Install
$ agentstack add skill-momentmaker-kaijutsu-security-and-hardening ✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
Security + Hardening
> Adapted from addyosmani/agent-skills under the MIT License. Copyright (c) Addy Osmani. Modifications by kaijutsu maintainers — composed with blunder-hunt.
A focused review pass that walks the OWASP Top 10 against a code change set. The deliverable is a list of findings, each with severity, evidence, and remediation.
When to invoke
- Before merging changes that touch auth, sessions, payment, PII, or external network calls
- After taking on a new dependency
- After a security-relevant CVE in the project's stack
- User says "security review" / "audit" / "harden"
Process
Step 1: Identify the target
- PR diff:
gh pr diff - Branch diff:
git diff main...HEAD - File set: explicit list from user
Step 2: Walk the OWASP Top 10
For each category, scan the target. Tick yes / no per finding.
| # | Category | Look for | |---|---|---| | A01 | Broken Access Control | missing authz checks, IDOR, path traversal, allowed-by-default routes | | A02 | Cryptographic Failures | hardcoded secrets, weak ciphers (MD5/SHA1), missing TLS, plaintext PII | | A03 | Injection | SQL/NoSQL/LDAP/cmd/template injection, unsanitized concat into queries / shells / templates | | A04 | Insecure Design | trust boundaries crossed without validation, ambient authority, no rate-limit on expensive ops | | A05 | Security Misconfiguration | default creds, debug endpoints exposed, verbose error pages, permissive CORS | | A06 | Vulnerable / Outdated Components | dep versions with known CVEs, deprecated transitive deps | | A07 | Identification + Auth Failures | weak session mgmt, predictable session IDs, missing rate-limit on login, missing MFA gate | | A08 | Software / Data Integrity | unsigned artifacts, supply-chain trust gaps, missing SRI for external scripts | | A09 | Logging + Monitoring Failures | no audit log on auth events, no alerting on lockouts, secrets in logs | | A10 | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | user-controlled URLs in fetch/curl, allow-list missing, internal IPs not blocked |
Step 3: Compose blunder-hunt with hostile-input lens
After the OWASP sweep, invoke blunder-hunt with the hostile-input lens specifically:
> "Find every place where untrusted data flows into a trust boundary."
This catches subclasses of injection that don't fit neatly into the table above.
Step 4: Format findings
For each finding:
[severity] :
Category:
Issue:
Evidence:
Remediation:
Severities: critical (immediate fix), high (fix this PR), medium (file an issue, fix this sprint), low (FYI).
Step 5: Output
Write to a markdown file (docs/security-reviews/YYYY-MM-DD-.md) AND post inline as PR comments if a PR is in scope (compose pr-review if installed).
Anti-rationalization table
| Excuse | Rebuttal | |---|---| | "We're not exposed to the internet" | Internal threats matter too. Compromised employee laptop / supply-chain attack surface remains. | | "The framework handles auth" | Frameworks handle SOME auth. Application-layer authz (object-level) is your job. | | "We use prepared statements everywhere" | Then prove it. One missed concat in one query is the whole compromise. | | "Our deps are pinned" | Pinning ≠ secure. Run npm audit / cargo audit / pip-audit and report. | | "It's just a small change" | Auth bypass via 3-line change is the classic story. Size doesn't predict risk. |
Hard rules
- Never approve a security review without evidence per finding. Vague "looks fine" is forbidden.
- Critical findings block merge. No "we'll fix it next PR" for critical.
- Test the proposed fix. A remediation that doesn't actually mitigate is worse than nothing — the user thinks they're protected.
- Document supply-chain decisions. When a dep gets a CVE, the decision to upgrade-now vs. defer is a
decide-worthy moment.
Composes
blunder-hunt— hostile-input lens layered onto the OWASP sweeppr-review(optional) — post findings as inline PR comments if a PR is in scopedecide(optional) — record any architectural security decisions surfaced
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: momentmaker
- Source: momentmaker/kaijutsu
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://kaijutsu.dev/
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.