Qq Audit Security

> Part of Claude Code operator skills: a collection of skills for running a real Claude Code setup.

Audit security with expert personas

Audit security by running 23 expert personas in serial, fixing critical issues per framework before verifying.

23 security frameworks, each loaded as a deep expert persona into its own agent context. Serial execution: one framework → fix critical issues → verify → next. Each agent thinks like a 20-year specialist in that specific framework.

Expert lens: Is it safe? Would a security engineer approve?

Supersedes: ad-hoc security checklists, one-off OWASP scans.

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Modes

This skill responds to three modes based on the args passed. Interpret intent loosely: fuzzy matching, not exact phrasing.

Mode 1: Full serial audit (no args or "run all")

Triggers: /qq-audit-security, "run all", "full audit", "everything", no args at all.

Mode 2: Single framework (framework name + optional scope)

Triggers: /qq-audit-security OWASP Top 10, "just run XSS on the form handler", "CSRF on the checkout flow", etc.

Match the framework name fuzzily: "owasp", "top 10", "xss", "cross site scripting" should all match the right framework. "csrf", "anti-forgery", "request forgery" should all match CSRF Protection. If ambiguous, show the 2-3 closest matches and ask.

Mode 3: List frameworks (help/list/discovery)

Triggers: "list", "what do you have", "what frameworks", "help", "which ones", "show me", etc.

Show the framework table from the framework inventory below, then ask which one(s) to run.

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Smart interview (runs before any audit)

DO NOT ask dumb questions. Before asking anything, gather what you already know:

1. Check conversation context: What product are we working on? What files have been discussed? What has the user been complaining about?
2. Check project CLAUDE.md: Product description, tech stack, target audience.
3. Check recent session state: What was just built or changed?

Pre-fill and present assumptions:

> "Here’s what I know going in: > - Product: [name] ([description from context]) > - Tech stack: [framework, language, hosting, inferred from project] > - Auth model: [session-based / JWT / OAuth, inferred from code] > - Known attack surface: [public APIs, file uploads, user input, third-party integrations] > - Scope: [full app / specific endpoints / specific component] > > Anything wrong or missing?"

Use AskUserQuestion with multiple choice ONLY for genuine gaps. For example, if you truly can’t tell whether auth is session-based or JWT, ask. If you can infer it, state the inference.

Interview output becomes the audit context: passed to every framework agent so they audit with purpose, not generically.

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Execution flow (full audit)

Phase 1: Context gathering

1. Run smart interview (above)
2. Read the product’s key routes, middleware, and API endpoints to understand scope
3. Map the attack surface: public endpoints, auth flows, data stores, third-party integrations

Phase 2: Serial framework execution

For each framework (in order 1-23):

1. Spawn one agent with these instructions:

• "Read the framework subskill file at ~/.agents/skills/qq-audit-security/frameworks/[NN-name].md"
• "You ARE the expert described in that document. Think like them, not like a generalist."
• "Audit [product name] focusing on [scope]. Context: [interview output]"
• "Previous frameworks found these issues: [cumulative findings list]. Do NOT re-report duplicates."
• "Score 1-10, list findings with file:line references, fix critical issues (score < 7), write report."

1. Collect the agent’s output:

• Score for this framework
• Findings (new, not duplicates)
• Fixes applied
• Items flagged for downstream frameworks

1. Verify build if fixes were applied (npx next build or equivalent)

1. Update cumulative state:

• Add findings to the dedup list
• Update the running score card
• Note cross-framework flags for upcoming frameworks

1. Move to next framework

Phase 3: Synthesis

1. Run framework #23 (Privacy/Data Minimization) as the final review
2. Compile consolidated report:

• Overall security posture score
• Per-framework scores
• All findings grouped by severity (critical / high / medium / low)
• Fixes applied (with file:line)
• Remaining items for future rounds

1. Compare to previous audit rounds if they exist

Phase 4: Report

Save to project’s data directory:

• data/audit-security-[date].md: full report
• data/audit-security-[date]-summary.md: scores + critical findings only

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Framework inventory

| # | Framework | Expert lens | Subskill file | |---|-----------|-------------|---------------| | 1 | OWASP Top 10 | The ten most critical web application security risks: is the app defended against the attack classes that actually matter? | 01-owasp-top-10.md | | 2 | Injection Prevention | All data entering queries parameterized: is untrusted input ever interpreted as code? | 02-injection-prevention.md | | 3 | Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Prevention | User content escaped in every rendering context: can an attacker execute scripts in another user’s browser? | 03-xss-prevention.md | | 4 | CSRF Protection | State-changing operations require anti-CSRF tokens: can an attacker trick a user’s browser into making unwanted requests? | 04-csrf-protection.md | | 5 | Authentication Security | Resists credential stuffing, brute force, and identity spoofing: can the application reliably prove who someone is? | 05-authentication-security.md | | 6 | Authorization / Broken Access Control | Every object access checks server-side permissions: can users reach resources or functions they shouldn’t? | 06-authorization-enforcement.md | | 7 | Sensitive Data Exposure | Encrypted at rest and in transit, no secrets in logs: is sensitive data protected throughout its lifecycle? | 07-sensitive-data-exposure.md | | 8 | Content Security Policy (CSP) | Strict CSP preventing inline scripts and unauthorized origins: does the browser enforce what code is allowed to run? | 08-content-security-policy.md | | 9 | Dependency Vulnerability Audit | Third-party CVEs and timely patching: are the application’s dependencies free of known exploitable vulnerabilities? | 09-dependency-vulnerabilities.md | | 10 | Security Headers Audit | HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, and friends: do HTTP response headers harden the browser’s security posture? | 10-security-headers.md | | 11 | API Security / Broken Function-Level Authorization | Function-level authorization on every API endpoint: can callers invoke operations they shouldn’t have access to? | 11-api-security.md | | 12 | File Upload Security | Validated type, size, and content, stored safely: can an attacker weaponize the file upload feature? | 12-file-upload-security.md | | 13 | Session Management Security | Timeout, rotation, secure cookies, and invalidation: can an attacker hijack, fixate, or ride a user’s session? | 13-session-management.md | | 14 | Cryptographic Practices | Current algorithms, proper key lengths, and sound key management: is the application’s cryptography actually protecting what it claims to protect? | 14-cryptographic-practices.md | | 15 | SSRF Prevention | User-controlled URLs validated before server-side fetch: can an attacker make the server request internal resources? | 15-ssrf-prevention.md | | 16 | Mass Assignment / Over-Posting | Only whitelisted fields accepted on write operations: can an attacker modify fields they shouldn’t by including extra parameters? | 16-mass-assignment.md | | 17 | Business Logic Abuse | Business rules enforced server-side: can an attacker exploit the application’s intended functionality for unintended outcomes? | 17-business-logic-abuse.md | | 18 | DNS/Subdomain Security | No dangling CNAMEs, proper email authentication: is the DNS infrastructure defended against hijacking and spoofing? | 18-dns-subdomain-security.md | | 19 | Client-Side Storage Security | No tokens or PII in localStorage: is the client-side storage model defended against extraction, persistence, and cross-site access? | 19-client-storage-security.md | | 20 | Clickjacking Protection | Frame-ancestors CSP and X-Frame-Options: can an attacker trick users into clicking hidden elements by framing the application? | 20-clickjacking-protection.md | | 21 | Supply Chain Security | Build pipeline protected per SLSA: can an attacker inject malicious code through dependencies, build tools, or CI/CD infrastructure? | 21-supply-chain-security.md | | 22 | Secrets Rotation | Never in code, always auditable: are secrets managed with proper lifecycle controls, rotation, and zero-code-exposure guarantees? | 22-secrets-rotation.md | | 23 | Privacy/Data Minimization | Only necessary data collected and retained per GDPR Art. 5: does the application collect the minimum personal data required and delete it when no longer needed? | 23-privacy-data-minimization.md |

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Key principles

• Serial, not parallel: 70% of findings duplicate across frameworks. Serial means each round finds genuinely new issues after fixes.
• Fix before moving on: don’t accumulate a findings list. Fix each framework’s criticals before the next audit.
• Expert persona, not checklist: each agent IS the specialist. They reason from principles, not rules.
• Hold every fix to a real quality bar: is this real data? Does it prevent errors? Is the complexity earned?
• Code + config: code audits miss runtime configuration issues. Always audit deployed headers, CSP, and server config when possible.
• Multi-round: after all 23 frameworks, run the full cycle again. Scores increase each round until plateau.
• Dedup across frameworks: each agent receives cumulative findings so they don’t re-report known issues.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: lee-fuhr
• Source: lee-fuhr/claude-operator-skills
• License: MIT
• Homepage: https://operator.leefuhr.com

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.