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Security And Hardening

skill-momentmaker-kaijutsu-security-and-hardening · by momentmaker

OWASP-Top-10-aware security review of a diff or target file set. Use when the user says "security review", "OWASP check", "audit for vulns", "harden this", "security audit", or invokes /security. Composes blunder-hunt's hostile-input lens. Surfaces injection, auth gaps, broken access control, sensitive data exposure, and supply-chain risks.

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-momentmaker-kaijutsu-security-and-hardening

✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access Used
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

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About

Security + Hardening

> Adapted from addyosmani/agent-skills under the MIT License. Copyright (c) Addy Osmani. Modifications by kaijutsu maintainers — composed with blunder-hunt.

A focused review pass that walks the OWASP Top 10 against a code change set. The deliverable is a list of findings, each with severity, evidence, and remediation.

When to invoke

  • Before merging changes that touch auth, sessions, payment, PII, or external network calls
  • After taking on a new dependency
  • After a security-relevant CVE in the project's stack
  • User says "security review" / "audit" / "harden"

Process

Step 1: Identify the target

  • PR diff: gh pr diff
  • Branch diff: git diff main...HEAD
  • File set: explicit list from user

Step 2: Walk the OWASP Top 10

For each category, scan the target. Tick yes / no per finding.

| # | Category | Look for | |---|---|---| | A01 | Broken Access Control | missing authz checks, IDOR, path traversal, allowed-by-default routes | | A02 | Cryptographic Failures | hardcoded secrets, weak ciphers (MD5/SHA1), missing TLS, plaintext PII | | A03 | Injection | SQL/NoSQL/LDAP/cmd/template injection, unsanitized concat into queries / shells / templates | | A04 | Insecure Design | trust boundaries crossed without validation, ambient authority, no rate-limit on expensive ops | | A05 | Security Misconfiguration | default creds, debug endpoints exposed, verbose error pages, permissive CORS | | A06 | Vulnerable / Outdated Components | dep versions with known CVEs, deprecated transitive deps | | A07 | Identification + Auth Failures | weak session mgmt, predictable session IDs, missing rate-limit on login, missing MFA gate | | A08 | Software / Data Integrity | unsigned artifacts, supply-chain trust gaps, missing SRI for external scripts | | A09 | Logging + Monitoring Failures | no audit log on auth events, no alerting on lockouts, secrets in logs | | A10 | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | user-controlled URLs in fetch/curl, allow-list missing, internal IPs not blocked |

Step 3: Compose blunder-hunt with hostile-input lens

After the OWASP sweep, invoke blunder-hunt with the hostile-input lens specifically:

> "Find every place where untrusted data flows into a trust boundary."

This catches subclasses of injection that don't fit neatly into the table above.

Step 4: Format findings

For each finding:

[severity] :
Category: 
Issue: 
Evidence: 
Remediation: 

Severities: critical (immediate fix), high (fix this PR), medium (file an issue, fix this sprint), low (FYI).

Step 5: Output

Write to a markdown file (docs/security-reviews/YYYY-MM-DD-.md) AND post inline as PR comments if a PR is in scope (compose pr-review if installed).

Anti-rationalization table

| Excuse | Rebuttal | |---|---| | "We're not exposed to the internet" | Internal threats matter too. Compromised employee laptop / supply-chain attack surface remains. | | "The framework handles auth" | Frameworks handle SOME auth. Application-layer authz (object-level) is your job. | | "We use prepared statements everywhere" | Then prove it. One missed concat in one query is the whole compromise. | | "Our deps are pinned" | Pinning ≠ secure. Run npm audit / cargo audit / pip-audit and report. | | "It's just a small change" | Auth bypass via 3-line change is the classic story. Size doesn't predict risk. |

Hard rules

  • Never approve a security review without evidence per finding. Vague "looks fine" is forbidden.
  • Critical findings block merge. No "we'll fix it next PR" for critical.
  • Test the proposed fix. A remediation that doesn't actually mitigate is worse than nothing — the user thinks they're protected.
  • Document supply-chain decisions. When a dep gets a CVE, the decision to upgrade-now vs. defer is a decide-worthy moment.

Composes

  • blunder-hunt — hostile-input lens layered onto the OWASP sweep
  • pr-review (optional) — post findings as inline PR comments if a PR is in scope
  • decide (optional) — record any architectural security decisions surfaced

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.