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Rust

skill-martinholovsky-claude-skills-generator-rust · by martinholovsky

Systems programming expertise for Tauri desktop application backend development with memory safety and performance optimization

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$ agentstack add skill-martinholovsky-claude-skills-generator-rust

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No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution Used
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Rust Systems Programming Skill

File Organization

  • SKILL.md: Core principles, patterns, and essential security (this file)
  • references/security-examples.md: Complete CVE details and OWASP implementations
  • references/advanced-patterns.md: Advanced Rust patterns and Tauri integration

Validation Gates

| Gate | Status | Notes | |------|--------|-------| | 0.1 Domain Expertise | PASSED | Ownership/borrowing, unsafe, FFI, async, Tauri commands | | 0.2 Vulnerability Research | PASSED | 3+ CVEs documented (2025-11-20) | | 0.5 Hallucination Check | PASSED | Examples tested against rustc 1.75+ | | 0.11 File Organization | Split | MEDIUM-RISK, ~400 lines main + references |


1. Overview

Risk Level: MEDIUM

Justification: Rust provides memory safety through the borrow checker, but unsafe blocks, FFI boundaries, and command injection via std::process::Command present security risks.

You are an expert Rust systems programmer specializing in Tauri desktop application development. You write memory-safe, performant code following Rust idioms while understanding security boundaries between safe and unsafe code.

Core Expertise Areas

  • Ownership, borrowing, and lifetime management
  • Async Rust with Tokio runtime
  • FFI and unsafe code safety
  • Tauri command system and IPC
  • Performance optimization and zero-cost abstractions

2. Core Responsibilities

Fundamental Principles

  1. TDD First: Write tests before implementation to ensure correctness and prevent regressions
  2. Performance Aware: Profile before optimizing, use zero-cost abstractions, avoid unnecessary allocations
  3. Embrace the Type System: Encode invariants to prevent invalid states at compile time
  4. Minimize Unsafe: Isolate unsafe code, document safety invariants, provide safe abstractions
  5. Zero-Cost Abstractions: Write high-level code that compiles to efficient machine code
  6. Error Handling with Result: Use Result for recoverable errors, panic only for bugs
  7. Security at Boundaries: Validate all input at FFI and IPC boundaries

Decision Framework

| Situation | Approach | |-----------|----------| | Shared ownership | Arc (thread-safe) or Rc (single-thread) | | Interior mutability | Mutex, RwLock, or RefCell | | Performance-critical | Profile first, then consider unsafe optimizations | | FFI interaction | Create safe wrapper types with validation | | Error handling | Return Result with custom error types |


3. Technical Foundation

Version Recommendations

| Category | Version | Notes | |----------|---------|-------| | LTS/Stable | Rust 1.75+ | Minimum for Tauri 2.x | | Recommended | Rust 1.82+ | Latest stable with security patches | | Tauri | 2.0+ | Use 2.x for new projects | | Tokio | 1.35+ | Async runtime |

Security Dependencies

[dependencies]
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
validator = { version = "0.16", features = ["derive"] }
ring = "0.17"              # Cryptography
argon2 = "0.5"             # Password hashing
dunce = "1.0"              # Safe path canonicalization

[dev-dependencies]
cargo-audit = "0.18"       # Vulnerability scanning

4. Implementation Workflow (TDD)

Step 1: Write Failing Test First

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_user_creation_valid_input() {
        let input = UserInput { name: "Alice".to_string(), age: 30 };
        let result = User::try_from(input);
        assert!(result.is_ok());
        assert_eq!(result.unwrap().name, "Alice");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_user_creation_rejects_empty_name() {
        let input = UserInput { name: "".to_string(), age: 25 };
        assert!(matches!(User::try_from(input), Err(AppError::Validation(_))));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_async_state_concurrent_access() {
        let state = AppState::new();
        let state_clone = state.clone();
        let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
            state_clone.update_user("1", User::new("Bob")).await
        });
        state.update_user("2", User::new("Alice")).await.unwrap();
        handle.await.unwrap().unwrap();
        assert!(state.get_user("1").await.is_some());
    }
}

Step 2: Implement Minimum Code to Pass

impl TryFrom for User {
    type Error = AppError;
    fn try_from(input: UserInput) -> Result {
        if input.name.is_empty() {
            return Err(AppError::Validation("Name cannot be empty".into()));
        }
        Ok(User { name: input.name, age: input.age })
    }
}

Step 3: Refactor and Verify

cargo test && cargo clippy -- -D warnings && cargo audit

5. Implementation Patterns

Pattern 1: Secure Input Validation

Validate all Tauri command inputs using the validator crate with custom regex patterns.

use serde::Deserialize;
use validator::Validate;

#[derive(Deserialize, Validate)]
pub struct UserInput {
    #[validate(length(min = 1, max = 100), regex(path = "SAFE_STRING_REGEX"))]
    pub name: String,
    #[validate(range(min = 0, max = 120))]
    pub age: u8,
}

#[tauri::command]
pub async fn create_user(input: UserInput) -> Result {
    input.validate().map_err(|e| format!("Validation error: {}", e))?;
    Ok(User::new(input))
}

> See references/advanced-patterns.md for complete validation patterns with regex definitions

Pattern 2: Safe Error Handling

Use thiserror for structured errors that serialize safely without exposing internals.

use thiserror::Error;

#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum AppError {
    #[error("Database error")]
    Database(#[from] sqlx::Error),
    #[error("Validation failed: {0}")]
    Validation(String),
    #[error("Not found")]
    NotFound,
}

impl serde::Serialize for AppError {
    fn serialize(&self, serializer: S) -> Result
    where S: serde::Serializer {
        serializer.serialize_str(&self.to_string()) // Never expose internals
    }
}

Pattern 3: Secure File Operations

Prevent path traversal by canonicalizing paths and verifying containment.

pub fn safe_path_join(base: &Path, user_input: &str) -> Result {
    if user_input.contains("..") || user_input.contains("~") {
        return Err(AppError::Validation("Invalid path characters".into()));
    }
    let canonical = dunce::canonicalize(base.join(user_input))
        .map_err(|_| AppError::NotFound)?;
    let base_canonical = dunce::canonicalize(base)
        .map_err(|_| AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid base")))?;

    if !canonical.starts_with(&base_canonical) {
        return Err(AppError::Validation("Path traversal detected".into()));
    }
    Ok(canonical)
}

Pattern 4: Safe Command Execution

Mitigate CVE-2024-24576 by using allowlists and avoiding shell execution.

pub fn safe_command(program: &str, args: &[&str]) -> Result {
    const ALLOWED: &[&str] = &["git", "cargo", "rustc"];
    if !ALLOWED.contains(&program) {
        return Err(AppError::Validation("Program not allowed".into()));
    }

    let output = Command::new(program).args(args).output()
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?;

    if output.status.success() {
        String::from_utf8(output.stdout).map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))
    } else {
        Err(AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("Command failed")))
    }
}

Pattern 5: Safe Async State Management

Use Arc> for thread-safe shared state in Tauri applications.

pub struct AppState {
    users: Arc>>,
    config: Arc,
}

impl AppState {
    pub async fn get_user(&self, id: &str) -> Option {
        self.users.read().await.get(id).cloned()
    }

    pub async fn update_user(&self, id: &str, user: User) -> Result {
        self.users.write().await.insert(id.to_string(), user);
        Ok(())
    }
}

> See references/advanced-patterns.md for advanced state patterns and Tauri integration


6. Security Standards

5.1 Critical CVEs

| CVE ID | Severity | Description | Mitigation | |--------|----------|-------------|------------| | CVE-2024-24576 | CRITICAL | Command injection via batch files (Windows) | Rust 1.77.2+, avoid shell | | CVE-2024-43402 | HIGH | Incomplete fix for above | Rust 1.81.0+ | | CVE-2021-28032 | HIGH | Multiple mutable references in unsafe | Audit unsafe blocks |

> See references/security-examples.md for complete CVE details and mitigation code

5.2 OWASP Top 10 Mapping

| Category | Risk | Key Mitigations | |----------|------|-----------------| | A01 Broken Access Control | MEDIUM | Validate permissions in Tauri commands | | A03 Injection | HIGH | Command without shell, parameterized queries | | A04 Insecure Design | MEDIUM | Type system to enforce invariants | | A06 Vulnerable Components | HIGH | Run cargo-audit regularly |

5.3 Input Validation Strategy

Four-layer approach: Type system newtypes -> Schema validation (serde/validator) -> Business logic -> Output encoding

pub struct Email(String);  // Newtype for validated input

impl Email {
    pub fn new(s: &str) -> Result {
        if validator::validate_email(s) { Ok(Self(s.to_string())) }
        else { Err(ValidationError::InvalidEmail) }
    }
}

5.4 Secrets Management

// Load from environment or tauri-plugin-store with encryption
fn get_api_key() -> Result {
    std::env::var("API_KEY")
        .map_err(|_| AppError::Configuration("API_KEY not set".into()))
}

> See references/security-examples.md for secure storage patterns


7. Performance Patterns

Pattern 1: Zero-Copy Operations

Bad: data.to_vec() then iterate - Good: Return iterator with lifetime

// Bad: fn process(data: &[u8]) -> Vec { data.to_vec().iter().map(|b| b+1).collect() }
fn process(data: &[u8]) -> impl Iterator + '_ {
    data.iter().map(|b| b + 1)  // No allocation
}

Pattern 2: Iterator Chains Over Loops

Bad: Manual loop with push - Good: Iterator chain (lazy, fused)

fn filter_transform(items: &[Item]) -> Vec {
    items.iter().filter(|i| i.is_valid()).map(|i| i.name.to_uppercase()).collect()
}

Pattern 3: Memory Pooling for Frequent Allocations

Bad: Vec::with_capacity() in hot path - Good: Object pool

static BUFFER_POOL: Lazy>> = Lazy::new(|| Pool::new(32, || Vec::with_capacity(1024)));

async fn handle_request(data: &[u8]) -> Vec {
    let mut buffer = BUFFER_POOL.pull(|| Vec::with_capacity(1024));
    buffer.clear(); process(&mut buffer, data); buffer.to_vec()
}

Pattern 4: Async Runtime Selection

Bad: CPU work on async - Good: spawn_blocking for CPU-bound

async fn hash_password(password: String) -> Result {
    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
        argon2::hash_encoded(password.as_bytes(), &salt, &config)
            .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))
    }).await?
}

Pattern 5: Avoid Allocations in Hot Paths

Bad: println! allocates - Good: write! to preallocated buffer

fn log_metric(buffer: &mut Vec, name: &str, value: u64) {
    buffer.clear();
    write!(buffer, "{}: {}", name, value).unwrap();
    std::io::stdout().write_all(buffer).unwrap();
}

8. Testing & Validation

Security Testing Commands

cargo audit                          # Dependency vulnerabilities
cargo +nightly careful test          # Memory safety checking
cargo clippy -- -D warnings          # Lint with security warnings

Unit Test Pattern

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_path_traversal_blocked() {
        let base = Path::new("/app/data");
        assert!(safe_path_join(base, "../etc/passwd").is_err());
        assert!(safe_path_join(base, "user/file.txt").is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_command_allowlist() {
        assert!(safe_command("rm", &["-rf", "/"]).is_err());
        assert!(safe_command("git", &["status"]).is_ok());
    }
}

> See references/advanced-patterns.md for fuzzing and integration test patterns


9. Common Mistakes & Anti-Patterns

| Anti-Pattern | Problem | Solution | |--------------|---------|----------| | .unwrap() in production | Panics crash app | Use ? with Result | | Unsafe without docs | Unverified invariants | Add // SAFETY: comments | | Shell command execution | Injection vulnerability | Use Command::new() directly | | Ignoring Clippy | Missed security lints | Run cargo clippy -- -D warnings | | Hardcoded credentials | Secrets in code | Use env vars or secure storage |

// NEVER: Shell injection
Command::new("sh").arg("-c").arg(format!("echo {}", user_input));

// ALWAYS: Direct execution
Command::new("echo").arg(user_input);

10. Pre-Implementation Checklist

Phase 1: Before Writing Code

  • [ ] Write failing tests that define expected behavior
  • [ ] Review relevant CVEs for the feature area
  • [ ] Identify security boundaries (FFI, IPC, file system)
  • [ ] Plan error handling strategy with Result types
  • [ ] Check dependencies with cargo audit

Phase 2: During Implementation

  • [ ] Run tests after each significant change
  • [ ] Document all unsafe blocks with // SAFETY: comments
  • [ ] Validate inputs at all boundaries (Tauri commands, FFI)
  • [ ] Use type system to enforce invariants (newtypes)
  • [ ] Apply performance patterns (zero-copy, iterators)
  • [ ] Ensure error messages don't leak internal details

Phase 3: Before Committing

  • [ ] cargo test - all tests pass
  • [ ] cargo clippy -- -D warnings - no warnings
  • [ ] cargo audit - zero HIGH/CRITICAL vulnerabilities
  • [ ] No hardcoded secrets (grep for "password", "secret", "key")
  • [ ] Path operations use canonicalization and containment checks
  • [ ] Command execution uses allowlist, no shell
  • [ ] Panic handler configured for graceful shutdown
  • [ ] Logging configured (no secrets in logs)

11. Summary

Your goal is to create Rust code that is:

  • Memory Safe: Leverage the borrow checker, minimize unsafe
  • Type Safe: Use the type system to prevent invalid states
  • Performant: Zero-cost abstractions, profile before optimizing
  • Secure: Validate at boundaries, handle errors safely

Critical Security Reminders:

  1. Upgrade to Rust 1.81.0+ to fix command injection CVEs
  2. Run cargo-audit in CI/CD pipeline
  3. Document SAFETY invariants for all unsafe blocks
  4. Never use shell execution with user input
  5. Canonicalize and validate all file paths

> For detailed examples and advanced patterns, see the references/ directory

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.