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SKILL unreviewed MIT Self-run

Adversarial Verify

skill-ralfyishere-rules-with-receipts-adversarial-verify · by ralfyishere

Actively try to disprove or break your own answer before presenting it. Activate before finalizing any High or Critical-effort deliverable — code changes, bug diagnoses, analyses, recommendations, math, migrations, strategy memos — and whenever you notice high confidence with low verification. Trigger signals: you're about to say "this should work", "the issue is X", or present a conclusion the u…

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-ralfyishere-rules-with-receipts-adversarial-verify

Open-source listing, not yet scanned by AgentStack. Follow the source repository for install instructions.

Security review

⚠ Flagged

1 finding(s); flagged for manual review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures
  • high Possible prompt-injection directive.

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

Reliability & compatibility

Not yet reviewed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
2mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.

How agent discovery & health will work →
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About

Adversarial Verify

Purpose

Switch from author to attacker before the user does. Work that survives a genuine attempt to break it is worth presenting; work that hasn't been attacked is a hypothesis wearing a conclusion's clothes. This is a short, targeted pass — minutes, not a second project.

When to use this skill

  • Before presenting any High/Critical-tier deliverable (per effort-calibration).
  • After "finishing" a fix, when the pull toward declaring victory is strongest and scrutiny is weakest.
  • When your confidence is high but your verification count is low — that mismatch is the trigger.
  • Before recommending a decision the user will act on (architecture, purchase, strategy).

When NOT to use this skill

  • Low-tier tasks and simple factual answers — one sanity check suffices.
  • Explicitly rough drafts and brainstorms, where the user asked for volume or speed.
  • As a substitute for live-state-truth: attacking a claim in your head is weaker than running it. If a check is executable, execute it.

Operating procedure

Step 1 — Finish the draft first. Attacking while authoring produces neither good work nor good attacks.

Step 2 — Switch roles. You are now a skeptical senior reviewer whose job is to find the flaw. Assume there is one.

Step 3 — Run the attack list (pick the 3+ most relevant; don't run all mechanically):

| Attack | Question | |---|---| | Hidden assumption | What am I treating as true that I never checked? | | Edge cases | Empty input, zero, negative, huge, duplicate, concurrent, unicode, missing file, expired auth? | | Counterexample | Can I construct one input/scenario where this answer is wrong? | | Wrongness probe | "What would have to be true for this to be wrong?" — then check whether it's true | | Expert objection | What's the strongest objection a domain expert would raise? | | Alternative explanation | (For diagnoses) What else produces these exact symptoms? | | Success criteria audit | Does this actually satisfy the plan's success criteria, or something adjacent? |

Step 4 — Test the attacks for real. For each credible attack, prefer execution over reasoning: run the edge-case input, re-run the test suite, recompute the number a different way, reread the source paragraph. Reasoning-only rebuttals are the weakest form of defense.

Step 5 — Resolve. For each attack: fixed (change the work), defended (evidence that it holds — cite it), or disclosed (real limitation, stated to the user). Silence is not an option for a credible attack.

Step 6 — Stop. One pass, timeboxed. If the pass found major flaws, fix and run one more pass. Don't spiral into infinite review.

Quality bar

  • At least 3 distinct attacks were attempted on important work, and at least one was tested by execution/observation, not just thought.
  • The attacks were genuine — aimed at the weakest point, not the most defensible one.
  • Anything that survived only "it seems fine" is disclosed as unverified, not presented as solid.

Common failure modes

  • Strawman review: attacking trivial points (naming, formatting) while the load-bearing logic goes unexamined.
  • Author's immunity: running the checklist but unconsciously steering every attack toward "actually it's fine." If all attacks failed instantly, suspect the attacker.
  • Verification by re-assertion: "I checked and it's correct" with no artifact. A defense cites evidence: a command output, a test result, a quoted source.
  • Skipping the strongest attack because it's expensive to test. That's the one that matters — run it or disclose it.
  • Infinite loop: review passes forever, deliverable never ships. One pass, fix, one confirm pass, done.
  • Local verification mistaken for global completion: verifying the things you changed while never asking what your changes made stale elsewhere — sibling docs, mirrors, cross-repo claims, counts and version strings that repeat the fact you just altered. The attack that catches it: "if a stranger diffed the whole system against reality, what would disagree?" Sweep everything that RESTATES the changed fact, not just the fact (observed: a multi-repo 'everything is updated' claim survived until a detail pass found staleness in every repo). When the changed fact is a published claim, the sweep is its own skill — correction-propagation.
  • Attacking the work but not the guard: when the thing you're verifying is itself a check, detector, allowlist, sanitizer, or CI step, attack THAT — a guard that can't fail, or that a one-token variant slips past, is false assurance, not safety. The deep procedure is security-pattern-review.

Example

Draft conclusion: "The memory leak is in the image cache; fix: clear it on navigation."

Attack run: Alternative explanation — do event listeners also accumulate? (Checked heap snapshot: yes, listener count grows too → conclusion incomplete, fixed.) Counterexample — does memory grow even with image cache disabled? (Ran it: grows slower but still grows → confirms second cause, fixed.) Success criteria audit — original symptom was OOM after ~2h; does the fix hold in a 2h soak? (Too slow to run now → disclosed: "verified over 15 min; 2-hour soak still recommended.")

Works with sibling skills

  • Consumes the success criteria from plan-gate — that's the contract to audit against.
  • live-state-truth supplies the execution muscle for step 4; verification-discipline labels whatever survives as fact vs. inference.
  • In debugging-playbook, this runs at the root-cause step: attack the diagnosis before writing the fix.
  • ruthless-editor is the prose analog; run this on substance first, that on wording after.

Provenance and maintenance

Written 2026-07 as part of a portable, project-agnostic quality pack. No repo-specific claims. Re-verify by auditing recent misses: when the user found a flaw you didn't, check which attack in the table would have caught it — if none, add a new attack row; if one existed but wasn't run, the failure is in step 3 discipline, not the list.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.