Install
$ agentstack add skill-mathews-tom-armory-dependency-audit ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
Dependency Audit
Comprehensive dependency risk assessment: license compatibility analysis, maintenance health scoring, CVE detection, bloat identification, and transitive dependency risk mapping. Produces an actionable report with prioritized remediation steps organized by urgency (security → license → maintenance → bloat).
Reference Files
| File | Contents | Load When | | ------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | | references/license-compatibility.md | License compatibility matrix, copyleft detection, commercial-safe licenses | Always | | references/health-metrics.md | Maintenance health indicators, scoring criteria, abandonment detection | Always | | references/bloat-detection.md | Identifying unused deps, duplicate functionality, heavy transitive trees | Bloat analysis requested | | references/cve-sources.md | CVE databases, advisory sources, vulnerability severity interpretation | Security audit requested |
Prerequisites
- Access to the project's dependency files (
pyproject.toml,requirements.txt,
package.json, Cargo.toml, go.mod)
- Lock file (for exact versions and transitive dependencies)
- Project license (to determine compatibility requirements)
Workflow
Phase 1: Parse Dependency Tree
- Direct dependencies — Packages explicitly declared in the project.
- Transitive dependencies — Dependencies of dependencies. Often 10-50x the
direct count.
- Version constraints — Pinned (
==1.2.3), ranged (`>=1.0, 18 months |
| Commits (90 days) | 10+ | 1-9 | 0 | | Open issues response | 8 weeks or no response | | Bus factor | 3+ maintainers | 2 | 1 | | CI status | Passing | Flaky | Failing or absent |
Phase 4: Check Security
- Known CVEs — Check against advisory databases:
- Python:
pip-audit, PyPI advisory database - Node.js:
npm audit, GitHub Advisory Database - General: NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
- Severity classification — CVSS score interpretation:
| CVSS Score | Severity | Action | | ---------- | -------- | ---------------------- | | 9.0-10.0 | Critical | Upgrade immediately | | 7.0-8.9 | High | Upgrade within days | | 4.0-6.9 | Medium | Upgrade within weeks | | 0.1-3.9 | Low | Upgrade at convenience |
- Fix availability — Is there a patched version? If not, what's the workaround?
Phase 5: Detect Bloat
- Unused dependencies — Dependencies imported nowhere in the codebase.
- Duplicate functionality — Multiple packages doing the same thing (2 HTTP clients,
2 JSON parsers).
- Heavy transitive trees — Packages that pull in dozens of sub-dependencies for
a simple feature.
- Size analysis — Large packages used for small functionality.
Phase 6: Report
Produce a prioritized report with action items.
Output Format
## Dependency Audit: {Project Name}
### Summary
| Metric | Count |
|--------|-------|
| Direct dependencies | {N} |
| Transitive dependencies | {N} |
| License issues | {N} |
| Maintenance concerns | {N} |
| Security vulnerabilities | {N} |
| Bloat candidates | {N} |
### License Compliance
| Package | Version | License | Compatible | Issue |
|---------|---------|---------|------------|-------|
| {pkg} | {ver} | MIT | Yes | None |
| {pkg} | {ver} | GPL-3.0 | No | Copyleft in proprietary project |
| {pkg} | {ver} | Unknown | Unknown | License not identifiable |
### Maintenance Health
| Package | Last Release | Commits (90d) | Maintainers | Status |
|---------|-------------|---------------|-------------|--------|
| {pkg} | {date} | {N} | {N} | {Healthy/Warning/Abandoned} |
### Security Vulnerabilities
| Package | Version | CVE | Severity | Fix Available | Fixed In |
|---------|---------|-----|----------|---------------|----------|
| {pkg} | {ver} | {CVE-ID} | {severity} | {Yes/No} | {version} |
### Bloat Analysis
| Package | Install Size | Used By | Recommendation |
|---------|-------------|---------|----------------|
| {pkg} | {size} | {usage description} | {Remove/Replace/Keep} |
### Action Items
#### Immediate (Security)
1. Upgrade {pkg} to {version} — fixes {CVE-ID} ({severity})
#### Short-term (License)
1. Review {pkg} GPL usage — may require license change or removal
#### Medium-term (Maintenance)
1. Find alternative to {pkg} — abandoned since {date}
#### Long-term (Bloat)
1. Remove {pkg} — unused in codebase
2. Replace {pkg} with lighter alternative
### Transitive Risk
- {direct-dep} depends on {transitive-dep} which has {issue}
Calibration Rules
- Production dependencies first. Dev/test dependencies have lower risk since they
don't ship to users. Audit production dependencies with higher scrutiny.
- Transitive risk is real. A direct dependency with MIT license may pull in a GPL
transitive dependency. Always check the full tree.
- Abandoned is not broken. A mature, stable library that hasn't been updated in a
year may be perfectly fine. Evaluate based on whether the library is "done" vs "neglected."
- Security is non-negotiable. Critical and High CVEs must be addressed immediately.
Medium CVEs should be tracked. Low CVEs can wait for the next dependency update cycle.
Error Handling
| Problem | Resolution | | --------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | No lock file available | Audit based on declared dependencies. Note that transitive analysis is incomplete without a lock file. | | License metadata missing | Check the package's repository for LICENSE file. Note packages where license cannot be determined. | | Package registry unavailable | Work from cached metadata and local lockfile data. | | Too many dependencies to audit manually | Prioritize: production deps first, then direct deps, then transitive deps with known issues. |
When NOT to Audit
Push back if:
- The project is a prototype that won't ship — defer audit until production decision
- The user wants dependency updates, not audit — different task (dependabot, renovate)
- The project has no dependencies (pure standard library) — nothing to audit
Rationalizations
| Rationalization | Reality | |---|---| | "It's a trusted package" | Trust is not a security model — trusted packages get compromised (event-stream, ua-parser-js, colors.js) | | "Only a minor version bump" | Minor versions can introduce vulnerabilities, change behavior, or add transitive dependencies — semver is a promise, not a guarantee | | "We don't use the vulnerable function" | Transitive dependencies might — and attack surface includes any code loaded into the process | | "The CVE is low severity" | Low severity in isolation can be critical in your context — a "low" SSRF in an internal service with cloud metadata access is critical | | "We'll update when there's a known exploit" | Known exploits mean you're already behind — patch within SLA, not after breach | | "Too many dependencies to audit" | That's the problem, not an excuse — high dependency count IS a risk finding |
Red Flags
- Auditing only direct dependencies while ignoring transitive dependency tree
- Dismissing CVEs without checking if the vulnerable code path is reachable
- No license compatibility check — GPL in a proprietary codebase is a legal finding
- Accepting "no known vulnerabilities" from a single scanner without cross-referencing
- Ignoring dependency age — unmaintained packages with no updates in 2+ years are a risk
- Skipping lockfile analysis (pinned vs. floating versions)
Verification
- [ ] Both direct and transitive dependencies scanned
- [ ] Vulnerability scanner output captured:
npm audit/pip-audit/cargo audit - [ ] Each CVE finding includes: severity, affected version range, upgrade path, reachability assessment
- [ ] License compatibility verified against project license
- [ ] Dependency age and maintenance status checked for top-level deps
- [ ] Lockfile present and version pinning verified — no floating ranges in production
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: Mathews-Tom
- Source: Mathews-Tom/armory
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://mathews-tom.github.io/armory/
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.