Install
$ agentstack add skill-giuseppe-trisciuoglio-developer-kit-aws-cloudformation-iam ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
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Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
AWS CloudFormation IAM Security
Overview
Use this skill to model IAM with CloudFormation in a way that stays secure, auditable, and maintainable.
The most important design concerns are:
- separating trust policies from permission policies
- preferring roles over long-lived users wherever possible
- keeping least-privilege boundaries readable and reusable
Do not treat SKILL.md as a full IAM encyclopedia. Use the bundled references for larger policy examples and service-specific variants.
When to Use
- Creating IAM roles for Lambda, ECS, EC2, Step Functions, or other AWS services
- Defining inline policies, managed policies, and permission boundaries in CloudFormation
- Modeling cross-account assume-role access with constrained trust policies
- Exporting IAM role ARNs or managed policy ARNs to downstream stacks
- Reviewing wildcard permissions, boundary drift, or role replacement risk
- Creating reusable IAM stacks for platform or application teams
Instructions
1. Define the trust boundary first
Identify who or what assumes the role (service principal, cross-account principal, or federated identity), then write the trust policy with explicit principals and conditions before adding permissions.
2. Grant the minimum permission set
Use inline policies for role-specific access; use managed policies for shared patterns across principals. Scope actions and resources tightly, and use conditions where possible.
3. Apply permission boundaries for delegated role creation
Use permission boundaries when teams create or extend roles in their own stacks, when guardrails are needed around privileged services (IAM, KMS, Organizations), or to separate maximum allowed permissions from application-specific policies.
Name roles and policies consistently so stack outputs and audits remain easy to trace.
4. Model cross-account access
For cross-account roles: trust only the exact source account or principal, add sts:ExternalId conditions when appropriate, keep permission and trust policies separate, and export only the ARNs that consuming accounts need.
5. Validate the template and policy behavior
Before rollout, use these commands to verify the template and IAM behavior:
# Validate CloudFormation template syntax
aws cloudformation validate-template --template-body file://template.yaml
# Preview changes before applying
aws cloudformation create-change-set \
--stack-name \
--template-body file://template.yaml \
--change-set-type CREATE
# Simulate whether a principal can perform specific actions
aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
--policy-source-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/LambdaExecutionRole \
--action-names dynamodb:GetItem dynamodb:PutItem
# Check for wildcards in IAM policies within the template
aws cloudformation list-stack-resources --stack-name
After deployment, confirm policy attachments and stack outputs match the intended security model.
Examples
Example 1: Service role for Lambda with tightly scoped permissions
Resources:
LambdaExecutionRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Properties:
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
Service: lambda.amazonaws.com
Action: sts:AssumeRole
Policies:
- PolicyName: DynamoDbWritePolicy
PolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Action:
- dynamodb:GetItem
- dynamodb:PutItem
Resource: !GetAtt OrdersTable.Arn
Example 2: Cross-account role with an external ID condition
Resources:
PartnerReadRole:
Type: AWS::IAM::Role
Properties:
AssumeRolePolicyDocument:
Version: "2012-10-17"
Statement:
- Effect: Allow
Principal:
AWS: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/partner-reader
Action: sts:AssumeRole
Condition:
StringEquals:
sts:ExternalId: partner-contract-001
Keep the trust relationship narrow and pair it with a separate read-only permission policy.
Best Practices
- Prefer IAM roles over long-lived IAM users for application and automation access.
- Separate trust policies from permission policies when reviewing or refactoring templates.
- Use permission boundaries when delegating role creation to other teams.
- Scope resources, actions, and conditions as tightly as the workload allows.
- Export stable ARNs and names only when another stack truly consumes them.
- Keep expanded policy libraries and edge cases in
references/instead of bloating the root skill.
Constraints and Warnings
- Overly broad wildcards in IAM are easy to deploy and hard to notice later.
- Named IAM resources can be hard to replace safely once other systems depend on them.
- IAM changes may appear successful in CloudFormation before eventual consistency settles across AWS services.
- Some Identity Center or organization-wide access patterns need complementary tooling outside a single CloudFormation stack.
- Misconfigured trust policies are often a bigger risk than missing permissions.
References
references/examples.mdreferences/reference.md
Related Skills
aws-cloudformation-securityaws-cloudformation-ec2aws-cloudformation-ecsaws-cloudformation-lambda
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: giuseppe-trisciuoglio
- Source: giuseppe-trisciuoglio/developer-kit
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.