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Security Scan

skill-huzaifa525-claude-code-optimizer-security-scan · by huzaifa525

Use when the user wants a security audit, vulnerability scan, or asks about potential security issues.

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-huzaifa525-claude-code-optimizer-security-scan

✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets Used
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Run a comprehensive security scan on the codebase.

Iron Law

> No "probably safe." Verify or flag. > If you cannot confirm a pattern is secure, flag it. False positives are cheap. Missed vulnerabilities are not.

Scan Checklist

1. Hardcoded Secrets (CRITICAL)

grep -rn "password\s*=\|api_key\s*=\|secret\s*=\|token\s*=" src/
grep -rn "BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY" .
grep -rn "sk-\|pk_\|ghp_\|gho_\|AKIA" src/

Also check for:

  • Base64-encoded secrets (long random strings in config)
  • Secrets in comments ("// old password was...")
  • Secrets in test fixtures that match production patterns

2. SQL Injection

  • String concatenation in SQL queries ("SELECT * FROM " + table)
  • Raw queries without parameterization
  • ORM bypass with raw SQL
  • Dynamic table/column names from user input

3. XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)

  • dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML, document.write
  • Template rendering with unescaped user input ({!! !!}, | safe, ``)
  • URL parameters reflected in page without encoding
  • SVG/image uploads that could contain scripts

4. Command Injection

  • exec(), spawn(), system() with user-controlled input
  • Template strings in shell commands
  • Unsanitized filenames in file operations

5. Authentication & Authorization

  • Routes/endpoints missing auth middleware
  • Role checks that can be bypassed (client-side only)
  • Password hashing (must be bcrypt/argon2/scrypt — NOT md5/sha1/sha256)
  • JWT: check expiry validation, algorithm confusion, secret strength
  • Session fixation or missing session regeneration on login

6. Input Validation

  • API endpoints accepting unvalidated input
  • Missing type checks, length limits, format validation
  • File upload: missing type restrictions, size limits, path traversal
  • Regex DoS (ReDoS) — catastrophic backtracking patterns

7. Sensitive Data Exposure

  • Sensitive data in logs (passwords, tokens, PII)
  • Stack traces or internal paths in error responses
  • .env files not in .gitignore
  • Sensitive data in URL query parameters (logged by proxies)
  • Missing HTTPS enforcement

8. Dependency Vulnerabilities

npm audit 2>/dev/null || pip audit 2>/dev/null || true

Check for known CVEs in dependencies.

9. Insecure Configuration

  • CORS: overly permissive (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *)
  • Missing security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)
  • Cookie settings: missing httpOnly, secure, sameSite flags
  • Debug mode enabled in production config
  • Default credentials in config files

Anti-Rationalization

| Excuse | Rebuttal | |--------|----------| | "This is internal/admin-only code" | Internal code gets exposed via SSRF, insider threats, and supply chain attacks. Secure it. | | "We're behind a firewall" | Firewalls fail. Defense in depth means every layer is secure. | | "This secret is only in development" | Dev secrets leak to production. Use env vars and secret managers. | | "Nobody would find this endpoint" | Security through obscurity is not security. Assume attackers find everything. | | "The framework handles this automatically" | Verify. Frameworks have defaults, and defaults get overridden. | | "This is a low-priority app" | Low-priority apps are pivot points. Attackers use them to reach high-priority systems. | | "We'll fix it later" | Later never comes. Flag it now with severity. |

Pre-Delivery Checklist

Before presenting the report, verify:

  • [ ] All 9 scan categories were checked (not skipped)
  • [ ] Every finding has a file:line reference
  • [ ] Severity levels are justified (not guessed)
  • [ ] No "probably safe" — each item is verified or flagged
  • [ ] Dependency audit command was actually run
  • [ ] .env and .gitignore were checked
  • [ ] Auth middleware coverage was mapped to routes
  • [ ] Passed checks section acknowledges secure patterns found
  • [ ] Recommendations are prioritized by actual risk, not alphabetical

Output Format

## Security Scan Report

### Critical (exploit risk — fix immediately)
- [file:line] [vulnerability] — [impact] — [fix]

### High (significant risk)
- [file:line] [vulnerability] — [impact] — [fix]

### Medium (moderate risk)
- [file:line] [vulnerability] — [impact] — [fix]

### Low (minor risk / hardening)
- [file:line] [issue] — [recommendation]

### Passed Checks
- [what looks good — acknowledge secure patterns]

### Prioritized Recommendations
1. [most urgent fix]
2. [next priority]
3. [etc.]

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.