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SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Skill 044

skill-legendtkl-agentic-skill-router-skill-044 · by legendtkl

Hunt for credential access techniques like LSASS dumping or browser credential theft. Use when searching for evidence of credential harvesting. Takes MITRE technique IDs and searches for behavioral indicators in SIEM.

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-legendtkl-agentic-skill-router-skill-044

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
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2mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

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About

Credential Access TTP Hunt Skill

Proactively hunt for MITRE ATT&CK Credential Access techniques (T1003, T1555, etc.) based on threat intelligence or hypothesis.

Inputs

  • TECHNIQUE_IDS - Comma-separated MITRE technique IDs (e.g., "T1003.001,T1555.003")
  • TIME_FRAME_HOURS - Lookback period (default: 72)
  • (Optional) TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY - UDM query to narrow scope
  • (Optional) HUNT_HYPOTHESIS - Reason for the hunt
  • (Optional) HUNT_CASE_ID - SOAR case for tracking

Common Techniques

| Technique | Description | |-----------|-------------| | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | | T1003.002 | Security Account Manager | | T1003.003 | NTDS | | T1003.004 | LSA Secrets | | T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials | | T1003.006 | DCSync | | T1555.001 | Keychain | | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | | T1555.004 | Windows Credential Manager |

Workflow

Step 1: Research Techniques

For each technique in TECHNIQUE_IDS:

gti-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="Explain MITRE ATT&CK technique T1003.001")

Understand:

  • What the technique does
  • Common procedures/tools
  • Detection methods

Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries

T1003.001 - LSASS Memory Access:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"

Look for suspicious parent processes accessing lsass.exe.

T1003.001 - Known Dumping Tools:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
 principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "procdump" OR
 principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "sekurlsa")

T1555.003 - Browser Credential Files:

metadata.event_type = "FILE_OPEN" AND
(target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Login Data" OR
 target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Web Data" OR
 target.file.full_path CONTAINS "cookies.sqlite") AND
principal.process.file.full_path NOT IN ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe")

T1003.006 - DCSync:

metadata.event_type = "DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_REPLICATION" AND
principal.hostname NOT IN @known_domain_controllers

General - Credential Dumping Tools:

metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
 target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "lazagne" OR
 target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "pypykatz")

Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.

Step 3: Execute Searches

secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)

Step 4: Analyze Results

Look for:

  • Low-prevalence events (unusual parent-child relationships)
  • Access from unexpected applications
  • Correlation with other suspicious activity
  • Known bad tool signatures

Step 5: Enrich Findings

If suspicious events found:

secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=USER_OR_HOST)

For file hashes:

gti-mcp.get_file_report(hash=HASH)

Step 6: Document Hunt

Use /document-in-case:

  • Techniques hunted with descriptions
  • Queries used
  • Findings (positive AND negative)
  • Enrichment results
  • Risk assessment

Step 7: Escalate or Conclude

Credential theft confirmed: → Trigger /respond-compromised-account for affected users → Escalate to incident response → Consider password resets for exposed credentials

No findings: → Document negative results → Confirm detection coverage for these techniques

Required Outputs

After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:

| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | FINDINGS | Detected credential access activity (events, processes, files accessed) | | DETECTED_TECHNIQUES | MITRE techniques observed (e.g., T1003.001, T1555.003) | | AFFECTED_ACCOUNTS | Accounts potentially compromised (users whose credentials may be exposed) |

Detection Gaps to Note

If queries return no results, consider:

  • Is the required telemetry being collected?
  • Are endpoint logs being forwarded to SIEM?
  • Do detection rules exist for these techniques?

Document gaps for security engineering follow-up.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.