Install
$ agentstack add skill-neo4j-contrib-neo4j-skills-neo4j-security-skill ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
When to Use
- Creating, altering, suspending, or dropping users
- Creating roles, granting/revoking role membership
- Granting/denying/revoking graph, database, or DBMS privileges
- Inspecting current privileges (
SHOW PRIVILEGES) - Implementing property-level access control (read/write per property)
- Setting up ABAC rules against OIDC claims
- Referencing LDAP/SSO auth provider configuration
When NOT to Use
- Writing Cypher queries against application data →
neo4j-cypher-skill - Cluster ops, backups, server config →
neo4j-cli-tools-skill - Driver connection setup →
neo4j-driver-*-skill
MCP Write Gate — MANDATORY
Before executing ANY of the following, show the planned command and wait for explicit confirmation:
CREATE USER/ALTER USER/DROP USERCREATE ROLE/DROP ROLEGRANT/DENY/REVOKE(any privilege)CREATE AUTH RULE/DROP AUTH RULE
Never auto-execute privilege changes. Show exact Cypher, annotate impact, get "yes".
Execution Context
All security Cypher runs against the system database:
// Neo4j auto-routes CREATE/ALTER/SHOW USER|ROLE|PRIVILEGE to system
// If using cypher-shell: cypher-shell -d system
// If using driver: use database="system"
1. User Management
Create user
CREATE USER alice SET PASSWORD 'secret' CHANGE NOT REQUIRED;
// CHANGE REQUIRED (default): forces password change on first login
// CHANGE NOT REQUIRED: password valid immediately
// SET STATUS ACTIVE (default) | SUSPENDED
Parameterised password (preferred in scripts)
CREATE USER $username SET PASSWORD $password CHANGE NOT REQUIRED;
Alter user
ALTER USER alice SET PASSWORD $newPw CHANGE NOT REQUIRED;
ALTER USER alice SET STATUS SUSPENDED; // lock account
ALTER USER alice SET STATUS ACTIVE; // unlock
ALTER USER alice SET HOME DATABASE mydb; // default db on connect
ALTER USER alice IF EXISTS SET PASSWORD $pw; // safe if missing
Show users
SHOW USERS YIELD username, roles, passwordChangeRequired, suspended, homeDatabase
WHERE suspended = false
RETURN username, roles ORDER BY username;
Drop user
DROP USER alice IF EXISTS;
2. Role Management
Create / drop role
CREATE ROLE analyst;
CREATE ROLE analyst IF NOT EXISTS;
DROP ROLE analyst IF EXISTS;
Assign / remove roles
GRANT ROLE analyst TO alice;
GRANT ROLE analyst, writer TO alice, bob; // bulk
REVOKE ROLE analyst FROM alice;
Inspect roles
SHOW ROLES YIELD role, member ORDER BY role;
SHOW ROLE analyst PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDS; // returns runnable GRANT commands
SHOW POPULATED ROLES YIELD role; // only roles with members
3. Privilege Decision Table
| Goal | Command | |---|---| | Allow db connection | GRANT ACCESS ON DATABASE mydb TO analyst | | Read all graph data | GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO analyst | | Read specific label | GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst | | Read specific rel type | GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb RELATIONSHIPS KNOWS TO analyst | | Read one property | GRANT READ {email} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst | | Traverse but hide properties | GRANT TRAVERSE ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst | | Write (create/set) | GRANT WRITE ON GRAPH mydb TO writer | | Create nodes only | GRANT CREATE ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO writer | | Delete nodes only | GRANT DELETE ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO writer | | Execute procedure | GRANT EXECUTE PROCEDURE apoc.* TO analyst | | Execute function | GRANT EXECUTE USER DEFINED FUNCTION apoc.* TO analyst | | All on one db | GRANT ALL ON DATABASE mydb TO dba | | Full DBMS admin | GRANT ALL ON DBMS TO dba | | Manage users | GRANT USER MANAGEMENT ON DBMS TO secadmin | | Manage roles | GRANT ROLE MANAGEMENT ON DBMS TO secadmin | | Schema changes | GRANT CREATE ELEMENT TYPES ON DATABASE mydb TO schemaadmin |
DENY overrides GRANT
// Analyst can read Person but NOT the ssn property
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;
DENY READ {ssn} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;
REVOKE removes a specific grant or deny
REVOKE GRANT READ {email} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person FROM analyst;
REVOKE DENY READ {ssn} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person FROM analyst;
REVOKE MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person FROM analyst; // removes both grant+deny
4. Common Role Patterns
Read-only analyst
CREATE ROLE analyst IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ACCESS ON DATABASE mydb TO analyst;
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO analyst;
GRANT EXECUTE PROCEDURE apoc.* TO analyst;
Write role (no admin)
CREATE ROLE writer IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ACCESS ON DATABASE mydb TO writer;
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO writer;
GRANT WRITE ON GRAPH mydb TO writer;
Read-only on specific labels only
CREATE ROLE limited_reader IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ACCESS ON DATABASE mydb TO limited_reader;
GRANT TRAVERSE ON GRAPH mydb ELEMENTS * TO limited_reader; // can traverse
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO limited_reader; // Person props visible
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Company TO limited_reader; // Company props visible
// Other labels: traversable but properties invisible
DBA role (full admin)
CREATE ROLE dba IF NOT EXISTS;
GRANT ALL ON DBMS TO dba;
GRANT ALL ON DATABASE * TO dba;
5. Property-Level Access Control (Enterprise)
Restrict read access to individual properties:
// Grant read on all Person props, then deny sensitive ones
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;
DENY READ {ssn, dateOfBirth} ON GRAPH mydb NODES Person TO analyst;
Property-based pattern matching (sub-graph access):
// Only see Person nodes where classification = 'public'
GRANT MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb
FOR (n:Person) WHERE n.classification = 'public'
TO analyst;
// Block access to classified nodes
DENY MATCH {*} ON GRAPH mydb
FOR (n) WHERE n.classification <> 'UNCLASSIFIED'
TO regularUsers;
Constraints:
FORpattern applies to read privileges only — not write- Each property-based privilege restricted by a single property
- Performance overhead scales with number of rules;
TRAVERSErules cost more thanREAD - Ensure the property used for rules cannot be modified by the restricted role
6. ABAC — Attribute-Based Access Control (Enterprise + OIDC)
ABAC grants roles dynamically from JWT/OIDC claims rather than explicit GRANT ROLE ... TO user.
Prerequisites
# neo4j.conf
dbms.security.abac.authorization_providers=
Create auth rule
CREATE AUTH RULE salesRule
SET CONDITION abac.oidc.user_attribute('department') = 'sales';
GRANT ROLE analyst TO AUTH RULE salesRule;
Compound conditions
CREATE OR REPLACE AUTH RULE seniorRule
SET CONDITION abac.oidc.user_attribute('department') = 'engineering'
AND abac.oidc.user_attribute('level') >= 5;
GRANT ROLE senior_engineer TO AUTH RULE seniorRule;
Manage auth rules
SHOW AUTH RULES YIELD ruleName, condition, roles;
ALTER AUTH RULE salesRule SET ENABLED false; // disable without dropping
RENAME AUTH RULE salesRule TO salesDeptRule;
DROP AUTH RULE salesDeptRule;
REVOKE ROLE analyst FROM AUTH RULE salesRule;
Notes:
- Missing claims evaluate to NULL → rule condition false → role not granted
- Rules apply immediately to existing sessions when claims are already loaded
- ABAC works only with OIDC providers (not native or LDAP)
7. SHOW PRIVILEGES Patterns
// All privileges in the system
SHOW PRIVILEGES YIELD *;
// Privileges for a specific user (as runnable commands)
SHOW USER alice PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDS;
// Privileges for a specific role
SHOW ROLE analyst PRIVILEGES YIELD privilege, action, resource, graph, segment;
// Find who has access to a database
SHOW PRIVILEGES YIELD *
WHERE graph = 'mydb'
RETURN role, action, resource, segment ORDER BY role;
// Find all DENY rules
SHOW PRIVILEGES YIELD *
WHERE access = 'DENIED'
RETURN role, action, resource, segment;
8. Built-in Roles (do not drop)
| Role | Scope | |---|---| | admin | Full DBMS + all databases | | architect | Schema changes + write on all databases | | publisher | Write on all databases | | editor | Write excluding schema changes | | reader | Read-only on all databases | | public | All users implicitly; default home database access |
Assign built-in roles: GRANT ROLE reader TO alice;
9. Auth Provider Config Reference (operational — not Cypher)
Native (default)
dbms.security.auth_enabled=true
dbms.security.auth_max_failed_attempts=3 # lockout threshold
LDAP
dbms.security.auth_provider=ldap
dbms.security.ldap.host=ldap://ldap.example.com
dbms.security.ldap.authentication.mechanism=simple
dbms.security.ldap.authentication.user_dn_template=uid={0},ou=users,dc=example,dc=com
dbms.security.ldap.authorization.group_membership_attributes=memberOf
dbms.security.ldap.authorization.group_to_role_mapping=\
"cn=analysts,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com" = analyst;\
"cn=admins,ou=groups,dc=example,dc=com" = admin
OIDC / SSO (Okta, Auth0, Entra ID)
dbms.security.oidc..display_name=Okta
dbms.security.oidc..auth_flow=pkce
dbms.security.oidc..well_known_discovery_uri=https://example.okta.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
dbms.security.oidc..audience=neo4j
dbms.security.oidc..claims.username=email
dbms.security.oidc..claims.groups=groups
dbms.security.oidc..authorization.group_to_role_mapping=\
"neo4j-analysts" = analyst;\
"neo4j-admins" = admin
Config changes require server restart. Roles referenced in mappings must exist in Neo4j (native or created via Cypher).
Checklist — New Role Setup
- [ ] Determine required operations: read / write / admin
- [ ] Identify target database(s) and graph scope (all labels vs specific)
- [ ] Identify any properties that must be hidden (→ DENY READ)
- [ ] Create role:
CREATE ROLE ... IF NOT EXISTS - [ ] Grant ACCESS on database
- [ ] Grant MATCH / TRAVERSE / WRITE as needed
- [ ] Apply DENY for restricted properties
- [ ] Run
SHOW ROLE ... PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDSto verify - [ ] Assign to users:
GRANT ROLE ... TO ... - [ ] Test with
SHOW USER ... PRIVILEGES AS COMMANDS
Full privilege syntax → [references/privilege-reference.md](references/privilege-reference.md)
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: neo4j-contrib
- Source: neo4j-contrib/neo4j-skills
- License: MIT
- Homepage: https://neo4j.com/llms.txt
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.