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SKILL verified Apache-2.0 Self-run

Kill Chain Analysis

skill-mingyiseclab-mingyi-atlas-kill-chain-analysis · by MingyiSecLab

Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-mingyiseclab-mingyi-atlas-kill-chain-analysis

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
  • ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
  • ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • ✓ Untrusted network calls
  • ✓ Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • ✓ Network access No
  • ✓ Filesystem access No
  • ✓ Shell / process execution No
  • ✓ Environment & secrets No
  • ✓ Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

✓ Security review passed
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Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

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About

Kill Chain Analysis & Attack Path Decision-Making

Decision Framework

When selecting the next action, evaluate in order:

  1. What does the OPPLAN say? — Prioritized objectives drive decisions
  2. What do findings tell us? — Previous phase results constrain options
  3. What's the risk/reward? — Lower noise approaches first
  4. What's the OPSEC impact? — Consult opsec skill before noisy actions

Findings Analysis

After Recon Phase — Selecting Attack Vectors

Read recon/ outputs and categorize:

| Finding Type | Indicates | Next Action | |-------------|-----------|-------------| | Web apps with known CVEs | Web exploitation path | exploit → web techniques | | AD services (88/389/636) | AD attack surface | exploit → AD techniques (after initial access) | | Exposed credentials (OSINT) | Credential-based access | exploit → credential stuffing/spray | | Cloud misconfigs (S3/blob) | Cloud attack path | exploit → cloud-specific techniques | | VPN/remote access services | Network perimeter entry | exploit → VPN/RDP exploitation | | Employee emails + breach data | Social engineering path | exploit → phishing (if in scope) |

Attack Vector Prioritization

Rank available vectors by:

Score = (Success Probability × Impact) / Detection Risk

1. Valid credentials from OSINT        → High prob, High impact, Low noise
2. Known web CVE (public exploit)      → High prob, Med impact, Med noise
3. AD misconfiguration (no patch)      → Med prob,  High impact, Med noise
4. Password spray against O365         → Med prob,  High impact, High noise
5. Zero-day or custom exploit          → Low prob,  High impact, Low noise

Always prefer: credentials > misconfigurations > known CVEs > brute force

After Exploitation — Deciding Post-Exploit Strategy

Once a foothold is established, analyze:

| Context | Decision | |---------|----------| | Low-privilege user on workstation | Prioritize: privesc → cred dump → lateral to server | | Service account on server | Prioritize: cred dump (may have cached admin creds) → lateral | | Domain user credentials | Prioritize: AD enumeration → Kerberoasting → DCSync path | | Local admin on single host | Prioritize: cred dump → check for cached domain creds → lateral | | Already domain admin | Prioritize: objective completion → evidence collection → reporting |

Handling Blocked Objectives

Failure Analysis Decision Tree

Objective BLOCKED
│
├── WHY did it fail?
│   ├── Defense mechanism (WAF/EDR/IDS)
│   │   → Consult defense-evasion skill → retry with evasion
│   │
│   ├── Missing prerequisite (need creds/access/info)
│   │   → Identify which prior phase provides it → re-order objectives
│   │
│   ├── Target hardened / not vulnerable
│   │   → Check findings for alternative target → redirect attack
│   │
│   └── Tool failure / environment issue
│       → Retry with different tool or approach
│
├── Is there an ALTERNATIVE path?
│   ├── YES → Craft new delegation with adjusted approach
│   └── NO  → Mark BLOCKED, document reason, proceed to next objective
│
└── Should we REVISIT later?
    ├── YES (new intel may help) → Keep status BLOCKED, note in lessons_learned.md
    └── NO (dead end) → Mark BLOCKED permanently

Common Pivots

| Original Approach | Alternative When Blocked | |-------------------|-------------------------| | SQLi on web app | SSTI, deserialization, SSRF, or move to different web app | | Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting, ADCS abuse, password spray | | LSASS dump blocked by EDR | nanodump, comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpWriteDump via syscall | | WinRM blocked | PsExec, WMI, DCOM, RDP, SMB exec | | Password spray lockout | Low-and-slow spray, single-password-multiple-users |

MITRE ATT&CK Phase Mapping

Use this to map OPPLAN objective phases to ATT&CK tactics:

| OPPLAN Phase | ATT&CK Tactic | Sub-Agent | |-------------|---------------|-----------| | Recon | TA0043 Reconnaissance | recon | | Initial Access | TA0001 Initial Access | exploit | | Execution | TA0002 Execution | exploit | | Persistence | TA0003 Persistence | postexploit | | Privilege Escalation | TA0004 Privilege Escalation | postexploit | | Defense Evasion | TA0005 Defense Evasion | exploit / postexploit | | Credential Access | TA0006 Credential Access | postexploit | | Discovery | TA0007 Discovery | recon / postexploit | | Lateral Movement | TA0008 Lateral Movement | postexploit | | Collection | TA0009 Collection | postexploit | | Exfiltration | TA0010 Exfiltration | postexploit |

Target Prioritization

When multiple targets are available, prioritize:

  1. Crown jewels — Targets explicitly named in OPPLAN objectives
  2. Domain controllers — Access = domain-wide compromise
  3. File servers — Likely contain sensitive data for objectives
  4. Admin workstations — Cached credentials for further access
  5. Application servers — May contain database credentials, API keys
  6. Standard workstations — Lower value, but may provide stepping stones

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.