Saas Api Security

SaaS API Security Audit

Audit the API surface of a SaaS — the endpoints exposed to customers, their integrations, and (when applicable) the public internet. Defensive focus.

When this skill applies

• Reviewing CORS configuration on web APIs
• Auditing rate limiting strategy (per-key, per-IP, per-tenant, global)
• Verifying webhook signature implementation (Stripe, GitHub, custom HMAC)
• Reviewing GraphQL query cost / depth limits
• Reviewing idempotency keys on write endpoints
• Auditing API key management (generation, storage, rotation, revocation)

Use other skills for: code-level vulnerabilities (saas-code-security-review), tenant isolation in queries (saas-tenant-isolation), Supabase-specific edge function auth (supabase-security-audit).

Workflow

Follow ../_shared/audit-workflow.md. API-specific notes below.

Phase 1: Scope confirmation

• Public API or internal-only?
• REST, GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, or mix?
• Auth mechanisms (API keys, JWT, OAuth, mTLS)?
• Gateway in front (Cloudflare, Kong, AWS API Gateway, Apigee)?
• Customer-facing webhooks outbound, inbound, both?

Phase 2: Inventory

• List all endpoints / GraphQL resolvers / WebSocket events.
• List rate-limit configurations (gateway + application layer).
• List CORS configurations per route or group.
• List webhook endpoints (inbound) and webhook destinations (outbound).
• List API key types (admin, scoped, ephemeral) and their issuance flow.

Phase 3: Detection — the checks

Rate limiting — see references/rate-limiting.md

• SAPI-RL-1 Every public endpoint has a rate limit (gateway or app layer).
• SAPI-RL-2 Auth endpoints (login, password reset, signup) have aggressive limits per IP AND per account.
• SAPI-RL-3 Rate limits are per-tenant on data endpoints — one tenant can't exhaust the global limit.
• SAPI-RL-4 Rate limit responses use 429 with Retry-After header.
• SAPI-RL-5 Internal services have their own limits (a buggy internal service shouldn't take down the whole gateway).
• SAPI-RL-6 Cost-based limiting on expensive endpoints (exports, search, batch operations) — not just request count.
• SAPI-RL-7 Limits scoped by API key, not just IP (one customer behind one IP shouldn't share a limit with others).

CORS — see references/cors-patterns.md

• SAPI-CORS-1 Access-Control-Allow-Origin uses an explicit allowlist, not *, on endpoints that return user data.
• SAPI-CORS-2 No origin reflection without validation (Allow-Origin: ).
• SAPI-CORS-3 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true only when needed and never with Allow-Origin: *.
• SAPI-CORS-4 Preflight responses (OPTIONS) cached with reasonable Access-Control-Max-Age.
• SAPI-CORS-5 Methods and headers allowlisted precisely, not *.
• SAPI-CORS-6 Wildcard subdomain patterns (*.example.com) verified — easy to mis-implement and reflect attacker.example.com.attacker.com.

Webhook security — see references/webhook-security.md

For inbound webhooks (your endpoints receiving from Stripe, GitHub, etc.):

• SAPI-WH-IN-1 Signature verified using provider's library (Stripe SDK, GitHub HMAC).
• SAPI-WH-IN-2 Raw body used for signature verification, not parsed JSON.
• SAPI-WH-IN-3 Timestamp checked; events older than 5-15 min rejected (replay protection).
• SAPI-WH-IN-4 Idempotency: handler tolerates duplicate delivery without double-processing.
• SAPI-WH-IN-5 Webhook secret stored as a secret, not in code.
• SAPI-WH-IN-6 Secret rotated after suspected exposure or every 12 months.

For outbound webhooks (your service notifying customers):

• SAPI-WH-OUT-1 Sign the payload (HMAC-SHA256 with per-customer secret) and include X-Webhook-Signature header.
• SAPI-WH-OUT-2 Include a timestamp in the signed payload; customer can reject stale events.
• SAPI-WH-OUT-3 URL validation at config time and delivery time — SSRF protection.
• SAPI-WH-OUT-4 Retry with exponential backoff; cap total attempts.
• SAPI-WH-OUT-5 Customer can rotate their secret without losing in-flight events.

GraphQL specifics

• SAPI-GQL-1 Query depth limit (typical: 10).
• SAPI-GQL-2 Query complexity / cost limit (preferred over depth alone).
• SAPI-GQL-3 Field-level rate limits on expensive resolvers.
• SAPI-GQL-4 Disable introspection in production OR allowlist clients that can introspect.
• SAPI-GQL-5 Aliases counted toward complexity (else a: thing b: thing c: thing ... is unbounded).
• SAPI-GQL-6 Persisted queries used where clients are first-party — eliminates the entire arbitrary-query attack surface.
• SAPI-GQL-7 Authorization checked per field, not just per root query. See saas-code-security-review/references/idor-bola-patterns.md.

REST specifics

• SAPI-REST-1 Methods restricted (GET / POST / PUT / DELETE / PATCH) — no TRACE, no CONNECT, no random methods.
• SAPI-REST-2 Idempotency keys supported on POST endpoints with side effects (Idempotency-Key header).
• SAPI-REST-3 Strict content-type checking on POST/PUT (application/json; reject text/plain injection vectors).
• SAPI-REST-4 Pagination caps maximum page size to prevent enumeration of entire dataset in one call.
• SAPI-REST-5 Field filtering / sparse fieldsets validated to prevent over-fetching internal columns.

API key management — see references/api-key-management.md

• SAPI-AK-1 Keys generated with CSPRNG, ≥ 256 bits of entropy.
• SAPI-AK-2 Keys prefixed with a recognizable identifier (sk_live_, cb_test_) for secret scanning.
• SAPI-AK-3 Keys hashed server-side (HMAC or hash) at rest — never stored in plaintext.
• SAPI-AK-4 Keys can be scoped to specific permissions (least privilege).
• SAPI-AK-5 Keys have last-used timestamps and inactive keys are flagged.
• SAPI-AK-6 Key revocation is immediate (no caching delays).
• SAPI-AK-7 Test/sandbox keys can't be used against production resources.

Authentication & session

• SAPI-AUTH-1 Bearer tokens validated on every request (no session caching that misses revocation).
• SAPI-AUTH-2 OAuth flows use PKCE for public clients.
• SAPI-AUTH-3 Refresh tokens rotate on use; reuse triggers session-family revocation.
• SAPI-AUTH-4 Cookie-based session: SameSite=Lax (or Strict), Secure, HttpOnly.

Response hygiene

• SAPI-RESP-1 No internal server details in error responses (stack traces, DB schema names, file paths).
• SAPI-RESP-2 Consistent error format; 401/403/404 don't leak existence vs permission.
• SAPI-RESP-3 Sensitive fields (password hashes, internal IDs) not in any API response, even by accident in admin endpoints.
• SAPI-RESP-4 Pagination cursors are opaque (signed/encrypted) if they encode sensitive state.

Phase 4: Triage

Critical class examples:

• No rate limiting on auth endpoints
• Webhook signature verification missing or broken (replay possible)
• CORS reflects any origin with credentials
• GraphQL with no depth/cost limit + introspection enabled
• API keys stored in plaintext in the database

Phase 5: Report

Use ../_shared/findings-schema.md. Prefix IDs with SAPI-.

References

• references/rate-limiting.md — Strategies (token bucket, sliding window), gateway vs app layer, per-tenant quotas
• references/cors-patterns.md — Allowlist patterns, credentials gotchas, subdomain wildcards
• references/webhook-security.md — HMAC patterns, replay protection, idempotency
• references/api-key-management.md — Generation, storage, scoping, rotation

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: hlsitechio
• Source: hlsitechio/claude-skills-security
• License: MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.