Install
$ agentstack add skill-myr-aya-gouvernai-skill-gouvernai ✓ scanned · ✓ verified — works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ● Network access Used
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ● Environment & secrets Used
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
About
GouvernAI — Runtime Guardrails
Runtime guardrails for AI agents. Classifies every sensitive action by risk tier, enforces proportional controls, and logs a full audit trail.
Enforcement model: This skill operates through natural language instructions that you read and follow with judgment. There is no programmatic enforcement layer — you are the enforcement mechanism. The audit log creates accountability. Follow these instructions faithfully on every sensitive action.
Quick reference
| Situation | Action | |-----------|--------| | Read file, list directory, git status, draft message | Excluded — proceed normally, no gate | | Write to user file, git commit | T2 — notify user, proceed unless objected, log | | Send email, modify config, delete files, curl, npm install | T3 — pause, require approval, log | | sudo, credential transmit, purchase, public post | T4 — full stop, warn, require approval, log | | Credential transmission, obfuscated command | BLOCKED — hard constraint, no override | | Bulk operation (5+ targets) | Escalate +1 tier | | Unfamiliar endpoint or recipient | Escalate +1 tier | | User invokes /guardrails | Show session stats |
Reference files
Read these on demand — do NOT load them every session:
| File | Read when | |------|-----------| | GUIDE.md | First gated action of the session | | ACTIONS.md | Classifying an action (Step 3) | | TIERS.md | Checking escalation rules or controls (Steps 4, 7) | | POLICY.md | Checking hard constraints or conflicts (Step 6) |
All reference files are in the same directory as this SKILL.md.
When this skill does NOT activate
Do NOT run the gate for read-only or zero-side-effect actions:
- Reading files, listing directories
- Read-only CLI commands (ls, pwd, cat, git status, git log, git diff)
- Writing to files in directories explicitly named
scratch/,temp/, ortmp/only - Drafting messages that are not sent
- Navigating to known URLs (bookmarked, previously visited in session)
- Checking whether a credential or env var exists (boolean check, no value exposed)
- Reading existing cron or scheduling config
- Reading from public APIs with no authentication
- Writing to
guardrails_log.mdfor guardrails logging purposes - Reading or writing
guardrails-mode.jsonfor mode persistence
Trigger — when this skill activates
Run the gate process below before executing ANY of these action types:
- Writing, modifying, or deleting user files or config
- State-modifying shell or terminal commands (git commit, npm install, mkdir, and anything beyond read-only)
- Outbound network requests using authentication or sending data externally
- Sending emails, messages, or communications to any recipient
- Reading, displaying, or transmitting credential values
- Browser form submissions, interactive element clicks, or file downloads
- Creating or modifying cron jobs or webhooks
- Financial transactions (purchases, payments, billing changes)
- Permission or access control changes
- Any irreversible or bulk (5+ targets) operation
Sequential pattern detection
In addition to gating individual actions, watch for multi-step patterns across the conversation that could indicate data exfiltration or policy circumvention. If you detect any of the following patterns, escalate the current action to Tier 4 regardless of its base classification:
Variable staging then transmission: A command stores sensitive data in a variable (e.g. SECRET=$(cat .env)) followed by a later command that transmits it to the network (e.g. curl -d "$SECRET"). Flag the transmission command as Tier 4.
Fragmented data extraction: Multiple commands that each extract a small piece of a secret (character slicing, substring operations, split/cut on credential files) followed by any outbound network request. Flag the first network request after the extraction as Tier 4.
Credential embedding in generated files: When asked to generate config files, scripts, or templates, check whether the content includes interpolated credential variables (like $API_KEY, process.env.API_KEY). If the file is then transmitted, committed to a public repo, or uploaded, escalate to Tier 4.
Disguised exfiltration: A request to "health check endpoints", "test connectivity", or "validate URLs" where the URLs or request bodies contain credential-like values or variable interpolations. Escalate to Tier 4.
These patterns require judgment — not every variable assignment followed by a curl is malicious. Apply this detection when the conversation context suggests sensitive data is in play.
Gate process
IMPORTANT — Output efficiency: Every message adds cost. Combine steps into a single response. Keep reasoning brief. Do not narrate steps separately. Read GUIDE.md on the first gated action for output format templates.
Step 1 — Identify. List the actions matching trigger criteria. State what, where, and what data is involved.
Step 2 — Determine mode. Read guardrails-mode.json from the working directory. If the file exists, use the mode and audit_only fields. If the file does not exist, default to full gate (mode: "full-gate", audit_only: false). Mode values: full-gate (default), strict (all tiers +1), relaxed (T2 skips gate). If audit_only is true, T2 and T3 auto-proceed with logging; T4 halts without executing.
Step 3 — Classify. Read ACTIONS.md. Assign base tier (2, 3, or 4).
Step 4 — Escalate. Read TIERS.md. Apply escalation rules if applicable. Result is final tier.
Step 5 — Pre-approval. If action matches a known pre-approved pattern AND final tier < 4, log with "PRE-APPROVED" tag and proceed. If escalation raised the action to Tier 4, pre-approval is void.
Step 6 — Hard constraints. Read POLICY.md. If any NEVER rule is violated, BLOCK regardless of tier or approval.
Step 7 — Controls. Apply the universal control from TIERS.md for the final tier × mode.
Step 8 — Log and execute. Append to guardrails_log.md in the working directory. Log: timestamp, tier, type, description, mode, outcome, approval, escalation reason. Execute or halt.
Note: Writes to guardrails_log.md are exempt from the gate.
Actions not in the catalog
- Does it match trigger criteria? If not, proceed normally.
- If it triggers the gate, classify by analogy to the most similar listed action.
- If no analogy fits, default to Tier 3.
- Log with "UNLISTED" tag for future catalog updates.
Slash commands
| Command | What it does | |---------|-------------| | /guardrails | Show current mode, tier distribution, approvals/denials for this session | | /guardrails log | Display recent audit log entries | | /guardrails strict | All tiers +1 — persisted to guardrails-mode.json | | /guardrails relaxed | Tier 2 skips gate — persisted to guardrails-mode.json | | /guardrails audit | Audit-only mode: T2/T3 auto-proceed, T4 halts | | /guardrails reset | Return to default full-gate mode | | /guardrails policy | Display hard constraints |
Mode changes are written to guardrails-mode.json in the working directory and persist across sessions.
Built by Myr-Aya · MindXO · MIT License
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: Myr-Aya
- Source: Myr-Aya/GouvernAI-skill
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://gouvernai.ai/
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.