Engineering Security Engineer

Security Engineering Guide

Overview

This guide covers application security, infrastructure hardening, threat modeling, vulnerability management, and security operations. Use it when designing auth systems, reviewing code for security issues, setting up security scanning in CI/CD, responding to incidents, managing secrets, or ensuring compliance with security frameworks.

First 10 Minutes

• Map the attack surface before suggesting fixes: public routes, auth entrypoints, admin paths, file upload/download flows, third-party callbacks, and secrets-loading paths.
• Run the bundled scripts from the skill directory first, not the repo under review: engineering-security-engineer/scripts/scan_secrets.sh and engineering-security-engineer/scripts/audit_auth_surface.py.
• For large mobile/web repos, start with high-signal trees such as src, app, server, api, config, and scripts; only scan the full repo if needed.
• Use scripts/scan_secrets.sh first. Secret exposure changes priority immediately.
• Use scripts/audit_auth_surface.py next to inventory auth-related files and session/token patterns before reviewing login or authorization changes.
• Identify the highest-risk trust boundary in the task: browser to API, API to service, service to database, or CI to cloud.

Refuse or Escalate

• Refuse to approve security-sensitive changes that skip authorization checks, input validation, or audit logging "for later."
• Escalate immediately when the task involves credential exposure, insecure direct object access in production, or suspected compromise.
• Do not recommend weakening CSP, CORS, or cookie settings without documenting the exact breakage and the narrowest safe exception.
• Escalate if the requested solution conflicts with legal or compliance obligations already named in the system.

Threat Modeling

When to Threat Model

• Before building any new feature that handles user data, authentication, authorization, payments, or file uploads.
• When adding a new external dependency, third-party integration, or API endpoint.
• When changing data flow (new database, new cache, new queue) or access patterns.
• Quarterly review of existing threat models for systems handling PII, financial data, or health data.

STRIDE Framework

For every component in the system, evaluate:

• Spoofing: Can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user or service? Mitigation: strong authentication (MFA, mutual TLS, API keys with rotation).
• Tampering: Can data be modified in transit or at rest? Mitigation: TLS 1.2+ for transit, AES-256/KMS for rest, HMAC signatures for integrity verification.
• Repudiation: Can a user deny performing an action? Mitigation: immutable audit logs with timestamp, user ID, action, and IP. Ship to a separate log store that the application cannot modify.
• Information Disclosure: Can sensitive data leak through logs, error messages, API responses, or side channels? Mitigation: scrub PII from logs, return generic error messages to clients, use constant-time comparison for secrets.
• Denial of Service: Can the system be overwhelmed? Mitigation: rate limiting, request size limits, timeout enforcement, auto-scaling with cost caps.
• Elevation of Privilege: Can a user gain unauthorized access? Mitigation: RBAC/ABAC at every layer, principle of least privilege, input validation on all trust boundaries.

DREAD Risk Scoring

For each identified threat, score 1-10 on:

• Damage: How severe if exploited? (10 = full data breach, 1 = cosmetic issue)
• Reproducibility: How easy to reproduce? (10 = every time, 1 = requires rare conditions)
• Exploitability: How much skill/tooling needed? (10 = script kiddie, 1 = nation-state)
• Affected users: How many users impacted? (10 = all users, 1 = single user)
• Discoverability: How easy to find? (10 = publicly visible, 1 = requires insider access)

Average score determines priority: >7 = Critical (fix before release), 5-7 = High (fix within sprint), 3-5 = Medium (fix within quarter), 1k/week for JS, >500/week for Python), open CVEs (zero critical), and maintenance status (>1 active maintainer).

• Pin exact dependency versions in lock files. Use Renovate or Dependabot for automated upgrade PRs with test runs.

A07: Identification and Authentication Failures

• Require MFA for all admin accounts and for any account with access to PII or financial data.
• Issue short-lived access tokens (15 min JWT) with opaque refresh tokens stored server-side. Refresh tokens must be rotatable and revocable.
• Implement password requirements: minimum 8 characters, check against breached password lists (Have I Been Pwned API or local k-anonymity check), no maximum length less than 128 characters.
• Session management: regenerate session ID after login, set Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict on all cookies. Expire idle sessions after 30 minutes for sensitive applications.

A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures

• Verify integrity of all CI/CD artifacts: sign Docker images (cosign/Notary), verify checksums on downloaded binaries, use lock files for dependency integrity.
• Pin CI/CD action versions to SHA, not tags: uses: actions/checkout@a81bbbf not uses: actions/checkout@v4. Tags can be moved; SHAs cannot.
• Implement Subresource Integrity (SRI) for any third-party scripts loaded from CDNs.

A09: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

• Log all: authentication events (login, logout, failed attempts, MFA challenges), authorization failures (403s), input validation failures (400s), admin actions, and data access to PII.
• Never log: passwords, tokens, session IDs, full credit card numbers, or other secrets. Mask sensitive fields.
• Ship logs to a centralized, append-only system (CloudWatch, Datadog, Splunk) separate from the application. Retention: 90 days hot, 1 year cold for compliance.
• Alert on: >10 failed login attempts from same IP in 5 minutes, any admin action outside business hours, any access to bulk PII export, and 5xx error rate >1%.

A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

• Validate and allowlist all URLs provided by users. Block requests to internal IP ranges: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata).
• If the application needs to fetch external URLs, use a dedicated HTTP client with: DNS resolution restricted to public IPs, request timeout (5s), and response size limit (10MB).
• For cloud environments, disable IMDS v1 and require IMDSv2 (AWS) or equivalent. The metadata endpoint is the most common SSRF escalation vector.

Secrets Management

Rules

• Never commit secrets to source control. Use .gitignore for .env files and run git-secrets or trufflehog in CI to catch accidental commits.
• Store secrets in: HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, or Azure Key Vault. Inject at runtime via environment variables or sidecar.
• Rotate secrets on a schedule: API keys every 90 days, database passwords every 90 days, encryption keys every 365 days. Automate rotation — manual rotation gets skipped.
• If a secret is exposed (committed to git, logged, or sent to an unauthorized party): revoke immediately, rotate, audit access logs for the exposure window, and notify affected users if PII was accessible.

Secret Detection in CI

• Run trufflehog or gitleaks on every PR. Block merge on any finding.
• Scan Docker images for embedded secrets: docker history --no-trunc and check for ENV/ARG with secrets.
• Check Terraform state files for secrets: use sensitive = true for all secret variables. Store state encrypted in S3 with restricted access.

Supply Chain Security

• Use lock files (package-lock.json, poetry.lock, go.sum) and verify integrity hashes.
• Pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs, not tags. Review action source code before using.
• Run SCA (Software Composition Analysis) in CI: Snyk, Grype, or npm audit --audit-level=high. Block merges on critical/high findings.
• For Docker base images, use specific version tags (not latest), verify digests, and rebuild images monthly to pick up security patches.
• Maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for production applications. Generate with syft or trivy sbom.

API Security Decision Rules

• Authenticate every API call. Public endpoints must still have rate limiting and abuse detection.
• Use OAuth 2.0 + PKCE for user-facing APIs. Use API keys with HMAC signatures for service-to-service. Use mutual TLS for internal high-security services.
• Validate request bodies with strict schemas. Reject unknown fields (no mass assignment). Enforce maximum payload sizes.
• Return consistent error responses that do not leak implementation details. {"error": "invalid_request", "message": "Validation failed"} — never stack traces or SQL errors.
• Implement request signing for webhooks: HMAC-SHA256 with a shared secret. Include a timestamp in the signature to prevent replay attacks (reject if >5 minutes old).

Self-Verification Protocol

After implementing security controls, verify:

• Auth: Test with: no token (expect 401), expired token (expect 401), valid token wrong role (expect 403), valid token correct role (expect 200). Test every endpoint, not just the ones you changed.
• Input validation: Send OWASP test payloads to every input field: ' OR '1'='1, alert(1), ../../../etc/passwd, ; ls -la, {{7*7}}. All must be rejected or safely escaped.
• Headers: Run curl -I https://yourapp.com and verify all security headers are present with correct values.
• Secrets: Search the entire repo: git log --all -p | grep -iE '(password|secret|api.key|token).*=.*[A-Za-z0-9]{8,}'. Zero matches on real secrets.
• Dependencies: Run npm audit / pip audit / trivy image. Zero critical or high vulnerabilities.
• Logging: Perform a login, a failed login, an authorization failure, and a data access. Verify all four events appear in the log system with correct fields.
• Rate limiting: Send 200 requests to a rate-limited endpoint within 1 minute. Verify 429 responses appear at the configured threshold.

Failure Recovery

• Security vulnerability reported: Assess severity with DREAD within 1 hour. Critical (>7): patch within 24 hours, notify affected users. High (5-7): patch within 7 days. Medium (3-5): patch within 30 days. Low (<3): add to backlog.
• Secret exposed in git: Immediately: (1) rotate the secret, (2) revoke the old secret, (3) search logs for unauthorized usage during exposure window, (4) use git filter-branch or BFG to remove from history, (5) force-push. Notify affected users if data access is possible.
• DDoS detected: Enable CDN-level DDoS protection (Cloudflare Under Attack Mode, AWS Shield). Increase rate limiting thresholds. Enable geo-blocking if attack originates from a specific region. Scale up infrastructure only as a last resort — it is expensive and the attacker can scale too.
• Compromised credentials: Immediately: (1) disable the compromised account, (2) rotate all secrets the account had access to, (3) review audit logs for the account's actions during the compromise window, (4) notify the user and require password reset with MFA re-enrollment. If the compromised account is a service account, additionally check all systems it had access to for signs of lateral movement.
• Failed security scan blocking deploy: Never bypass the scan. Read the findings. If it is a true positive, fix it. If it is a false positive, add an explicit suppression with a comment explaining why and a review date (max 90 days). If the scan tool is broken, fix the tool — do not disable it.

Existing System Security Audit

When assessing the security of an existing system:

1. Map the attack surface (30 min) — List all: public endpoints, authentication mechanisms, data stores, external integrations, file upload/download capabilities, and admin interfaces.
2. Check auth (15 min) — How are tokens issued, validated, and revoked? Is MFA available? Are sessions properly managed? Test BOLA on 5 endpoints.
3. Check secrets (15 min) — Run trufflehog on the repo. Check environment variable management. Verify secrets are not in Docker images, logs, or Terraform state.
4. Check dependencies (10 min) — Run npm audit / pip audit / trivy. Count critical and high findings.
5. Check headers (5 min) — Run scripts/check_security_headers.sh on the production URL. Flag missing headers.
6. Check logging (10 min) — Are auth events logged? Are logs shipped to a centralized system? Can the application modify its own logs?
7. Check data handling (10 min) — Is PII encrypted at rest? Is all traffic over TLS? Are backups encrypted? Who has access to production data?
8. Prioritize findings — Score each finding with DREAD. Present the top 5 by risk score with specific remediation steps and effort estimates.

Deliverables

• Threat summary listing trust boundaries, likely abuse paths, and top risks by DREAD score.
• Remediation plan with priority, exploit preconditions, and owner.
• Verification checklist covering authz, secrets, headers, dependencies, and audit logs.
• If the task is incident response: timeline, containment action, rotation status, and follow-up validation steps.

Compliance Quick Reference

SOC 2

• Access control: RBAC with quarterly access reviews. Document who has access to what and why.
• Change management: All changes through version-controlled PRs with reviews. No direct production access.
• Monitoring: Centralized logging with 1-year retention. Alert on unauthorized access attempts.
• Incident response: Documented procedure, tested annually. Post-mortems for all security incidents.

GDPR

• Data inventory: Document all PII collected, where it is stored, why it is collected, and retention period.
• Consent: Collect explicit consent before processing. Make opt-out as easy as opt-in.
• Right to erasure: Implement a data deletion pipeline that removes user data from all stores (including backups within retention period).
• Data breach notification: Notify supervisory authority within 72 hours. Notify affected users "without undue delay."

HIPAA

• Encrypt all PHI at rest (AES-256) and in transit (TLS 1.2+). No exceptions.
• Access controls: minimum necessary principle. Log all access to PHI with user, timestamp, and purpose.
• Business Associate Agreements (BAAs) with all vendors that process PHI.
• Annual risk assessment and security training for all personnel with PHI access.

Scripts

scripts/check_security_headers.sh

Check HTTP security headers for a given URL. Tests for: Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Strict-Transport-Security, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy. Reports missing, misconfigured, and present headers with grades.

scripts/check_security_headers.sh https://yourapp.com
scripts/check_security_headers.sh --json https://api.yourapp.com

scripts/scan_secrets.sh

Scan a directory or git repository for accidentally committed secrets. Checks for: API keys, AWS credentials, private keys, database connection strings, JWT secrets, generic token assignments, and common credential patterns. By default it skips generated/vendor trees such as www/, platforms/, Pods/, dist/, and build/ to reduce noise.

scripts/scan_secrets.sh .
scripts/scan_secrets.sh --git-history /path/to/repo
scripts/scan_secrets.sh --format json /path/to/project

scripts/audit_auth_surface.py

Scan a repository for auth, session, token, cookie, and middleware hotspots. By default it skips generated/vendor trees such as www/, platforms/, Pods/, dist/, and build/. Use this before reviewing login flows, RBAC changes, or session security.

scripts/audit_auth_surface.py .
scripts/audit_auth_surface.py /path/to/repo --top 20

References

• [Auth Patterns](refe

…

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

• Author: PeterHdd
• Source: PeterHdd/agent-skills
• License: MIT

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.