Electron Security

Electron Security Audit

Audit Electron desktop apps. Electron combines a Chromium renderer with a Node main process — the most dangerous configurations let renderer code call Node APIs directly.

When this skill applies

• Reviewing BrowserWindow webPreferences
• Auditing preload scripts and contextBridge usage
• Reviewing IPC channels for unsafe exposure
• Checking deep link / protocol handler implementations
• Reviewing auto-updater configuration

Workflow

Follow ../_shared/audit-workflow.md.

Phase 1: Stack detection

grep -E '"electron":' package.json
electron --version 2>/dev/null
find . -name 'electron-builder.*' -o -name 'forge.config.*' 2>/dev/null

Electron version matters — Chromium and Node versions update together; old Electron = old Chromium = unpatched browser CVEs.

Phase 2: Inventory

# BrowserWindow configs
grep -rn 'new BrowserWindow\|webPreferences' src/ main/ 2>/dev/null

# Preload references
grep -rn 'preload:' src/ main/ 2>/dev/null

# IPC handlers
grep -rn 'ipcMain.handle\|ipcMain.on\|ipcRenderer.send\|ipcRenderer.invoke' src/ main/ renderer/ 2>/dev/null

# Context bridge
grep -rn 'contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld' src/ main/ 2>/dev/null

# Webview tags
grep -rn '/dev/null

# Protocol handlers
grep -rn 'app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient\|protocol.registerSchemesAsPrivileged' src/ main/ 2>/dev/null

Phase 3: Detection — the checks

BrowserWindow webPreferences

The default-secure pattern (Electron 12+):

new BrowserWindow({
  webPreferences: {
    contextIsolation: true,      // ← must be true
    nodeIntegration: false,      // ← must be false
    sandbox: true,                // ← preferred true
    webSecurity: true,            // ← default true; never disable
    allowRunningInsecureContent: false,  // ← never true
    preload: path.join(__dirname, 'preload.js'),
  },
});

• ELC-WP-1 contextIsolation: true. False = renderer can access Node APIs directly via globals.
• ELC-WP-2 nodeIntegration: false. True = require('child_process').exec(...) works from any rendered page.
• ELC-WP-3 sandbox: true when feasible. Sandboxed renderer can't use Node even in preload (use contextBridge for safe IPC).
• ELC-WP-4 webSecurity: true (default). Never disable; turns off same-origin policy.
• ELC-WP-5 allowRunningInsecureContent: false.
• ELC-WP-6 experimentalFeatures: false.
• ELC-WP-7 enableRemoteModule: false (removed in Electron 14+; check for @electron/remote use which has similar risks).

The above is non-negotiable for any app loading remote content. For apps that load only local files, defaults are still recommended (defense in depth).

Preload scripts and contextBridge

With contextIsolation: true, the preload script has access to a privileged context separated from the renderer's web context. To expose APIs to the renderer:

// preload.js
const { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } = require('electron');

contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld('api', {
  // EXPOSE specific, narrow APIs
  saveFile: (data) => ipcRenderer.invoke('save-file', data),
  loadFile: (path) => ipcRenderer.invoke('load-file', path),
});

• ELC-PL-1 Preload doesn't expose generic functions like eval, require, full ipcRenderer, or fs directly.
• ELC-PL-2 Each exposed function in api.* corresponds to a vetted main-process handler. The renderer can call only what's exposed.
• ELC-PL-3 Exposed functions don't accept renderer-controlled arguments that the main process trusts as filesystem paths, command strings, or URLs without validation.

IPC handlers

// main.js
ipcMain.handle('load-file', async (event, filepath) => {
  // BAD — renderer can pass any path
  return fs.readFile(filepath);
  
  // GOOD — validate path is in allowed directory
  const safeRoot = path.resolve(app.getPath('userData'), 'documents');
  const resolved = path.resolve(safeRoot, filepath);
  if (!resolved.startsWith(safeRoot + path.sep)) {
    throw new Error('Forbidden path');
  }
  return fs.readFile(resolved);
});

• ELC-IPC-1 Every ipcMain.handle / ipcMain.on validates inputs from the renderer.
• ELC-IPC-2 No IPC handler does shell command execution with renderer-supplied args.
• ELC-IPC-3 No IPC handler reads arbitrary filesystem paths — confine to known directories.
• ELC-IPC-4 Verify event.senderFrame if multiple webContents could send IPC; subframes are a vector.
• ELC-IPC-5 No ipcMain.on (fire-and-forget) for security-sensitive operations — use ipcMain.handle so renderer can't replay without ack.

Webview tag

`` is the in-app browser; it's notoriously dangerous.

• ELC-WV-1 ` disabled if not used — set webviewTag: false` in webPreferences.
• ELC-WV-2 If used: handle will-attach-webview to constrain webPreferences:

``js app.on('web-contents-created', (event, contents) => { contents.on('will-attach-webview', (e, webPreferences, params) => { delete webPreferences.preload; webPreferences.nodeIntegration = false; webPreferences.contextIsolation = true; // Block navigation to internal pages if (!params.src.startsWith('https://')) e.preventDefault(); }); }); ``

• ELC-WV-3 Prefer ` with appropriate sandbox over ` when possible.

Navigation control

Renderer should not be able to navigate the BrowserWindow to arbitrary URLs:

• ELC-NAV-1 will-navigate handler restricts navigation to allowlisted origins:

``js contents.on('will-navigate', (e, url) => { const parsedUrl = new URL(url); if (!['app.yourorg.com'].includes(parsedUrl.host)) { e.preventDefault(); } }); ``

• ELC-NAV-2 setWindowOpenHandler (replaces new-window) restricts what window.open / target=_blank does:

``js contents.setWindowOpenHandler(({ url }) => { shell.openExternal(url); // open in default browser return { action: 'deny' }; }); ``

Content Security Policy

• ELC-CSP-1 App's CSP set via meta tag or main-process header injection. Same patterns as web — restrict script-src, no unsafe-inline unless required.
• ELC-CSP-2 Local content uses app:// or file:// carefully; consider registering a custom protocol and serving from it (better security model than file://).

Deep links / protocol handlers

app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient('myapp');
app.on('open-url', (event, url) => {
  // url is from any source — validate
});

• ELC-DL-1 Protocol handler validates the URL structure before acting.
• ELC-DL-2 Deep links don't trust embedded data (e.g., myapp://auth?token=... — verify the token, don't blindly accept).
• ELC-DL-3 On macOS, the open-url event fires when the app is opened via the protocol; queue handling until app is ready.

Auto-updater

• ELC-AU-1 Updates served over HTTPS only.
• ELC-AU-2 Updates signed; signature verified before installation (electron-updater handles this if configured).
• ELC-AU-3 Update server URL verified — not user-configurable.
• ELC-AU-4 Squirrel.Windows / NSIS updaters have known issues with installer hijacking on Windows; confirm using current electron-updater versions with signed installers.

Native dependencies

• ELC-NAT-1 Native modules (node-gyp-compiled) audited and pinned. Native modules execute with full process privileges.
• ELC-NAT-2 ASAR archive integrity considered — ASAR files are not encrypted; anyone with the binary can extract source. Don't put secrets in ASAR.

Electron version

• ELC-VER-1 Electron version current. Chromium CVEs land in Electron releases roughly monthly; old Electron = exploitable browser. Check electron --version matches a current supported line (last 2-3 majors).

Process model

• ELC-PM-1 Main process doesn't run user-supplied JavaScript via vm or Function.
• ELC-PM-2 Renderer-to-renderer IPC (between BrowserWindows) goes through main; no shared globals.

Phase 4: Triage

Critical: nodeIntegration: true; missing context isolation; IPC handler executing shell with renderer-controlled args; webview with permissive config.

Phase 5: Report

Use ../_shared/findings-schema.md. Prefix IDs with ELC-.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: hlsitechio
• Source: hlsitechio/claude-skills-security
• License: MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.