Install
$ agentstack add skill-legendtkl-agentic-skill-router-skill-044 ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Credential Access TTP Hunt Skill
Proactively hunt for MITRE ATT&CK Credential Access techniques (T1003, T1555, etc.) based on threat intelligence or hypothesis.
Inputs
TECHNIQUE_IDS- Comma-separated MITRE technique IDs (e.g., "T1003.001,T1555.003")TIME_FRAME_HOURS- Lookback period (default: 72)- (Optional)
TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY- UDM query to narrow scope - (Optional)
HUNT_HYPOTHESIS- Reason for the hunt - (Optional)
HUNT_CASE_ID- SOAR case for tracking
Common Techniques
| Technique | Description | |-----------|-------------| | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | | T1003.002 | Security Account Manager | | T1003.003 | NTDS | | T1003.004 | LSA Secrets | | T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials | | T1003.006 | DCSync | | T1555.001 | Keychain | | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | | T1555.004 | Windows Credential Manager |
Workflow
Step 1: Research Techniques
For each technique in TECHNIQUE_IDS:
gti-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="Explain MITRE ATT&CK technique T1003.001")
Understand:
- What the technique does
- Common procedures/tools
- Detection methods
Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries
T1003.001 - LSASS Memory Access:
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"
Look for suspicious parent processes accessing lsass.exe.
T1003.001 - Known Dumping Tools:
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "procdump" OR
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "sekurlsa")
T1555.003 - Browser Credential Files:
metadata.event_type = "FILE_OPEN" AND
(target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Login Data" OR
target.file.full_path CONTAINS "Web Data" OR
target.file.full_path CONTAINS "cookies.sqlite") AND
principal.process.file.full_path NOT IN ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe")
T1003.006 - DCSync:
metadata.event_type = "DOMAIN_CONTROLLER_REPLICATION" AND
principal.hostname NOT IN @known_domain_controllers
General - Credential Dumping Tools:
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
(target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "mimikatz" OR
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "lazagne" OR
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "pypykatz")
Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.
Step 3: Execute Searches
secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)
Step 4: Analyze Results
Look for:
- Low-prevalence events (unusual parent-child relationships)
- Access from unexpected applications
- Correlation with other suspicious activity
- Known bad tool signatures
Step 5: Enrich Findings
If suspicious events found:
secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=USER_OR_HOST)
For file hashes:
gti-mcp.get_file_report(hash=HASH)
Step 6: Document Hunt
Use /document-in-case:
- Techniques hunted with descriptions
- Queries used
- Findings (positive AND negative)
- Enrichment results
- Risk assessment
Step 7: Escalate or Conclude
Credential theft confirmed: → Trigger /respond-compromised-account for affected users → Escalate to incident response → Consider password resets for exposed credentials
No findings: → Document negative results → Confirm detection coverage for these techniques
Required Outputs
After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:
| Output | Description | |--------|-------------| | FINDINGS | Detected credential access activity (events, processes, files accessed) | | DETECTED_TECHNIQUES | MITRE techniques observed (e.g., T1003.001, T1555.003) | | AFFECTED_ACCOUNTS | Accounts potentially compromised (users whose credentials may be exposed) |
Detection Gaps to Note
If queries return no results, consider:
- Is the required telemetry being collected?
- Are endpoint logs being forwarded to SIEM?
- Do detection rules exist for these techniques?
Document gaps for security engineering follow-up.
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: legendtkl
- Source: legendtkl/agentic-skill-router
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://legendtkl.github.io/agentic-skill-router/
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.