployment ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
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Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Tech — Data-Trust Deployment Pattern
A four-dimension assignment of data sensitivity class to deployment pattern with explicit per-tier controls. Anchored to NIST AI RMF (GOVERN/MAP/MEASURE/MANAGE), ISO/IEC 42001, EU AI Act risk tiers, and IMDA Model AI Governance Framework + GenAI Companion.
Empirical anchor: BCG 2025 broad-use-vs-value 88/25 gap — 88% of organizations use AI broadly, only ~25% capture material value; the gap is largely a data-trust and deployment-pattern gap, not a model gap. (A different BCG 88/25 finding — manager role-modeling — is cited in people-readiness-conversation and people-literacy-curriculum; always read "88/25" here as broad-use-vs-value.) MIT 95% — most enterprise GenAI pilots fail to reach production, and shadow-AI usage runs ~2x sanctioned usage in the surveyed cohort.
Verdict vocabulary (stable output contract): Approved / Conditional / Blocked, with assigned deployment tier and per-tier control checklist.
Dimension 1: Data Sensitivity Classification
Core question: What class of data does this workflow actually touch — and which regulatory regime governs it?
Classify the data INPUT, the data IN-FLIGHT (prompt + retrieval), and the data OUTPUT separately. The most sensitive of the three sets the tier.
CLASS LADDER (assign one):
- PUBLIC — already published; no confidentiality cost if exposed.
- INTERNAL — non-public business data, low individual harm if leaked (org charts, internal docs, generic SOPs).
- CONFIDENTIAL — commercially sensitive (M&A, pricing, source code, unreleased product, supplier contracts, legal privilege).
- REGULATED — named regime applies. Identify which:
- PII under GDPR (EEA), PDPA (SG), CCPA (CA)
- PHI under HIPAA (US health) — requires BAA
- PCI-DSS (cardholder data)
- MNPI under MAS (SG financial), MiFID II (EU), SEC Reg FD (US)
- Student records under FERPA (US education) / equivalent
- Cross-border transfer triggers — GDPR Chapter V, China PIPL, India DPDP
DIAGNOSTIC QUESTIONS:
- What is the worst single record in the prompt? (One PHI record drags the entire workflow into the regulated tier.)
- Does retrieval pull regulated data even when the user does not type it? (RAG hit on a confidential index = confidential prompt.)
- Does the output get stored, indexed, or fed back as training data? (Storage class follows the highest-class input.)
- Which jurisdiction's regulator can fine us for this dataset? (Name the regulator, not the country.)
Output: DATA CLASS | REGULATORY REGIME(S) | JURISDICTION + REGULATOR | CROSS-BORDER FLAG
Dimension 2: Deployment-Pattern Map
Core question: Which of the five deployment tiers does this data class permit?
FIVE TIERS (least to most isolated):
- T1 — Public consumer SaaS (ChatGPT free/Plus, Gemini consumer, Claude.ai personal). Provider may train on input. No DPA. No tenant isolation.
- T2 — Enterprise SaaS with DPA (ChatGPT Enterprise/Team, Gemini for Workspace, Claude for Work, Copilot M365). Contractual no-train, signed DPA, SOC2/ISO 27001, regional residency options.
- T3 — Private-tenant cloud / hyperscaler-hosted model (Azure OpenAI, AWS Bedrock, Vertex AI, SageMaker). Model runs in tenant subscription; data stays in tenant; no provider training.
- T4 — VPC self-host / dedicated (Bedrock provisioned, Azure OpenAI PTU in private VNet, self-hosted Llama/Mistral/Qwen on tenant GPUs, NVIDIA NIM in customer VPC).
- T5 — Air-gapped / on-prem (no egress; on-prem GPU; sovereign cloud; classified networks; SCIF-equivalent).
PERMISSION MATRIX (minimum tier required):
| Data Class | Min. Tier | Notes | |---|---|---| | Public | T1 | T1 acceptable; T2 preferred for auditability | | Internal | T2 | Block T1 if logging or compliance asks for audit trail | | Confidential | T3 | T2 only with explicit legal/IP review and no-train DPA | | Regulated PII (GDPR/PDPA) | T3 | T2 acceptable IF residency + DPA + DPIA done | | Regulated PHI (HIPAA) | T3 with BAA | T2 only if BAA signed; otherwise T4 | | Regulated MNPI / privileged | T4 | Bank/legal default; T5 if regulator requires no egress | | Sovereign / classified | T5 | Air-gapped only |
EU AI Act overlay: if the use case is high-risk (Annex III) or GPAI with systemic risk, the deployment pattern must support Art. 12 logging, Art. 14 human oversight, and Art. 26 deployer obligations regardless of tier.
Output: ASSIGNED TIER | TIER JUSTIFICATION | EU AI ACT RISK TIER | EXCEPTIONS REQUESTED
Dimension 3: Control-Stack Selection
Core question: What is the minimum control set this tier requires under NIST AI RMF MEASURE/MANAGE and ISO 42001?
CONTROL STACK (per tier — minimums, not maximums):
LOGGING + AUDIT:
- T1: not acceptable for audited workflows.
- T2: tenant-side prompt/response log retained per record schedule; admin console export.
- T3-T5: full prompt/response/tool-call/identity log; immutable store; SIEM integration.
DLP + REDACTION (pre-prompt):
- T2+: regex + ML DLP on egress; redact PII/PHI/PCI before send; block clipboard-class secrets.
- T3+: policy engine inline (Presidio, Nightfall, Microsoft Purview, Cloudflare AI Gateway).
ACCESS SCOPE:
- Role-based access on the model endpoint AND on retrieval indexes.
- ABAC on RAG corpora — user can only retrieve documents they could already read.
- Per-agent identity (machine identity, not shared API key).
RETENTION:
- T1: assume indefinite retention by provider — disqualifying for anything beyond Public.
- T2: zero-day or per-DPA; verify in admin settings.
- T3-T5: tenant-controlled; tied to record retention schedule.
CROSS-BORDER:
- Pin region. GDPR: EU residency or SCCs + TIA. PDPA: SG residency or transfer impact assessment. China PIPL: in-country processing for personal info.
NIST AI RMF MAPPING:
- GOVERN 1.1 — policies for data class + deployment tier mapping documented.
- MAP 4 — data and model risks identified pre-deployment.
- MEASURE 2.7 — privacy risk measured; MEASURE 2.10 — security risk measured.
- MANAGE 2.4 — documented "off" path; MANAGE 4.1 — incident response.
ISO 42001 mapping: Annex A controls A.6 (data), A.7 (resources), A.8 (impact). IMDA GenAI Companion: provenance, data quality, third-party assessment.
Consult nist-rmf-functions.md for the four-function mapping and pwc-20-item-checklist.md for the deployer checklist items.
Output: LOGGING SPEC | DLP/REDACTION SPEC | ACCESS + RETENTION SPEC | CROSS-BORDER POSTURE | NIST/ISO/IMDA CITATIONS
Dimension 4: Shadow-AI Suppression
Core question: How do we kill the consumer-tier-tool-on-corporate-data flow without killing AI adoption?
SANCTIONED-TOOL CATALOGUE:
- Publish a one-page list: for each common task (summarize, draft, code, analyze image), name the sanctioned T2/T3 tool and the data class it covers.
- Map every consumer-tier tool to its enterprise twin: ChatGPT free → ChatGPT Enterprise; Gemini consumer → Gemini for Workspace; Claude.ai → Claude for Work; Copilot consumer → Copilot M365.
CONDITIONAL-ACCESS POLICY:
- Identity-provider rules (Entra, Okta) that block consumer-tier domains from corporate identity.
- Browser/endpoint DLP that blocks paste of classified strings to consumer-tier URLs.
- Network egress policy: log + alert on traffic to consumer AI endpoints from managed devices.
BRING-YOUR-OWN-AI BOUNDARY:
- Personal-device + personal-account use of T1 tools is permitted ONLY for Public-class tasks.
- Any work data on a personal-device T1 tool = policy violation; route to sanctioned T2 instead.
MEASUREMENT:
- Track shadow-AI rate (consumer endpoint hits / total AI endpoint hits) monthly.
- Track sanctioned-tool seat utilization — low utilization is a UX/training problem, not a policy win.
DIAGNOSTIC QUESTIONS:
- Which sanctioned tool replaces ChatGPT for our top 5 user tasks? (If unanswered, shadow AI is rational.)
- Is the enterprise-tier license actually deployed to the people who would otherwise use the consumer tier? (License hoarding by IT = shadow AI guaranteed.)
- Do users know the data-class rules in plain English? (One page or it does not exist.)
Output: SANCTIONED CATALOGUE STATUS | CONDITIONAL-ACCESS POSTURE | SHADOW-AI RATE | SEAT UTILIZATION
Synthesis: Deployment Pattern Verdict
Consolidate Dimensions 1–4. Name the sign-off owners: CISO, business owner, DPO.
DEPLOYMENT VERDICT: [Approved / Conditional / Blocked]
- Approved — data class fits assigned tier; full control stack present; sanctioned-tool path exists.
- Conditional — fits tier but one or more controls (DLP, residency, BAA, DPIA, logging) are missing; list the conditions and the owner.
- Blocked — data class above tier ceiling (e.g., PHI proposed on T1 or T2 without BAA); MNPI on shared-tenant T2; cross-border transfer without legal basis.
DELIVER:
- One-line verdict.
- Assigned tier (T1–T5) with one-line justification.
- Control checklist — tick/cross against logging, DLP, access, retention, cross-border.
- Regulatory citations triggered (e.g., "EU AI Act Art. 26 deployer obligations; GDPR Art. 28 processor; HIPAA BAA required; MAS TRM Guidelines §6").
- Sanctioned-tool replacement if user requested a consumer-tier tool.
CRITICAL BLOCKERS (any one = Blocked):
- Regulated data proposed on T1.
- PHI on T2 without signed BAA.
- MNPI / privileged data on shared-tenant T2 without legal sign-off.
- Cross-border transfer with no SCC / adequacy / PIPL basis.
- No prompt/response logging on a workflow that produces customer-facing or regulated output.
Consult eu-ai-act-essentials.md (Art. 4, 12, 14, 26), imda-4-dimensions-agentic.md (technical controls), isg-data-foundation.md (data foundation prerequisites), and ai-stack-layers.md (where in the stack each control sits).
Output: VERDICT | ASSIGNED TIER | CONTROL CHECKLIST | REGULATORY CITATIONS | SANCTIONED-TOOL ROUTE
References
All files below live in references/ at the plugin root (${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/references/ when installed as a plugin).
nist-rmf-functions.md— GOVERN / MAP / MEASURE / MANAGE; MEASURE 2.7 privacy, 2.10 security; MANAGE 2.4 off-path.eu-ai-act-essentials.md— Art. 4 literacy; Art. 12 logging; Art. 14 oversight; Art. 26 deployer obligations; risk tiers.imda-4-dimensions-agentic.md— technical controls dimension; GenAI Companion provenance + data quality.isg-data-foundation.md— data-foundation prerequisites that make any deployment tier viable.ai-stack-layers.md— where logging, DLP, retrieval, and identity controls sit in the stack.pwc-20-item-checklist.md— deployer-side control checklist items aligned to this skill's output.
Reference files are bundled with this skill — Claude resolves them by filename regardless of install layout (single-skill or plugin).
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: geledek
- Source: geledek/enterprise-ai-transformation-skills
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.