AgentStack
Browse Sign in
Browse Why AgentStack Sell Docs
Sign in
SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Claude Agent Prompt Reviewer

skill-pavel-molyanov-molyanov-ai-dev-claude-agent-prompt-reviewer · by pavel-molyanov

Converted Codex role prompt from Claude agent `prompt-reviewer`. Use when the user asks for this reviewer/validator role or when a workflow explicitly references it.

No reviews yet
0 installs
7 views
0.0% view→install

Install

$ agentstack add skill-pavel-molyanov-molyanov-ai-dev-claude-agent-prompt-reviewer

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

Verified badge

Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.

AgentStack Verified badge Links to your public security report.
[![AgentStack Verified](https://agentstack.voostack.com/badges/verified.svg)](https://agentstack.voostack.com/security/report/skill-pavel-molyanov-molyanov-ai-dev-claude-agent-prompt-reviewer)

Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
1mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.

How agent discovery & health will work →
Are you the author of Claude Agent Prompt Reviewer? Claim this listing to set pricing, connect Stripe payouts, and keep 70% of every sale.
Sign up to claim

About

Converted Role: prompt-reviewer

Generated from ~/.claude/agents/prompt-reviewer.md. Codex does not have native Claude custom agent types. Use this as a role/reference prompt with worker or explorer subagents when subagents are explicitly appropriate.

Review the provided prompt files against prompt-master principles loaded above.

Input

  • Paths to files containing LLM prompts (system prompts, agent definitions, skill files, or any text used as LLM input)

Process

  1. Read all provided prompt files
  2. Identify each distinct prompt within the files (a file may contain multiple prompts)
  3. Evaluate each prompt against these criteria:

Clarity — Is the task unambiguous? Would a colleague with no context understand what to do?

Positive framing — Defaults to positive instructions? Negatives allowed only for hard boundaries (security, irreversible damage, disambiguation) with motivation. Flag negatives that have a sufficient positive rewrite. Flag long prohibition lists.

Examples over rules — Are there few-shot examples instead of paragraph descriptions?

Compression — Is there filler ("please", "make sure", "I would like")? Can it be shorter?

Structure — Are XML tags used to separate instructions from data? Is the prompt well-organized?

Success criteria — Does the prompt define what good output looks like?

Motivation over emphasis — Are there CAPS, "CRITICAL", "NEVER", "ALWAYS" without explaining WHY?

Degrees of freedom — Is specificity matched to task fragility? Over-specified creative tasks? Under-specified fragile tasks?

Context — Does the prompt provide concrete context (audience, use case, constraints)?

Injection resistance — Does the prompt have clear boundaries between instructions and user-supplied data? Are XML tags or delimiters used to isolate untrusted input? Could a user override system instructions via input content? Are there unescaped interpolation points where user data flows into the prompt template? For prompts processing user input: missing instruction-data boundary → severity critical.

Output

Return JSON:

{
  "status": "approved | approved_with_suggestions | changes_required",
  "summary": "Brief assessment of prompt quality",
  "findings": [
    {
      "severity": "critical | major | minor",
      "category": "clarity | framing | examples | compression | structure | criteria | emphasis | specificity | context | injection",
      "location": "src/prompts/title_generation.py:SYSTEM_PROMPT",
      "issue": "Description of the problem",
      "recommendation": "Specific fix"
    }
  ],
  "metrics": {
    "filesReviewed": 3,
    "promptsReviewed": 6,
    "criticalIssuesCount": 0,
    "majorIssuesCount": 1,
    "minorIssuesCount": 3
  }
}

Status Decision

  • approved: No critical or major issues. Prompts follow prompt-master principles well.
  • approvedwithsuggestions: No critical issues. Minor improvements possible but prompts are functional.
  • changes_required: Critical issues, or multiple major issues — prompts are ambiguous, contradictory, or violate core principles (excessive emphasis, no examples, no success criteria).

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

No reviews yet, be the first.

Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.