Install
$ agentstack add skill-harperaa-secure-claude-skills-resource-exhaustion ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
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Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Resource Exhaustion and Denial of Service in AI-Generated Code
The Performance Security Nexus
Research from Databricks highlights:
> "Vibe coding often produces functionally correct but resource-inefficient code that can be exploited for denial of service attacks."
The AI's focus on functionality over performance creates multiple attack vectors.
1.6.1 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
The Problem
AI generates code that works perfectly for normal use but has no limits on resource consumption. This creates two major risks:
- Denial of Service (DoS): Attackers overwhelm server, making it unavailable
- Cost Explosion: Attackers abuse expensive operations (AI APIs, compute)
AI-Generated Vulnerable Code
// Prompt: "Create image processing endpoint"
app.post('/process-image', async (req, res) => {
const { imageUrl, operations } = req.body;
// ❌ VULNERABLE: No size or quantity limits
const imageBuffer = await downloadImage(imageUrl);
let processedImage = imageBuffer;
// ❌ VULNERABLE: Unbounded loop
for (const operation of operations) {
processedImage = await applyOperation(processedImage, operation);
}
res.send(processedImage);
});
// Attack: Send huge image or hundreds of operations
// Result: Server memory exhaustion and crash
Multiple Vulnerabilities in This Code
1. No Image Size Limit:
const imageBuffer = await downloadImage(imageUrl);
Attack:
- Upload 500MB image
- Server downloads entire image to memory
- Multiple concurrent requests
- Server runs out of memory → crash
2. No Operation Count Limit:
for (const operation of operations) {
processedImage = await applyOperation(processedImage, operation);
}
Attack:
- Send 1000 operations
- Each operation processes image
- Server CPU at 100% for minutes
- Legitimate requests time out
3. No Rate Limiting:
app.post('/process-image', async (req, res) => {
Attack:
- Send 10,000 requests simultaneously
- Server processes all (no queue)
- Server crashes or becomes unresponsive
4. No Timeout:
- Long-running operations never cancelled
- Malicious requests occupy resources forever
- Server capacity exhausted
5. No Validation:
- imageUrl could be anything
- Could point to 10GB file
- Could be internal URL (SSRF attack)
The $200,000 AI Cost Attack (Real Story)
One startup built a "summarize any article" AI feature without rate limiting:
Timeline:
- T+0: Feature launches (no rate limiting)
- T+10 min: Malicious user scripts 10,000 requests
- T+10 min: 10,000 OpenAI API calls made ($0.96 per call average)
- T+10 min: $9,600 in charges
- T+4 hours: Attack still running, unnoticed
- T+4 hours: Total cost exceeds $200,000
- T+5 hours: Startup notices, shuts down endpoint
- Outcome: Near bankruptcy, scramble for emergency funding
What went wrong:
- No rate limiting (unlimited requests)
- No request queuing (all processed immediately)
- No cost monitoring alerts
- No maximum spend limits on OpenAI API
Secure Implementation
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const sharp = require('sharp');
// ✅ SECURE: Rate limiting
const imageLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
max: 10, // 10 requests per window
message: 'Too many requests, please try again later',
standardHeaders: true,
legacyHeaders: false,
});
// ✅ SECURE: Request size limiting
app.use(express.json({ limit: '1mb' }));
// ✅ SECURE: Resource limits configuration
const LIMITS = {
MAX_IMAGE_SIZE: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB
MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION: 4000, // pixels
MAX_OPERATIONS: 5,
DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT: 5000, // 5 seconds
PROCESSING_TIMEOUT: 30000, // 30 seconds
MAX_CONCURRENT_JOBS: 3
};
// ✅ SECURE: Job queue for controlled concurrency
const Queue = require('bull');
const imageQueue = new Queue('image-processing', {
redis: {
port: 6379,
host: '127.0.0.1',
},
defaultJobOptions: {
timeout: LIMITS.PROCESSING_TIMEOUT,
attempts: 2,
removeOnComplete: true,
removeOnFail: true
}
});
// ✅ SECURE: Controlled image download
async function downloadImageSecure(url, limits) {
// Validate URL
const urlPattern = /^https?:\/\/(www\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\+~#=]{1,256}\.[a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\b/;
if (!urlPattern.test(url)) {
throw new Error('Invalid URL');
}
// ✅ SECURE: Prevent SSRF by checking against internal IPs
const parsed = new URL(url);
if (isInternalIP(parsed.hostname)) {
throw new Error('Access to internal resources not allowed');
}
const controller = new AbortController();
const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), limits.DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT);
try {
const response = await fetch(url, {
signal: controller.signal,
size: limits.MAX_IMAGE_SIZE, // Limit response size
headers: {
'User-Agent': 'ImageProcessor/1.0'
}
});
clearTimeout(timeout);
// ✅ SECURE: Validate content type
const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type');
if (!contentType || !contentType.startsWith('image/')) {
throw new Error('Invalid content type');
}
// ✅ SECURE: Check content length
const contentLength = parseInt(response.headers.get('content-length'));
if (contentLength > limits.MAX_IMAGE_SIZE) {
throw new Error('Image too large');
}
return await response.buffer();
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
app.post('/process-image', imageLimiter, async (req, res) => {
const { imageUrl, operations } = req.body;
// ✅ SECURE: Validate operations count
if (!Array.isArray(operations) || operations.length > LIMITS.MAX_OPERATIONS) {
return res.status(400).json({
error: `Maximum ${LIMITS.MAX_OPERATIONS} operations allowed`
});
}
// ✅ SECURE: Queue job instead of processing directly
const job = await imageQueue.add('process', {
imageUrl,
operations,
userId: req.user?.id,
ip: req.ip
});
res.json({
jobId: job.id,
status: 'queued',
estimatedTime: await imageQueue.getJobCounts()
});
});
// ✅ SECURE: Process jobs with resource controls
imageQueue.process('process', LIMITS.MAX_CONCURRENT_JOBS, async (job) => {
const { imageUrl, operations } = job.data;
// Download with limits
const imageBuffer = await downloadImageSecure(imageUrl, LIMITS);
// ✅ SECURE: Use sharp with resource limits
let pipeline = sharp(imageBuffer, {
limitInputPixels: LIMITS.MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION ** 2,
sequentialRead: true, // Lower memory usage
});
// Get image metadata to validate
const metadata = await pipeline.metadata();
if (metadata.width > LIMITS.MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION ||
metadata.height > LIMITS.MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION) {
throw new Error('Image dimensions exceed limits');
}
// ✅ SECURE: Apply operations with validation
for (const op of operations) {
pipeline = applyOperationSecure(pipeline, op, LIMITS);
}
// ✅ SECURE: Output with format restrictions
const output = await pipeline
.jpeg({ quality: 80, progressive: true })
.toBuffer();
// Store result temporarily
await storeResult(job.id, output);
return {
success: true,
resultId: job.id,
size: output.length
};
});
function applyOperationSecure(pipeline, operation, limits) {
const { type, params } = operation;
// ✅ SECURE: Whitelist allowed operations
const allowedOps = ['resize', 'rotate', 'blur', 'sharpen', 'grayscale'];
if (!allowedOps.includes(type)) {
throw new Error(`Operation '${type}' not allowed`);
}
switch(type) {
case 'resize':
// ✅ SECURE: Validate dimensions
const { width, height } = params;
if (width > limits.MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION ||
height > limits.MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION) {
throw new Error('Resize dimensions exceed limits');
}
return pipeline.resize(width, height, {
fit: 'inside',
withoutEnlargement: true
});
case 'rotate':
// ✅ SECURE: Validate angle
const angle = parseInt(params.angle);
if (isNaN(angle) || angle 360) {
throw new Error('Invalid rotation angle');
}
return pipeline.rotate(angle);
case 'blur':
// ✅ SECURE: Limit blur sigma
const sigma = Math.min(params.sigma || 1, 10);
return pipeline.blur(sigma);
default:
return pipeline;
}
}
Why AI Generates Resource Exhaustion Vulnerabilities
1. Focus on Functionality
AI thinks:
- "Download image" →
await downloadImage(url)✓ - "Process operations" →
for (op of ops) process(op)✓ - Works for normal inputs ✓
AI doesn't think:
- What if image is 1GB?
- What if 1000 operations?
- What if 1000 concurrent requests?
2. No Resource Awareness
AI doesn't understand:
- Memory is finite
- CPU is limited
- Bandwidth costs money
- API calls cost money
3. Training on Simple Examples
Tutorial code:
// Simple example (no limits)
app.post('/api/process', async (req, res) => {
const result = await expensiveOperation(req.body);
res.json(result);
});
AI learns: This is the pattern AI misses: Production needs limits, queues, rate limiting
Common Resource Exhaustion Patterns
1. Unbounded Loops
Vulnerable:
// Process all items (could be millions)
for (const item of userItems) {
await processItem(item);
}
Secure:
// Limit processing
const MAX_ITEMS = 100;
if (userItems.length > MAX_ITEMS) {
throw new Error(`Maximum ${MAX_ITEMS} items allowed`);
}
for (const item of userItems.slice(0, MAX_ITEMS)) {
await processItem(item);
}
2. Unlimited File Uploads
Vulnerable:
app.post('/upload', async (req, res) => {
const file = req.file; // No size check
await processFile(file);
});
Secure:
app.post('/upload', upload.single('file'), async (req, res) => {
const file = req.file;
// Check size
if (file.size > 10 * 1024 * 1024) { // 10MB
return res.status(413).json({ error: 'File too large' });
}
// Check type
if (!['image/jpeg', 'image/png'].includes(file.mimetype)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid file type' });
}
await processFile(file);
});
3. Expensive AI/API Operations
Vulnerable:
// No limits on expensive OpenAI calls
app.post('/summarize', async (req, res) => {
const { text } = req.body;
const summary = await openai.chat.completions.create({
model: 'gpt-4', // Expensive!
messages: [{ role: 'user', content: text }]
});
res.json({ summary });
});
Secure:
import { withRateLimit } from '@/lib/withRateLimit';
import { auth } from '@clerk/nextjs/server';
async function summarizeHandler(req: NextRequest) {
// Require authentication
const { userId } = await auth();
if (!userId) return handleUnauthorizedError();
const { text } = await req.json();
// Limit text length
if (text.length > 10000) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Text too long (max 10,000 characters)' },
{ status: 400 }
);
}
// Track usage per user
const usage = await getUserUsage(userId);
if (usage.summarizations >= DAILY_LIMIT) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Daily limit reached' },
{ status: 429 }
);
}
// Make API call with timeout
const summary = await Promise.race([
openai.chat.completions.create({
model: 'gpt-4-turbo', // Cheaper model
messages: [{ role: 'user', content: text }],
max_tokens: 150 // Limit response
}),
new Promise((_, reject) =>
setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Timeout')), 30000)
)
]);
// Track usage
await incrementUserUsage(userId, 'summarizations');
return NextResponse.json({ summary });
}
export const POST = withRateLimit(summarizeHandler);
4. Database Query Without Limits
Vulnerable:
app.get('/api/users', async (req, res) => {
// ❌ Returns ALL users (could be millions)
const users = await db.users.find();
res.json(users);
});
Secure:
app.get('/api/users', async (req, res) => {
const { page = 1, limit = 20 } = req.query;
// Validate pagination
const pageNum = Math.max(1, parseInt(page));
const limitNum = Math.min(100, Math.max(1, parseInt(limit)));
// Paginated query
const users = await db.users
.find()
.skip((pageNum - 1) * limitNum)
.limit(limitNum);
const total = await db.users.countDocuments();
res.json({
users,
pagination: {
page: pageNum,
limit: limitNum,
total,
pages: Math.ceil(total / limitNum)
}
});
});
5. Unbounded Recursion
Vulnerable:
// Process nested comments (unlimited depth)
function renderComments(comment) {
let html = `${comment.text}`;
// ❌ No depth limit - stack overflow possible
if (comment.replies) {
comment.replies.forEach(reply => {
html += renderComments(reply); // Recursive
});
}
return html;
}
Secure:
function renderComments(comment, depth = 0) {
// ✅ Limit recursion depth
const MAX_DEPTH = 10;
if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) {
return '[Maximum nesting reached]';
}
let html = `${escapeHtml(comment.text)}`;
if (comment.replies && comment.replies.length > 0) {
// Limit replies shown
const MAX_REPLIES = 50;
const replies = comment.replies.slice(0, MAX_REPLIES);
replies.forEach(reply => {
html += renderComments(reply, depth + 1);
});
if (comment.replies.length > MAX_REPLIES) {
html += `... ${comment.replies.length - MAX_REPLIES} more replies`;
}
}
return html;
}
Real-World Cost Examples
AI API Abuse
OpenAI GPT-4 Pricing (example):
- Input: $0.03 per 1K tokens
- Output: $0.06 per 1K tokens
- Average request: ~$0.50-$1.00
Attack scenario:
- Attacker sends 10,000 requests
- Cost: $5,000-$10,000
- If runs for hours: $50,000-$200,000+
Real incident from rate-limiting skill: > Built a "summarize any article" AI feature without rate limiting. A malicious user scripted 10,000 requests in minutes. At AI API costs, this generated $9,600 in charges in 10 minutes. The attack ran 4 hours unnoticed—total cost over $200,000.
Cloud Infrastructure Abuse
AWS/Cloud Costs:
- Compute: $0.10-$1.00 per hour per instance
- Storage: $0.023 per GB per month
- Bandwidth: $0.09 per GB
Attack scenario:
- Abuse image processing endpoint
- Generate 100GB of processed images
- Store on S3: $2.30/month (minimal)
- Bandwidth to serve: 100GB × $0.09 = $9 per abuse
- 1000 attackers: $9,000 in bandwidth
Database Overload
Attack:
// Request all records repeatedly
for (let i = 0; i
setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Timeout')), 10000)
)
]);
For Expensive Operations, Require Authentication
import { auth } from '@clerk/nextjs/server';
export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
// Expensive operation - require auth
const { userId } = await au
…
## Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- **Author:** [harperaa](https://github.com/harperaa)
- **Source:** [harperaa/secure-claude-skills](https://github.com/harperaa/secure-claude-skills)
- **License:** MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.