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SKILL verified MIT Self-run

Mcp Server Review

skill-selic-skills-mcp-server-review · by selic

Review an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for tool-design quality: tool naming and granularity, description/annotation accuracy, input schema strictness, output token budgets, error handling, and role/permission safety. Produces a prioritized findings list, not a rewrite. Use when reviewing, auditing, or hardening an MCP server or its tool definitions. Triggers on: review my MCP server, audit…

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Install

$ agentstack add skill-selic-skills-mcp-server-review

✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.

Security review

✓ Passed

No issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →

  • Prompt-injection patterns
  • Secret / credential exfiltration
  • Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
  • Untrusted network calls
  • Known-malicious package signatures

What it can access

  • Network access No
  • Filesystem access No
  • Shell / process execution No
  • Environment & secrets No
  • Dynamic code execution No

From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.

View the full security report →

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Reliability & compatibility

Security review passed
0 installs to date
no reviews yet
2mo ago

Declared compatibility

Claude CodeClaude Desktop

Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.

Preview Execution monitoring

We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.

How agent discovery & health will work →
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About

MCP server review

You audit an MCP server the way a demanding agent-integrator would: the tools are the API the model sees, so every name, description, and schema is a prompt. Find the highest-leverage defects and report them; do not silently rewrite the server.

Scope

Locate the tool surface first: Grep for tool registration (server.tool(, registerTool, @mcp.tool, tools/list handlers) and read the tool definitions + their handlers. Note the transport (stdio / streamable HTTP) and whether there is auth/RBAC.

Review dimensions

Go through each; for every issue capture file:line → problem → concrete fix.

1. Tool granularity & surface area

  • Too many near-duplicate tools (model can't choose) vs one overloaded tool with a

mode grab-bag. Prefer a small set of sharp, task-shaped tools.

  • Missing the obvious workflow tool (e.g. a search that replaces 3 list calls).
  • Destructive and read tools not clearly separated.

2. Names

  • Verb-first, unambiguous, namespaced consistently (itglue_list_documents, not

getDocs). A name should predict the effect without reading the description.

3. Descriptions & annotations

  • The description must state what it does, when to use it, and what it returns

it is read by the model, not a human changelog.

  • readOnlyHint / destructiveHint / idempotentHint must match reality. A

destructive tool marked read-only is a safety bug.

  • Undocumented API quirks the model must know (required filters, replace-vs-merge

semantics) belong in the description.

4. Input schema strictness

  • Every param typed and constrained (enums, min/max, formats) — loose string

where an enum belongs makes the model guess.

  • Required vs optional correct; sensible defaults; pagination params present on

list tools.

  • Reject invalid input with a clear message instead of forwarding garbage upstream.

5. Output shape & token budget

  • List tools must return summary fields, not full records, and must paginate —

a single call must not blow the client's context window. Provide a get_* for the full record.

  • Return structured content where the SDK supports it, mirrored by readable text.
  • Large/binary payloads referenced, not inlined.

6. Error handling

  • Errors returned as tool results (isError text the model can read and recover

from), never thrown to crash the session.

  • Messages are actionable ("filter[x] is required") and never leak secrets — no

tokens, API keys, or full auth headers in output or logs.

7. Auth, permissions, safety

  • If tiered (read/write/destructive), disallowed tools should be invisible in

tools/list and re-checked at call time (defense in depth).

  • Rate-limit / quota behavior is surfaced, not a silent hang.
  • Secrets come from env/config, never hardcoded; logs use labels/hashes.

Output

A prioritized list, most severe first, grouped by dimension. Each finding:

[dimension] path:line
Problem: 
Fix: 

End with a 3-line summary: biggest risk, quickest win, and overall design verdict (sharp / serviceable / needs-restructure). Offer to apply the top fixes only if the user asks — review first, edit second.

Source & license

This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.

Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.

Reviews

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Versions

  • v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.