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SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Supply Chain Audit

skill-hetcreep-coalmine-supply-chain-audit · by HetCreep

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-hetcreep-coalmine-supply-chain-audit

✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Supply-Chain Audit

Audit what the project trusts: deps, build pipeline, shipped artifact. Report; do NOT change deps unless asked.

1. Dependencies

  • Scope — honor .coalmine.json packageManifests if set: scan exactly those manifest/lockfile paths; else infer by inspecting the repo.
  • CVEs — run ecosystem auditor; cross-check every hit in GHSA/OSV/NVD. Cite advisory ID + affected range + fixed version. (Invoke source-grounding — never from memory.)
  • Maintenance — last release, commit recency, bus-factor, archived/deprecated flag.
  • License — flag copyleft inside permissive project, missing/unknown license.
  • Transitive — full tree; name the parent to bump for a transitive fix.
  • Behavior — phone home? install scripts? unexpected egress?

2. Build / CI

  • CI-only release builds?
  • Actions pinned to commit SHA (not floating tag)?
  • Lockfile committed + enforced in CI?
  • Minimal token scope? No pull_request_target?

3. Artifact

  • SHA-256 checksums published for every binary?
  • Signed (Authenticode/GPG)? Gap documented honestly?
  • SBOM generated?
  • User can verify before running?

Tooling

Per-ecosystem vuln/license/outdated commands + offline fallback: read references/tooling.md when selecting scanners.

Discipline

  • Ground every CVE/fixed-version in an advisory. Never from memory.
  • Don't auto-change deps — report + recommend; user decides (bumps break builds).
  • State what was NOT scanned. Blocked network scans → lockfile inspection fallback (see references/tooling.md), mark live checks N-A.

Fix mode (choice-gated)

After the report, present via ask_question:

  • Pin safe now — commit already-present unchanged lockfile, pin CI action to current SHA, add missing checksum step. Each: checkpoint → apply → verify.
  • Let me pick — user-selected fixes only.
  • Report only — change nothing.

NEVER auto-fix: dep version bump, lockfile regen (re-resolves entire transitive tree).

Output

| package | direct/transitive | issue | severity | advisory | fixed-in | action | Build+artifact checklist · Summary (counts + top fixes) · Not scanned

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.