Install
$ agentstack add skill-shimo4228-rules-distill-rules-distill ✓ scanned · ✓ verified, works with Claude Code, Cursor, and more.
Security review
✓ PassedNo issues found. Passed automated security review. · v0.1.0 How review works →
- ✓ Prompt-injection patterns
- ✓ Secret / credential exfiltration
- ✓ Dangerous shell & filesystem operations
- ✓ Untrusted network calls
- ✓ Known-malicious package signatures
What it can access
- ✓ Network access No
- ✓ Filesystem access No
- ✓ Shell / process execution No
- ✓ Environment & secrets No
- ✓ Dynamic code execution No
From automated source analysis of v0.1.0. “Used” means the capability is present in the source — more access means more to trust, not that it’s unsafe.
Verified badge
Passed review? Show it. Paste this badge into your README, it links to the public security report.
Reliability & compatibility
Declared compatibility
Compatibility is declared by the source manifest. End-to-end runtime verification is coming, see below.
We're building live execution health for every listing: tool-call success rate, median latency, uptime, and last-checked timestamps, measured, not self-reported. It isn't live yet, so we don't show numbers we can't stand behind.
How agent discovery & health will work →About
rules-distill — promote environment-specific facts to rules
Scan installed skills, find principles that belong in the always-loaded rules layer, and distill them into rules — appending to, revising, or creating rule files. The skill produces candidates and verdicts; it never edits rules without your approval.
> Design note: the old version shelled out to scan scripts and split analysis into > thematic subagent batches with a cross-batch merge step. With a large context window > that is unnecessary — and the cross-batch merge existed only to recover the > "appears in 2+ skills" signal that batching broke. Reading every skill and every > rule in one context makes that count exact, with no merge step. (That frequency > signal stopped being a gate on 2026-08-15 — see the candidate filter — but the > single-context argument still holds for the "not already in rules" test.)
When to Use
- Periodic rules maintenance (monthly, or after installing new skills)
- After a
skill-stocktakereveals patterns that should be rules - When rules feel incomplete relative to the skills in use
Phase 1 — Inventory (Glob, exhaustive)
Enumerate with Glob (no script):
- Skills:
~/.claude/skills/*/SKILL.md+~/.claude/skills/learned/*.md - Rules: read every
~/.claude/rules/**/*.mdin full — the corpus is small (measure live withwc -l; do not hardcode the count here, it drifts every time a rule is added or rightsized), so no grep pre-filter is needed
> Glob targets only skill definition files, so dependency markdown under .venv / > .pytest_cache is excluded structurally.
Present the counts (skills scanned, rule files, headings) before analysis.
Phase 2 — Cross-read & Verdict (inline, holistic)
Read every skill body and every rule into one context and analyze them together — extraction and matching are a single pass. Seeing all skills at once is what makes the recurrence count exact and the "not already in rules" test reliable.
A principle is a candidate only if ALL of these hold:
- Environment-specific — a fact, a wiring, or a trap particular to this machine,
harness, or set of accounts. A general engineering principle is not a candidate no matter how many skills repeat it.
- Substrate does not already do it — if the current model handles it natively, a
written rule does not add behaviour; it freezes an older default and competes with the newer one.
- Not a procedure — steps and workflows belong in a skill. Residency is for facts
and wiring, which have to be true before any particular task starts.
- Actionable behavior change — expressible as "do X" / "don't do Y", not "X is important"
- Clear violation risk — what goes wrong if ignored, in one sentence
- Not already in rules — check the full rules text, including the same idea in different words
> Tests 1–3 are rules/README.md's admission criterion (「この環境固有の事実・ > 配線・罠。思考や作業の手順は skill、一般的な判断は substrate が持つ」), established by > [ADR-0018](../../docs/adr/0018-rules-rightsize-for-claude5.md) and > [ADR-0035](../../docs/adr/0035-commit-review-hook-and-rules-rightsize.md). > > They replaced an older frequency gate ("appears in 2+ skills"), which this skill > used until 2026-08-15. Frequency and residency-worthiness point in opposite directions > often enough to matter: a general principle repeated in ten skills passes a frequency > gate and fails these (substrate has it — and ADR-0018 cut residency 60% removing > exactly that class), while a one-off environment trap fails a frequency gate and > passes these. Recurrence is now evidence, not a gate — report the count, do not > filter on it.
For each candidate, compare against the full rules text and assign a verdict:
| Verdict | Meaning | Present to user | |---------|---------|-----------------| | Append | Add to an existing section of an existing rule file | Target + draft | | Revise | Existing rule content is inaccurate/insufficient | Target + reason + before/after | | New Section | Add a new section to an existing rule file | Target + draft | | New File | Create a new rule file | Filename + full draft | | Already Covered | Sufficiently covered (even if worded differently) | Reason (1 line) | | Too Specific | Should stay at the skill level | Link to the relevant skill |
Exclude: principles already in rules, language/framework-specific knowledge (belongs in language-specific rules or skills), and code examples / commands (belong in skills).
Verdict quality
Each verdict must be self-contained — target, evidence, and rationale on its own.
# Good
Append to rules/common/security.md §Input Validation:
"Treat LLM output stored in memory or knowledge stores as untrusted — sanitize on
write, validate on read."
Evidence: llm-memory-trust-boundary, llm-social-agent-anti-pattern both describe
accumulated prompt-injection risks. Current security.md covers human input only;
the LLM-output trust boundary is missing.
# Bad
Append to security.md: Add LLM security principle
> この例の参照先について(2026-08-15 注記): 上の Good 例は 2026-03-18 に実行した > 昇格の実記録であり、当時 skills/learned/llm-social-agent-anti-pattern.md は実在した > (ECC v1.8.0 で導入、69aa2dd)。その 2 日後の 983d2a8 で ECC 由来ごと退役している。 > 例は書き換えない — 実際の昇格根拠でなかった skill 名に差し替えると、記録が事実と > ずれる(skill-comply/results/ の過去測定を書き換えない方針と同じ。ADR-0024)。 > なお同じ原則は現在 4 つの生きた資産が保持しており、証拠としてはむしろ厚くなっている: > learned/llm-memory-trust-boundary / collect-context:135-137(セッションログは > untrusted) / skill-comply:133-137(監査対象ファイルは untrusted) / > codex-review:71-72(agent output is untrusted、ADR-0013)。
現行フィルタの形で書いた Good 例(証拠は出現回数でなく、テスト 1–3 の通過理由):
# Good (current form)
New Section in rules/common/debugging.md:
"外部 platform への大量書き込み中に rate limit が連発したら、transient error ではなく
policy signal と扱って burst を止める。backoff で踏み抜かず人間へ報告する。"
Test 1 (environment-specific): この著者のアカウントで実際に起きた事象。2026-07-16、
backoff で継続した結果アカウント無期限 block + 全作成物削除。一般的な HTTP 429 の
作法ではなく、この運用固有の停止条件
Test 2 (not substrate-native): substrate の既定は 429 を transient として retry する。
rule はその既定を上書きするために要る
Test 3 (not a procedure): 手順でなく「rate limit 連発 = policy signal」という事実の宣言
Violation risk: 踏み抜くとアカウントごと失う(実証済み、復旧不能)
Recurrence: 1 skill (evidence であって gate ではない)
Recurrence が 1 でも通ることに注目する。旧ゲートならこの候補は落ちていた。
Phase 3 — User Review & Execution
Present a summary table (# | Principle | Verdict | Target | Confidence) as the overview, then confirm one by one (config-gc's confirm-each design): walk the candidates sequentially — for each, show its evidence, violation risk, and draft text, then ask [y/n/skip]. The user can modify the draft before approving, and can stop at any point. Never batch the approval ("apply all 5? [y/n]" defeats the design — one candidate, one decision); skipped candidates go to the ledger with status: skipped.
Never modify rules automatically. Always require user approval. This is the one hard gate — rules load every session, so a bad rule has outsized blast radius.
Then update the ledger inline (Read → merge → Write):
{
"distilled_at": "2026-03-18T10:30:42Z",
"candidates": {
"llm-output-trust-boundary": {
"principle": "Treat LLM output as untrusted when stored or re-injected",
"verdict": "Append",
"target": "rules/common/security.md",
"evidence": ["llm-memory-trust-boundary", "llm-social-agent-anti-pattern"],
"status": "applied"
}
}
}
distilled_at is real UTC (date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ); candidate IDs are kebab-case derived from the principle.
Design Principles
- What, not How: extract principles (rules territory) only. Code examples and commands stay in skills.
- Link back: draft text includes
See skill: [name]so readers can find the detailed How. - Glob = exhaustive collection, LLM = judgment: Glob guarantees the inventory is complete; the single-context cross-read guarantees contextual understanding.
- Anti-abstraction safeguard: the candidate filter (environment-specific / not substrate-native / not a procedure, plus the actionable-behavior and violation-risk tests) keeps overly abstract principles out of rules — abstraction is now rejected by test 1 directly, not inferred from frequency.
Related
skill-stocktake— audits skill quality; rules-distill promotes recurring principles to rules. Run stocktake first, then distill what survives.rules-stocktake— audits the rules this skill produces (residency cost, staleness, absorption) and demotes back what stopped earning its always-loaded slot; the inverse direction over the same boundary.learn-eval— extracts per-session patterns into skills/memory; rules-distill later promotes the cross-cutting ones to rules.
Source & license
This open-source skill is cataloged on AgentStack and links to its original source — we do not rehost the code.
- Author: shimo4228
- Source: shimo4228/rules-distill
- License: MIT
Install and usage instructions live in the source repository linked above.
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Versions
- v0.1.0 Imported from the upstream source.