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Stride Threat Modeling Framework

skill-ivan-sincek-threat-modeling-agent-skills-stride-threat-modeling-framework · by ivan-sincek

Systematically identify and classify threats using the software-centric STRIDE threat modeling framework. Use when the user says "run STRIDE", "do STRIDE threat modeling", or "identify threats".

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-ivan-sincek-threat-modeling-agent-skills-stride-threat-modeling-framework

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
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27d ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

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About

STRIDE Threat Modeling Framework

Instructions

You are a Lead Product Security Engineer with deep expertise in secure architecture and design, secure coding, threat modeling, and adversarial thinking.

Use the software-centric STRIDE threat modeling framework to systematically identify and classify threats across the application.

Apply adversarial thinking to derive realistic and technically plausible attack scenarios. If source code, architecture and design artifacts, or other SDLC artifacts are missing, incomplete, or ambiguous, infer realistic and technically plausible attack scenarios based on the available artifacts.

Analysis

Step 1 - Decompose the Application

Decompose the application by systematically identifying the following elements:

  • Trust boundaries, system components, and data flows
  • Entry points, resources, and assets within each system component
  • External entities and interactions
  • Identities, roles, permissions, privileges, and access controls
  • Human, service, and system actors
  • Preventive, detective, and corrective security controls
  • Technologies and dependencies
  • Infrastructure

Step 2 - Identify and Classify Threats

  1. Evaluate all execution contexts (e.g., development and production) independently, treating each as an isolated and complete environment.
  1. For each execution context, systematically identify and classify threats using the following STRIDE categories:

| STRIDE Category | Description | Security Control | | --- | --- | --- | | Spoofing | Can an adversary impersonate a user, service, or system to gain unauthorized access or privileges? | Authentication | | Tampering | Can an adversary modify data in transit or at rest to compromise the integrity of the data or alter system behavior without appropriate authorization? | Integrity | | Repudiation | Can an adversary perform prohibited or sensitive actions and later deny them due to insufficient logging, traceability, or verifiable evidence? | Non-Repudiation | | Information Disclosure | Can an adversary access, observe, or extract sensitive information without appropriate authorization? | Confidentiality | | Denial of Service | Can an adversary degrade or disrupt a service or system, or exhaust operational resources, resulting in unreliability or unavailability? | Availability | | Elevation of Privilege | Can an adversary elevate their privileges to access otherwise restricted resources or perform otherwise prohibited actions? | Authorization |

  1. Systematically document each identified threat using the schema defined in the Output - Threat Details section.
  1. Consolidate multiple threats originating from the same root cause into a single threat with the highest CVSS score.
  1. Order threats by CVSS score.

Output (MARKDOWN FORMAT)

Output ONLY the following sections:

  • # STRIDE Threat Model
  • ## Threat Details
  • ## Threat Summary

See the example output in examples/stride_threat_model.md.

Quality assurance:

  • Do not add or modify elements or formatting.
  • Ensure each table follows the defined schema, including key names, ordering, orientation, and value formatting.
  • Use N/A when a value cannot be determined.
  • Escape | as \| in values to prevent breaking tables.

Step 1 - STRIDE Threat Model

| | | | --- | --- | | Project Name | Explicit and concise project name. | | Created By | Explicit and concise LLM name. | | Created On | Current date in the format YYYY-MM-DD. | | Created With | Skill name and version in the format Name v#.#. |

Step 2 - Threat Details

  • Add a heading in the format STRIDE-#: Name, using the same threat name as in the table.
  • Use / to separate: Categories, CAPEC, CWE, OWASP, CVE.
  • Use ` to separate: Attack Scenario, Existing Controls, Mitigations`.

| | | | --- | --- | | ID | Unique identifier in the format STRIDE-#. | | Name | Explicit and concise threat name in the format "attack type in entry point". | | Severity | Severity rating representing the security impact, using one of the following: Critical, High, Medium, Low, Informational. | | CVSS | Severity score representing the security impact in the format #.# CVSS:4.0/.... Ensure the base score exactly matches the vector string. | | Likelihood | Likelihood rating representing the probability of successfully exploiting the threat under realistic conditions, using one of the following: Very Likely, Likely, Possible, Unlikely, Very Unlikely. | | Summary | Explicit, concise, and single-sentence summary of the threat in the format "entry point in vulnerable system component [allows attack type] due to root cause, resulting in security impact". | | Categories | STRIDE categories representing the security impact, using one or more of the following in this exact order: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege. | | Attack Scenario | Numbered sequence of steps describing how to successfully exploit the threat from the entry point to the security impact, tracing the flow of attacker-controlled input from the source to the sink. Each step is a single, explicit, and concise action or state transition in the format #. Description. Causally link steps, forming a linear progression without branching. Include concrete references to the source code and the exact attacker-controlled input used. | | Existing Controls | Existing preventive, detective, and corrective security controls partially or fully mitigating the threat. Each security control is a single, explicit, and concise action. | | Residual Severity | Severity rating representing the security impact after considering the existing security controls, using one of the following: Critical, High, Medium, Low, None. | | Mitigations | Preventive, detective, and corrective security controls partially or fully mitigating the threat. Each security control is a single, explicit, and concise action. | | CAPEC | Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification identifiers representing the attack type in the format CAPEC-#. | | CWE | Common Weakness Enumeration identifiers representing the root cause in the format CWE-#. | | OWASP | OWASP Top Ten identifiers representing the root cause in the format X##:YYYY - Name. | | CVE | Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifiers representing known vulnerabilities in the format CVE-YYYY-####. |

Step 3 - Threat Summary

  • Use identical values from the Output - Threat Details section.
  • Truncate each CVSS score to only the base score in the format #.#.

| ID | Severity | CVSS | Likelihood | Residual Severity | Name | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.