Secret Hygiene

Secret Hygiene

A practical workflow for credential management: detecting leaks, rotating cleanly, and preventing recurrence.

When to invoke

• A secret was committed to git, or a private repo went public
• A contributor leaves the project, or access scope changes
• A credential turned up in a public dump, paste, or leak feed
• Periodic audit (quarterly is reasonable)
• Onboarding a repo, hosting account, or VPS you inherited

Step 1 — Inventory what you have

You cannot rotate secrets you cannot enumerate. Build a list, even a rough one.

- Hosting panel:      creds in: 1Password vault X
- DB user:                creds in: server .env, 1Password
- API keys:
    - Stripe live + test        creds in: backend .env, Stripe dashboard
    - Mailgun                   creds in: backend .env
    - GitHub PAT                creds in: ~/.gitconfig (BAD — move to keychain)
- SSH keys: ~/.ssh/id_*         on machines: workstation, CI, VPS
- CI secrets: GitHub Actions    visible at: repo/settings/secrets

Keep this in a password manager or a private repo — never in plaintext on disk.

Step 2 — Scan for leaks (local + repos)

Local filesystem

# Files commonly containing secrets
find ~/Code -maxdepth 4 -type f \( -name '.env*' -o -name 'credentials*' -o -name 'secrets*' \) -not -path '*/node_modules/*' 2>/dev/null

# Permissions check — .env should be 600
find ~/Code -name '.env*' -not -path '*/node_modules/*' -exec stat -f '%Lp %N' {} \; 2>/dev/null

# Did you commit a .env by accident?
cd ~/Code/
git log --all --full-history -- '.env*' 2>/dev/null

Git history

# Quick grep across all history for high-signal patterns
git log -p --all -S 'AKIA'        # AWS access key
git log -p --all -S 'sk-'         # OpenAI / many SaaS
git log -p --all -S 'ghp_'        # GitHub PAT
git log -p --all -S 'xoxb-'       # Slack bot token
git log -p --all -S 'BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY'
git log -p --all -S 'BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY'

# Better: dedicated scanners
gitleaks detect --source . --report-format json --report-path gitleaks.json
trufflehog git file://. --json

Hosted (GitHub)

GitHub runs secret scanning for public repos automatically. For private repos with paid tiers, enable it. Push protection blocks future leaks at git push time — turn it on.

Step 3 — Rotation order

When a secret leaks, rotate outward from the access it grants. Common order:

1. The leaked secret itself — invalidate first.
2. Anything that secret could have been used to read (e.g. a leaked DB password → audit recent DB queries, then rotate DB user).
3. Anything that secret could have been used to write (e.g. a leaked API key with write scope → check for unauthorized writes, then rotate).
4. Adjacent secrets stored in the same place — if a .env leaked, assume every value in that .env leaked.
5. Inbound credentials that depend on the rotated outbound credential (downstream services, webhooks).

For each rotation, log: what, when, by whom, who was notified.

Step 4 — Purging git history (last resort)

Rewriting history is disruptive — every collaborator must re-clone, and tags/CI references may break. Do it only if a high-value secret is in history and rotating is genuinely insufficient (rare; usually rotation is enough).

Modern tool: git-filter-repo

# Install once: brew install git-filter-repo

# Backup first
git clone --mirror git@github.com:owner/repo.git repo-backup.git

# Remove a specific file from all history
cd repo-clone
git filter-repo --invert-paths --path .env
git filter-repo --invert-paths --path config/secrets.yml

# Or replace a literal string everywhere
echo 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE==>REDACTED' > replace.txt
git filter-repo --replace-text replace.txt

# Force-push (coordinate with the team — everyone re-clones after this)
git push --force --all
git push --force --tags

After force-push:

• Every collaborator must git clone fresh; rebasing existing forks is fragile
• Any CI/CD that pinned a commit SHA may break
• GitHub may still serve the old commit by SHA for a while — open a support ticket if cleanup is critical
• Rotate the secret anyway — assume it was already harvested before the purge

Step 5 — Prevention

Pre-commit scanning

Install once per workstation:

# Option A: gitleaks pre-commit hook
brew install gitleaks
gitleaks protect --staged --no-banner

Or via pre-commit framework — example .pre-commit-config.yaml:

repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
    rev: v8.18.0
    hooks:
      - id: gitleaks

.gitignore baseline

# Never commit these
.env
.env.*
!.env.example
*.pem
*.key
*.p12
id_rsa
id_ed25519
credentials.json
config/secrets.yml

.env.example convention

Commit a placeholder file with the keys but not the values:

# .env.example
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://user:password@localhost:5432/dbname
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_test_REPLACE_ME
GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_REPLACE_ME

Server-side secrets

• .env permissions: chmod 600 .env, owned by the app user
• Never bake secrets into Docker images (use runtime env, mounted files, or a secret store)
• For CI: use the platform's secret store (GitHub Actions secrets, GitLab CI variables) — never echo them into build logs

Token scope minimization

• GitHub PATs: prefer fine-grained tokens, scoped to a single repo/org with the minimum scopes
• Database users: separate read-only and read-write users for separate processes
• Cloud IAM: avoid root keys; use scoped service accounts with explicit, minimal IAM

Quick reference — common token prefixes

Useful for grep-based scans:

| Prefix | Provider | |---|---| | AKIA, ASIA | AWS access key | | ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_ | GitHub tokens | | xoxb-, xoxp-, xoxa- | Slack tokens | | sk_live_, sk_test_ | Stripe | | key- (Mailgun), re_ (Resend) | Mail providers | | sk-, sk-proj- | OpenAI / Anthropic-style | | glpat- | GitLab PAT | | dckr_pat_ | Docker Hub PAT | | npm_ | npm tokens | | -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- | SSH private key |

What this skill will not do

• Help retrieve or use credentials that are not yours.
• Scan repositories you do not have authorization to scan.
• Recommend storing secrets in source control "just for now" — there is no "just for now" with secrets.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: GoldenWing-360
• Source: GoldenWing-360/claude-security-skills
• License: MIT
• Homepage: https://goldenwing.at

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.